East Asia Books

Recent Elections and
Political Trends
in East Asia

Edited by Christian Schafferer

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Department of International Trade
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Austrian Association of East Asian Studies

Contents

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Abbreviations

CAGE	Citizens' Alliance for the 2000 General Elections
CCEJ	Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice
DJP	Democratic Justice Party
DLP	Democratic Labor Party
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Grand National Party
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KCTU	Korean Confederation of Trade Unions
KMT	Kuomintang
MDP	Millennium Democratic Party
MFLP	Mongolian Free Labor Party
MGP	Mongolian Green Party
MNDP	Mongolian National Development Party
MPRP	Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party
MSDP	Mongolian Social Democratic Party
NEC	National Election Commission (Korea)
NSO	National Statistical Office (Korea)
NKP	New Korea Party (predecessor of GNP)
NP	New Party
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PFP	People First Party
PRM	People's Republic of Mongolia
TSU	Taiwan Solidarity Union
ULD	United Liberal Democrats

Preface

The Austrian Association of East Asian Studies was founded as to support scientific studies of contemporary East Asian, to increase scholarly activities, and to stimulate the exchange of experience and knowledge about Asia.

As to achieve these objectives the association organises conferences and summer study programmes for students, and publishes books and journals. This book comprises four articles written by scholars from Europe and Asia and should help students and others interested in East Asian politics to better understand current political trends in Mongolia, South Korea, and Taiwan.

Heike Hermanns focuses on South Korea's party system, electoral processes, and the national and local elections of last few years. Christian Schafferer analyses the national and local elections held in Taiwan between 2001 and 2002. Hollis S. Liao takes a close look at the transformation of Mongolia's society. He tries to give the reader a clear picture about Mongolia's opposition parties, current political issues, and national elections. Kay Möller analyses current international and regional approaches on how to prevent possible military conflicts in East Asia and projects different scenarios of future relationships between the involved countries.

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Local and National Elections in South Korea

Heike Hermanns

In 2002, Japan and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) jointly hosted the Football World Cup. The South Korean team was one of the surprises of the event when they became the first Asian team to reach the semi-finals in the history of the competition. The successful organisation of one of the largest sports events in the world also showed how much Korea had progressed economically and politically over the last few decades of the twentieth century. This was the second major sporting event Korea had hosted; the Olympic Games were held in Seoul in 1988. When Seoul was chosen as the host city for the Olympics in 1981, South Korea was a newly industrialising economy governed by an authoritarian regime that had come to power in a military coup the previous year. By 2002, South Korea had become a democracy with regular, free elections and changes of power from ruling party to opposition. Furthermore, the country weathered a major economic crisis in 1997-98, holding on to its position among the fifteen largest economies in the world.

Since liberation from Japanese colonial rule and the division of the peninsula in 1945, South Korea underwent rapid socio-economic development but also experienced political turmoil for several decades. During the First Republic (1948-1960), President Syngman Rhee created a soft-authoritarian, anti-communist regime. After severe election rigging in 1960, student-led demonstrations forced Rhee to step down and go into exile. In the newly established Second Republic (1960-1961) Chang Myon was elected as prime minister, but factionalism and internal fighting crippled the government. Demonstrations and unrest continued on the streets.

In May 1961, a group of officers under the leadership of General Park Chung-hee decided that the nation's security was endangered by the unrest and staged a military coup. Park eventually retired from the military and, as a civilian candidate, was elected president in 1963. He then launched the export-led industrialisation strategy that saw Korea's dramatic rise to be-

come the twelfth biggest economy in the world within 30 years. In 1972, Park tightened his regime with the so-called *Yushin* ('revitalisation') Constitution, which effectively made him president for life (Fourth Republic, 1972-1979). The head of the Korean secret service assassinated Park Chung-hee in October 1979.

With the end of Park's authoritarian rule there were hopes for more democracy in South Korea. However, these were soon crushed when General Chun Doo-hwan overthrew the interim government in a two-stage coup in December 1979 and May 1980, establishing another authoritarian regime (Fifth Republic, 1981-1988). There were large-scale demonstrations against the coup in the southwestern city of Kwangju in May 1980. The uprising was brutally subdued by military force with substantial numbers of civilian casualties (between 200 acknowledged by official sources and 2000 according to opposition sources).

Under Park Chung-hee the country underwent substantial socio-economic changes: many Koreans moved from the countryside to cities for better education and employment opportunities. Smaller flats in cities undermined the traditional larger family units living together and most Koreans soon lived in nuclear families. Since the 1960s, the overall income and standard of living had increased greatly. Per capita income rose from US$ 100 in 1960 to US$ 10,000 in 1995.[1] With growing urbanisation, rising levels of education and greater availability of information, an increasing number of Koreans began to question the authoritarian rule and expressed concern about the lack of democracy in Korea. Traditionally, students and workers were the hotbed of opposition but gradually in the 1980s, new pressure groups such as environmental organisations developed and joined the increasingly vocal opposition against the authoritarian regime.

President Chun Doo-hwan (1981-1988) was an unpopular president, partly due to circumstances surrounding his coup but also because of the lack of economic growth during his tenure. In addition to internal pressures, external factors also had some influence on the situation in Korea in the 1980s. Since the mid-1970s a 'wave of democracy' (Huntington, 1991) had moved around the globe and by the mid-1980s had reached Asia's shores. In the South China Sea, another of the four 'Asian Tigers', Taiwan, had begun to introduce political changes. In the Philippines, popular protest led to the overthrow of the Marcos regime, encouraging demonstrators in Korea. The events in the Philippines also exposed a change in the attitude of the United States toward non-democratic regimes. It sent a signal to Seoul that the regime could not count on American support for prolonged military rule and a violent settlement to end the demonstrations (as in 1980). Furthermore, Seoul was to stage the Asian Games in 1986 and the Olympic Games in1988, hoping to display to the world their new economic power (following the example of the Tokyo games of 1964). The government and the opposition were aware that political instability would have had a negative impact on this image.

Given these pressures Chun initiated some measures to liberalise his regime and sanctioned a degree of political activity by opposition politicians in 1985. A new opposition party was founded only a month before the National Assembly elections in 1985. Despite this, opposition parties performed surprisingly well and gained over a third of the seats in the National Assembly. In 1986 and 1987, students and labour were the main initiators of further demonstrations for a democratic constitution. Under mounting public pressure, the government began negotiations about a new constitution following the end of Chun's term in 1988. A breakthrough came in June 1987 when Roh Tae-woo, a protégé of Chun, made a declaration accepting most of the opposition's demands. Roh called for direct, fair presidential elections, the rehabilitation of 'political criminals' (including leading dissident Kim Dae-jung), the restoration of the freedom of press, the relaxation of restrictive labour controls and respect for the autonomy of local governments and universities. Negotiations between leading opposition politicians and government representatives started again and a new constitution was agreed upon in autumn 1987 (to form the Sixth Republic, from 1988). Representatives of labour and students were, however, not included in the negotiations.

In the autumn of 1987, the opposition split into two factions, under the leadership of Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam respectively. Each of the two politicians thought it was his right to stand as opposition candidate and both eventually formed a party of their own. Due to this split, the opposition lost the election to Roh Tae-woo, the third major candidate who was elected with only 37% of the votes in December 1987. Roh was a retired general who had supported the 1980 coup. His inauguration was the first peaceful, orderly transfer of power in the Republic's history and placed Korea firmly among the new democracies of Huntington's 'third wave of democracy' (1991). Roh's government (1988-1993) was a transitional one, leading from military rule to a democratic government. Highlights of his administration were the successful Olympic Games of 1988 in Seoul, the admission of both Korean states to the United Nations in 1991 and the establishment of diplomatic relations with China, Russia and other former Communist countries.

In 1993, Kim Young-sam was inaugurated as president, the first office holder in over 30 years without military connections. During his presidency, Kim introduced measures to change the financial system to achieve more transparency and easier detection of corruption not only in the economy but also in politics and society. In order to qualify for joining the *Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development* (OECD) Kim Young-sam also initiated other economic reforms to lessen the influence of the government of economic decision-making. Moreover, Kim reduced the influence of the military on politics by abolishing an influential association of high-ranking officers. New appointments in the military leadership replaced officers associated with the previous governments of Chun and Roh.

During Kim Young-sam's presidency, Korea endured several tragedies. Hasty construction and lack of control by officials in the years of economic

boom were exposed when several buildings and bridges collapsed, killing hundreds of people. Numerous corruption scandals, including one implicating the president's son and other cabinet ministers, showed that the intimate connection between industry and government, a legacy from authoritarian days, continued to influence economic decision-making. When the Asian financial crisis reached Korea in autumn 1997, the government reacted too late and inadequately. The low point of Kim Young-sam's presidency came in November 1997 when the government had to ask the *International Monetary Fund* (IMF) for a bailout package of US\$ 57billion to avoid defaulting on foreign debts.

During the turmoil of late 1997, presidential elections were held and Kim Dae-jung, running for the fourth time, won by a small margin over the ruling party's candidate Lee Hoi-chang. Accordingly, the first transfer of power from the ruling party to the opposition took place in February 1998, showing the progress of democracy in South Korea. Although many problems remained, in particular due to the lack of institutionalisation of political parties, South Korea was often mentioned as a positive example of a democratic transition by both general observers and scholars of democratisation.[2]

During his term Kim Dae-jung concentrated his efforts on the relationship with North Korea. He pursued the so-called 'sunshine policy' of engaging North Korea in dialogue to reduce tensions on the peninsula. These efforts were rewarded with a summit meeting of the two Korean leaders, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il, in Pyongyang in June 2000. This summit was the highpoint of Kim Dae-jung's presidency. Kim's popularity in South Korea rose to over 90% and international recognition followed later that year when Kim was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. However, the lack of real progress in the North-South dialogue in the following years and North Korea's admission of the continuation of its nuclear programme in late 2002 reduced enthusiasm for the sunshine policy among Koreans. The United States also took a far more reserved position regarding engagement after the inauguration of George W. Bush in 2001. In the following year, President Bush included North Korea in his 'axis of evil' speech, denouncing North Korea for its efforts to produce and export weapons of mass destruction.

While concentrating on inter-Korean relations Kim paid less attention to domestic politics. Kim failed to pursue political reforms to rid the country of corruption and regionalism. His success in economic policies was also chequered. In 1999, the economy grew by more than 7% and Korea was the first country to recover from the Asian Crisis, repaying the IMF loan fully in 2001, earlier than scheduled. Kim's reform drive lost its momentum in the latter part of his presidency, partly because of the quick recovery but also due to resistance against reforms by large companies. Recurring financial scandals in the following years were a reminder that problems within the economic system remained unsolved. The opening of Korean markets for more foreign investment and products, as stipulated by the IMF, was faced by resistance among the population and administration. After an initial surge

at the end of the 1990s, the number of foreign companies investing in Korea levelled off.

In December 2002, Roh Moo-hyun, a former human rights lawyer, won the presidential elections on a ruling party ticket. Only 56 years old at the time of his election, Roh promised a generation change in Korean politics, which was marred by many legacies from the authoritarian past. Younger voters hoping for more radical change in the conservative establishment were Roh's main support base. During the election campaign, the presence of US troops in the country and a general feeling of anti-Americanism among the younger generation were major topics. Once elected, Roh had to balance these feelings with the security needs of South Korea.

Since the 1950s, South Korea has undergone dramatic political and socio-economic changes. The country developed from a war-torn, agricultural economy to the twelfth biggest economy in the world, from a succession of authoritarian regimes to a democracy. However, one constant remained: the national division and confrontation with North Korea. While the Cold War ended in Europe with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the stand-off continued on the Korean peninsula; a Stalinist system facing a capitalist and democratic country along the 38th parallel. The economic situation in the North deteriorated in the 1990s, when the country was stricken by natural disasters. With the demise of the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, North Korea lost its main allies and sources of support and raw materials, leading to a severe crisis in the country's industry. Regardless of these problems the North pursued a programme to develop long-range missiles and nuclear weapons. The regime regarded this as a security measure to avoid an invasion by the USA. The nuclear programme was also used as a bargaining tool for fuel, food and the delivery of a power station in 1994. In late 2002, the crisis flared up again, with the USA under George W. Bush taking a hard-line stand. The issue remained unsolved at the time of writing (November 2003). Despite all the progress made in politics and economy in South Korea, the country thus remained at the centre of international attention for reasons beyond its direct control.

The Electoral System and Elections in South Korea

In December 2002, South Korea elected a president for the sixteenth time since the Republic's establishment in 1948. It was the fourth round of presidential elections under the constitution of the Sixth Republic. This made the current constitution the most enduring Korea had up to this date. Free and relatively fair elections at the presidential, parliamentary and local level and a peaceful and orderly transfer of power have become regular occurrences in the country since 1988.

While democratic procedures seemed firmly established, maturity was lacking in other areas of democracy such as elite behaviour, confidence in

the constitution and the representativeness of the electoral system. The attitudes and behaviour of the political elite remained rooted in their experiences under authoritarian rule and showed little changes even after a decade of democracy. Political parties were short-lived, personality centred and lacked real programmes and ideological convictions, obstructing the consolidation of democracy. The electoral system and district magnitude remained objects of discussion, showing a lack of respect for the constitution. Discussions continued regarding a change in the governmental system with suggestions to change the balance of power from the presidency into the hands of a prime minister and parliament, with the president in a purely representational role.

The evolution of democracy and the electoral system in Korea are the main reasons for these shortcomings in democratic development. This chapter therefore first looks at the development of the electoral system and the frequent changes in the election rules for the three election types, presidential, parliamentary and local elections, over the last fifty years. Then, problems in the current electoral system are explored. These include a great variety in district magnitude and volatile political parties. Further intervening variables are the personalistic nature of Korean parties and the prevalence of regionalism among Korean voters and parties. The Constitutional Court made several rulings regarding seat allocation and district size that made changes in the electoral rules prior to the 2004 parliamentary elections necessary. The implementation was slow and no solution decided on six months prior to the election date. Political parties approached these changes with their own short-term advantages in mind, neglecting considerations of institutional efficiency and endurance. A later section explains in more detail the problems political parties pose for Korean democratic consolidation, followed by a description of the role of regionalism in South Korea.

The second part of the chapter deals with last rounds of elections in each of the three tiers, beginning with the National Assembly election of April 2000. The run-up to the presidential elections of December 2002 overshadowed events in the year 2002, including the local elections, therefore this chapter analyses the events leading up to the presidential elections first and then turns to the local elections of June 2002. The chapter concludes with a short summary and outlook.

Evolution of Election Rules and Systems
From the foundation of the Republic of Korea in 1948 until the beginning of the 21st century, the country experienced six republics and nine constitutional amendments. Although ruled by a succession of authoritarian regimes until 1987, there have been regular elections for the presidency and the National Assembly. These were often ineffectual and prone to vote-buying, bribery and government interference. Elections at the local level were less frequent but have become an integral a part of the Sixth Republic (1988-). Until the last 1980s, elections and electoral systems were often used to se-

cure the ruling regime's power rather than as a means of political competition. Apart from regular voting citizens had few opportunities for political participation and a democratic culture had little chance to develop. This deficit influenced the consolidation of democracy at the end of the 20th century. A historical overview of the development of democracy and elections is useful to understand this phenomenon.

Korea had very little experience with democracy until the foundation of the Republic of Korea in 1948. Traditional Korea was ruled by a royal dynasty and administered by the aristocracy, the *Yangban*. Under Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945), a limited number of Koreans were granted some rights to vote for - quite powerless - local assemblies if they paid enough taxes to qualify. Neither Koreans nor Japanese in Korea had the right to vote for the Japanese Parliament, the *Diet*. In 1948, a democratic constitution based on the American model was introduced, granting universal suffrage to Koreans over 21 years of age. In contrast to other countries, there had been hardly any struggle for electoral franchise in Korea. As a result, no culture of democracy had developed in Korea prior to 1948.[3] The majority of Koreans did not understand the concepts of democracy, political representation and participation. Given the lack of experience with democracy, the confusion and chaos in the following years was hardly surprising.

The Presidency
With the exception of the short-lived Second Republic (1960-1961) South Korea had a presidential government system. Only the First Republic (1948-1960) also provided for the position of a vice-president. Several methods of election had been used, both direct elections by the population and indirect elections either by the National Assembly or electoral colleges. The first president, Syngman Rhee, was elected by the National Assembly in 1948. A vice-president was elected separately. In 1952, however, Rhee pressured the National Assembly to change the constitution so that the president (and the vice-president) could be elected directly. In 1954, Rhee also abolished the two-term limit of the presidency to allow further terms in office. In the presidential elections of 1960, the government manipulated the results to its advantage, initiating large-scale student protests. Rhee was eventually forced to step down and go into exile. The Second Republic adopted a parliamentary constitution in which the president was a symbolic figure, elected by a bicameral National Assembly. The power in the country rested with the National Assembly and Premier Chang Myon.

After Park Chung-hee's military coup in 1961, the country was ruled by the interim 'Supreme Council for National Reconstruction' for two years. In late 1962, Park resurrected the presidency and, after resigning from the military, was elected in direct elections in 1963 and 1967. Like Rhee, Park changed the constitutional limit of two terms to stand again in the 1971 elections. Following a narrow victory over opposition candidate Kim Dae-jung in these elections, Park introduced a new constitution that provided for

indirect presidential elections by the 'National Council for Reunification'. The council was comprised of approximately 2,500 members selected by Park who then duly elected him. After Park's assassination in 1979, prime minister Choi Kyu-hah was chosen as interim president by the same method but he was soon ousted in General Chun Doo-hwan's coup. Chun himself also used the same collegial system to take over power officially in August 1980 but then introduced a new constitution for the Fifth Republic (1981-1988). Under the new rules, an enlarged 'Presidential Electoral College' with about 5,000 members elected the president for a seven-year term in 1981.

The governmental system was under discussion during the negotiations about the constitution for the Sixth Republic in 1987. Each side argued for a system that they considered more favourable for their own success. The opposition favoured a presidential system with direct elections, expecting an easy victory for their candidate. The ruling party supported a parliamentary system where coalition building would have been easier, as they feared they would gather fewer votes in the elections. The constitution eventually pre-scribed a return to direct elections and a singular five-year term for the presidency. Ten years later, the discussion about the governmental system started again when Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-pil formed a coalition for the presidential elections in 1997. They agreed that in case of a victory by Kim Dae-jung, the constitution would be changed after two years to a prime ministerial system. Although Kim Dae-jung won, these changes were not followed through. Disagreements within the coalition and a lack of the nec-essary majority in the National Assembly made change impossible. The discussions showed the lack of commitment by leading politicians to the existing constitution. In political circles the debate continued, mostly on how to improve the chances of electoral victory for certain candidates or parties.

Under the Korean constitution, most of the political power was vested in the position of the president, the executive, while the National Assembly had few powers to check the executive. The presidency was the highest prize in Korean politics and personalised political competition. In the Sixth Republic, the minimum age for the presidency stood at 40 years and the contestant had to be a resident in Korea for five consecutive years.[4] A can-didate could stand on a party ticket or as an independent. An independent candidate needed the support of 2,500 to 5,000 voters, with no more than 500 living in the same city or province. Public officials had to resign at least 90 days before the elections in order to be able to register as a candidate to avoid a collision of interests.

The National Assembly
Although over the decades, the National Assembly had been in a weak posi-tion vis-à-vis the executive and often little more than window-dressing, there have been regular parliamentary elections with a variety of electoral

systems. The first elections took place in the southern half of the peninsula in May 1948 and led to the eventual separation of the two Korean states. In 1948, 200 representatives were elected for four years by plurality in single-member districts to form the first National Assembly. The election system was modelled on that of the United States, but with only one chamber. With parties still in the process of formation and consolidation, a large number of parties were represented (17) and independents were the largest bloc in parliament (85). In the following elections of the First Republic, the number of parties decreased but the number of independents remained relatively substantial (over half in 1950, more than a third in 1954).

In the Second Republic the voting age was lowered from 21 to 20 years. The constitution provided for a bicameral National Assembly. Members of the House of Representatives were elected every four years in single-member districts. The members of the smaller House of Councillors, the 'upper chamber', were chosen by a proportional system, where Seoul and each province elected two to eight members. This experiment was short-lived, ending with the coup in 1961. In 1963, the constitution of the Third Republic (1963-1972) returned to a unicameral system. The size of the National Assembly was reduced by nearly a quarter (to 175) and one third of the seats was allocated to national district candidates according to a proportional system. The allocation system favoured the stronger parties, in particular the ruling party. In 1963 for example, the ruling party won only a third of the votes but was allotted half of the national seats and thus had a two-third majority in the Assembly. Candidates could only register by party nomination, thus eliminating independent representatives. Elections in the Third Republic were contested and the opposition managed to gain a substantial amount of seats despite government interference in the elections. In 1972, the National Assembly was dissolved and its functions taken over by an emergency cabinet for a year.

The Fourth Republic (1972-1979) only saw two rounds of elections, in 1973 and 1978. The electoral system was changed so that in each of the 73 districts two members were elected. The President appointed the last third of representatives to fill 219 seats. Due to this scheme, the government was guaranteed a majority, even when the opposition gained more votes in the elections, as in 1978. The National Assembly had little role to play but continued to be a source of opposition. After Park's assassination, a committee was set up to draft a new constitution but was cut short by another military coup under Chun Doo-hwan's leadership. In the Fifth Republic, some of the election rules were changed again. The number of seats increased by 16% to 276 and independents could stand again. In each constituency, two members were elected, and one third of the seats in the National Assembly were allocated along proportional lines.

During the negotiations about the new election system for the National Assembly in 1987 and 1988, the ruling party and one of the opposition parties favoured multi-member constituencies but another opposition party

demanded a single-member system. This system promoted parties with a strong regional bloc, an important consideration given the regional basis of Korean political parties. The other two parties eventually agreed to single-member districts. A survey found that many Koreans also preferred the latter system (Brady and Mo, 1992: 412). In the Sixth Republic, the system thus reverted to single-member constituencies. The number of legislators was reduced from 299 in 1988 to 273 in 2000. In 1988, one quarter of the seats was allocated proportionally using closed party lists (75). Their number was reduced in 1992 and again in 1996 down to 46. In order to qualify for proportional allocation a party had to gain either five direct seats or 5% of the votes nationwide. Seats were allocated in relation to the percentage of gained seats rather than votes, thus favouring the larger parties (Kim, Kim 2000: 57-58). In 1996, the proportional system was changed to provide a more equal allocation, in line with international models. The threshold was lowered to 3%. In July 2001, the Constitutional Court ruled that this system was unconstitutional, A new system will be introduced for the 2004 elections but as of November 2003 the nature of the system was still undecided.

In 1988, the government found itself for the first time in a minority position in the National Assembly, with three opposition parties comprising the majority of seats. This phenomenon of a small ruling party and large opposition was known as *yoso-yadae* in Korean. The competing executive and legislative majorities led to administrative gridlock. Only a party merger of the ruling party and two other parties led to a government majority in 1990, allowing for most government-supported legislation to pass through the National Assembly without difficulty. In 1998, President Kim Dae-jung faced a similar problem that was only solved after several months, when enough independents and members of other parties had joined the ruling party. Although the opposition *Grand National Party* (GNP) won more seats in the 2000 elections, the ruling party (*Millennium Democratic Party*, MDP) secured a majority in the parliament when it renewed its collation with the smaller *United Liberal Democrats* (ULD). Furthermore, the MDP attracted three members from other minority parties and an independent lawmaker. After by-elections in 2001, the ruling party lost the majority again, making the final years of Kim Dae-jung's presidency (1998-2003) difficult.

In the Sixth Republic, the minimum age for candidacy as representative in the National Assembly was 25. Independent candidates needed to be supported by 300-500 voters. Until 2001, contenders had to deposit a substantial amount (up 20 million won in 2000 - about US$ 19,000). The deposit was returned if candidates received a certain number of votes, obtained by dividing the total number of votes by the number of candidates. This practice had been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in July 2001, as it prevented many citizens from registering. A new system for the 2004 elections was still under discussion in November 2003. Govern-

ment officials with intentions to stand in the elections had to resign at least 90 days in advance of election day.

Local Elections

The division of Korea into several provinces began during the Choson Dynasty (1392-1910). Over the years, provinces were divided into northern and southern parts and the largest cities became separate administrative units. The administration was divided into three tiers in the municipalities and four in the provinces. The regional administration consisted of the provinces and municipalities. Below this level were cities and counties in provinces and districts in municipalities. In some counties, bigger cities were additionally divided into districts. At the lowest level were urban and rural districts, dealing with the day-to-day administration.

The First Republic provided for elected councils at the provincial level. Heads of the administration were to be appointed by the president but the Local Autonomy Act of 1949 granted the elected councils the right to dismiss them through a non-confidence vote. Due to the Korean War (1950-53) elections took place only in parts of the southern peninsula in 1952. In early 1956, prior to the next scheduled local elections, Syngman Rhee changed the regulations. Rhee introduced the direct election of administrative heads, hoping to weaken the power of the opposition politicians in the National Assembly. At the same time, the councils lost their right to remove the head of administration through a vote of non-confidence. The term for a council was shortened to three years and the number of councillors and council meetings was reduced. Two years later, in 1958, the Local Autonomy Act was changed again to quell the power of local councils where a number of opposition politicians were active. Rhee reverted to presidential appointments that replaced direct elections of administrative heads.

Following the overthrow of Rhee in 1960, the Second Republic introduced direct elections for all local heads, down to the lowest level of urban and rural neighbourhoods. Elections were held in December 1960 but within months the whole system was abolished in the aftermath of the military coup. Under the Park regime local autonomy was postponed until 'the unification of the country', as the constitution stated. In the Fifth Republic, local autonomy remained postponed until local authorities had reached some (unspecified) degree of financial self-reliance (Hinton, 1983: 203).

In 1988, a new Local Autonomy Act for the Sixth Republic was promulgated and amended several times in the following years. The Act prescribed elections at two levels of subnational administration. The higher level comprised municipalities and provinces while the lower level included counties, cities and districts. In spring 1991, elections for councils at both levels were held. In addition, the position of governor and mayor at higher level and mayor and head of county or ward also became subject to direct elections and thus accountable to the population. Elections were scheduled for 1992 but postponed for three years.[5] In June 1995, provincial and local

councils, governors, mayors and the heads of wards and counties were elected. The first term of full-fledged local government lasted for only three years until June 1998. From then on, four-year terms were scheduled, so that local elections were held within a two-year interval to National Assembly elections. Party endorsement was allowed only in elections at the higher level, while the lower level elections were to be non-partisan.

When local and regional councils were established the power structure of the National Assembly was repeated. The head of the administration (district head, mayor or governor) was in a strong position in relation to the councils, which had no possibility to remove the head. Although a decentralisation process had been taking place, local authorities remained restricted in their independence from central government. National regulations still influenced the number of personnel and the allocation of funds. Furthermore, financial provisions for many authorities were inadequate so that they depended on contributions by central government. Within this framework, councils had a limited scope to influence decision-making decisively.

Critics questioned the need for the lowest level of elections but after three rounds of elections in 2002, the rules were not changed. Local elections had yet to develop a role for themselves as independent institutions. They tended to be influenced by national politics and were regarded as a popularity test of the government, rather than as a ballot concerned with local issues and decisions. Apart from the contest for the mayoral positions in the big cities and role of provincial governor, campaigns were followed with little interest by the media and the population.

In the 2002 local elections, 16 posts at gubernatorial level and 232 at the lower level were contested, in addition to 682 council seats at the higher level and 3485 at the lower level. The number of seats in the councils has been reduced by about a quarter since 1991. Following the example of the National Assembly, the councils at gubernatorial level provided for candidates elected by proportional lists. This number was reduced over the last decade; in 2002, 73 seats were allocated by proportional lists (10.7%). The proportional seats were allocated in accordance with the percentage of the vote each of the party's candidates received. Following the above mentioned ruling of the Constitutional Court in July 2001, a new system was used for the first time in June 2002. In these elections, voters had a separate vote to voice their support for a party. The result determined the proportional allocation of local council seats among parties that won more than five percent of the total votes cast in each district. But in case a single party secured the bulk of the vote, and all other parties won less than five percent, seats were still be awarded to unsuccessful parties, regardless of their qualifications. The extra ballot brought the number of voting slips in these elections to five, confusing many voters.

Any resident over 25 could register as candidate for local elections, with the provision of a deposit that ranged between 2 million won up to 50 million won prior to 2002 (US$ 1,667-41,667). As with the parliamentary

elections, this deposit was paid back when a candidate reached a certain amount of votes, similar to National Assembly elections.[6] In higher-level elections, party members needed a letter of support from their party and letters of recommendations with a certain number of registered voters were required for independent candidates. Candidates for lower level elections also needed letters of recommendation. Again, public servants who planned on standing had to resign from their office, but with a shorter period of at least 60 days in advance of the election.

Apart from the above-mentioned elections the constitutions provided for referendums that were used on occasion, usually to seek approval of a new constitution. The constitution of the Third Republic was brought before the population and accepted in 1962. While the referendums in 1972 and 1980 with a similar topic were conducted under martial law, the 1987 referendum to approve the new constitution was held in without government interference. At local level, there was a provision for referendums to include citizens' wishes in administrative decisions.

Problems with the Current System
The role of the elections is to give expression to the intentions of voters. An election system that communicates these intentions accurately and without distortion is a vital prerequisite for a democratic system. This transmission depends on the size of the parliament, constituencies and the ballot structure. The size of the Korean National Assembly fluctuated from 175 (Third Republic) to nearly 300 (1988-1996). In 2000, the number was reduced to 273, partly reflecting the general trend of downsizing in many companies at that time. In international comparison, this is a very small number of representatives given the size of the population (see Table 1. 1).

Table 1. 1 International comparison of constituency sizes[7]

	Population	Number of representatives (lower house)	Number of voters represented by one legislator
United Kingdom	59,778,000	659	90,710
Italy	57,715,000	630	91,612
Taiwan	22,548,000	225	100,213
France	59,766,000	577	130,580
Spain	40,077,000	350	114,506
Germany	83,252,000	603	138,062
South Korea	48,324,000	273	177,010

Source: CIA World Factbook 2002, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook (July 2003), author's calculations

It is widely agreed that plurality single-member districts are one of the most disproportional election systems (Lijphart, 1999).[8] Korean National Assembly members were elected by a simple plurality, i.e. the candidate who received the most votes was elected. This disguised differences in the elector-

ate's preferences and a (sometimes large) minority might feel not represented. To overcome this problem in Korea, a certain number of seats were allocated by proportional party lists. The number of proportional seats was, however, relatively low, with one quarter of the seats being the highest number in the early days of the Sixth Republic. Furthermore, the allocation system favoured the larger parties and therefore did little to change disproportional representation. The Korean National Assembly was thus lacking in representativeness.

The malapportionment of constituencies was also a problem for fair representation. The size of each district should be determined by an equal proportion of the population in each district in relation to the total national population. The ratio of the largest district size to the average shows the representativeness and proportionality of the system. Malapportioned districts in a single-member districts lead to significantly unequal voting populations. Korea had rapidly urbanised over the last decades of the 20th century, but the electoral districts had changed little, thus leading to substantially unequal voting populations. Under authoritarian regimes, rural areas were far more likely to vote for the government while urban areas favoured the opposition. For this reason, the government used to neglect the re-zoning of constituencies (gerrymandering). In the mid-1990s, one particular constituency was more than five times the size of the national average. In the 1996 elections, over 20% of districts seats were allocated in a way violating the 'one person, one vote' rule, placing South Korea second in a comparative study about the malapportionment worldwide (Samuels and Snyder, 2001: 659; Table 1. 2).

Table 1. 2 Lower Chamber Malapportionment

	% of seats malapportioned
South Korea (1996)	20.75
Tanzania	29.19
Ecuador	20.4
France	6.95
Japan	4.62
United Kingdom	4.56
Germany	3.44
United States	1.44
Netherlands	0

Source: Data adapted from Samuels and Snyder, 2001: 661

A few weeks before the 2000 National Assembly Elections, a law was passed to reduce the number of constituencies by nearly ten percent. The changes in constituencies affected mostly rural areas where the number of voters had declined. Despite this belated and hastily designed move, the difference in district sizes remained considerable: in Seoul one legislator represented over 228,000 voters, while in Cholla-namdo it was only 165,000 (Kang, 2002: 95). Since then, the Constitutional Court ruled that this ratio

had to be reduced a maximum ratio of three times the national average. Further changes in district magnitude were discussed since 2000 but at the time of writing (November 2003) it seemed likely that another last-minute compromise would be negotiated in early 2004.

The negative effects of relatively few and disproportionate constituencies were exemplified by the differences in the percentage of a party's vote to the party's seats. This was re-enforced by the election system: a plurality system in single majority constituencies favours the strongest party. It also manufactures a majority for the strongest party. In countries with a system of proportional representation, the percentage of disproportionality was comparatively lower (Lijphart, 1999: 163). In Korea in 2000, the largest party (GNP) won 39% of the votes, but nearly 49% of the parliamentary seats while the second largest party (MDP) won 36% of the votes and 42% of the seats. Although a percentage of parliamentary seats (17%) were allocated by proportional lists, this was not enough to correct the negative influence of the election system. In addition, as mentioned before, the allocation system favoured larger parties and was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in 2001. To alleviate this problem, a new system was trialled in the local elections in the following year whereby voters had an extra, separate vote to express their preference for a party. This did not, however, address the wider problems with the election system.

International studies show that plurality systems tend to favour the evolution of two strong parties (Lijphart, 1999: 165; Duverger, 1964: 217). In single member constituencies smaller parties experience difficulties in winning seats, hence leading to a concentration in the party spectrum. In the case of the Sixth Republic of Korea, most National Assembly and presidential elections usually had three larger parties that gained a larger share of the votes and several smaller parties that competed unsuccessfully. While there were four successful parties in 1988, the number declined to three in the following parliaments. The spatial distribution of electoral support was responsible for the persistence of a smaller, third party under a plurality rule in Korea. Lacking an ideological and programmatic stance, political parties relied on regionalism as distinguishing feature during the 1990s, based on the home region of the respective party leader. Three regions formed the bases for regional parties, Honam in the southwest, Yongnam in the southeast and lastly, the Chungch'ong provinces in central Korea.

Political Parties

Political parties remained the Achilles' heel of Korean politics during the first decade of the Sixth Republic. In a democracy, political parties ideally serve as the central organisational connection between the state and society and the representation and mobilisation of citizens. Furthermore, parties play a central role on policy formulation and interest aggregation. Under the

authoritarian regimes, Korean parties had little chance to fulfil these roles. Until the 1980s, elections were semi-competitive. Opposition candidates competed in the elections but the election system was designed to provide a majority for the ruling regime, with two-member seats and the proportional allocation seats favouring the strongest party (see above). Following the establishment of the Sixth Republic, political parties showed little sign of change toward the role expected in a democratic system but continued to perpetuate the attitudes and behavioural patterns used under authoritarian rule. The political party system survived the democratic changes almost intact and remained personality-orientated, regionally based and lacking in an ideological or programmatic basis. Korean parties thus failed to fulfil their role in democratic consolidation in an appropriate manner.

The fluidity of the party system obstructed its institutionalisation. Institutionalisation has been described as the 'process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability' (Huntington, 1968: 12). In order to institutionalise, a party has to develop an identity beyond that of its leader and survive a change in leadership so that the organisation is set apart from its momentary leaders (Janda, 1980: 19). Furthermore, it needs a structure to deal with inner-party conflict.[9] Korean parties showed deficiencies in all these prerequisites throughout the history of the Republic of Korea.

When democracy was introduced to Korea in 1948, there was little experience with democratic procedures. Under Japanese rule, no political parties or groups could be formed, although some Communist groups had been formed in exile. Korea lacked the experience of party development that western democracies had gone through. Apart from school groups, there was no tradition of associations, no professional groups and no religious or class cleavages strong enough to serve as a basis for party formation, as they did in western societies. In South Korea from 1948 onwards, many parties were created around a charismatic personality to serve as their personal support base.[10] Until 2003, all ruling parties were centred on the President and did not survive the end of his rule. The MDP was the first party to survive a change in power at the presidency but factional fighting and discussion about a realignment continued over several months after the elections, partly due to President Roh Moo-hyun's weak support base within the party. In September 2003, a faction of Roh-supporters left the MDP and created their own party, the *Uridang* ('our party').

Under authoritarian rule, politics had become a zero-sum game, where the opposition faced the government as one bloc. Once this uniting factor disappeared the opposition broke up into several factions (most visibly in 1987 when both Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung stood as presidential candidates, thereby allowing Roh Tae-woo to win). The factions could easily break away from one party to form a new party or merge with another. Parties split over personalities rather than principle. This lack of coherence within parties was also an indicator for the lack of institutionalised parties in Korea (Janda, 1980: 154). Another sign of the lack of institutionalisation

was the number of independents elected to the National Assembly. From 1988 onwards, the number of independent candidates elected to the National Assembly remained stable at about ten percent, rather than showing a decrease, as could be expected in a consolidating democracy. Some of the representatives without a party membership, however, often joined a party group after the elections, usually the ruling party.[11]

During the 1990s, political parties were not consolidating at the same pace as other democratic institutions. A large number of parties have been in existence but many failed to become permanent and relevant. Between 1981 and 2002, 19 parties reached more than 3% in elections.[12] On average, the lifespan of a party in the Sixth Republic stood at just under 39 months.[13] The group of political actors remained relatively stable since parties often did not dissolve but changed their name and/or merged with other parties.[14] Both Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, for example, were members in ten or more political parties in their political careers spanning five decades. The cycle of party creations, dissolutions and realignments seemed to slow down in the late 1990s. At the time of the presidential elections in 2002, two parties had survived long enough to participate in more than one round of National Assembly and presidential elections respectively. The oldest party was Kim Jong-pil's *United Liberal Democrats* (ULD), founded in 1995. The *Grand National Party* (GNP) was formed in 1997, to mark a break from the *New Korea Party*'s (NKP) previous leader Kim Young-sam. At the time of writing in November 2003, it seemed likely that a new round of realignments would take place before the parliamentary elections in 2004, as all the parties were riddled with factional fighting.

Given the low party cohesion in Korea, election campaigns in single member constituencies tended to become personalised, with the individual being more important than party affiliation. Voters were more likely to identify with their representative rather than with a party. Korean elections were in this respect closer to American primaries than European parliamentary elections.[15] The lack of support from the party centre in terms of finance and personnel also reinforced personalised campaigns. Furthermore, media coverage neglected party platforms and concentrated on candidates' personalities and their personal programmes, reducing the role of political parties in election outcomes. This trend towards personality orientation in election decisions was confirmed by surveys among Korean voters; in 1992 for example, 42% of Koreans claimed that they chose candidates solely on basis of personal character rather than party affiliation or policy commitments (Shin, 1999: 188).

In the late 1990s, most Korean parties were mainly 'caucus parties', serving as election vehicles but being largely invisible at other times and failing to recruit active members.[16] The traditionally centralised and hierarchical structure of Korean society encouraged the development of personalised parties. Generally, personalistic leaders could contribute at the initial

stages of party formation but they seriously inhibited party institutionalisation in the longer run. The development of independent party organisations and branches was neglected, not the least because this diminished the power of the party leader. Inner-party democracy was virtually non-existent. Parties served as little more than a procedural device to formalise candidates for elections, in particular for the presidency. Party leaders exerted one-man control over party affairs and were influential in selecting candidates for the parliamentary and local elections. Local branches had little say and often saw candidates parachuted in to campaign there, using their own support teams. Places on the proportional lists in parliamentary elections were allocated by personal preference or in accordance to the donations given to the party. At the lower level of local government, candidates were required to stand without a party affiliation, further hampering the development of local party bases.

As a result of weak party structures, the existing local party branches were thus usually little more than personal support organisations for representatives. Local branches were often staffed by friends and relatives rather than party members. In times of economic hardship (as in 1997), local branches were the first to be closed when a reduction in party expenditure was needed. In 2003, a reform proposal suggested the closure of all local branches to avoid corruption. The lack of a membership base created a problem for party finances. Until the late 1980s, big conglomerates supported political parties with their 'contributions' that were often regarded as 'quasi-taxes' since non-payment would have negative effects for the respective company (see also Park, 1995: 178). The money from industry became less in the 1990s but the larger part still flowed to the ruling party. In 2000, the ruling MDP received 70% of the contributions by industry (Choi, 2002: 107). In the Sixth Republic, a government agency, Central Election Management Commission, allocated financial assistance to political parties in accordance to the number of seats in the National Assembly. This became an increasingly important source for party finance (see also Park, 1995). Lastly, parties relied on their elite members for financial contributions. The higher the rank within the party hierarchy, the higher was the expected contribution.[17]

Some parties tried to increase the input of party members in order to overcome the lack of inner-party democracy. Formal selection processes for candidates were introduced, given local chapters more influence. The ruling MDP instigated a primary-style selection process for its presidential candidate in 2002. This involved not only party members but also members of the public, thus reducing the role of rank-and-file members. In a second round of selections, as described in detail later, the party used the results of two telephone polls, rather than deciding within the party. This showed the important role that polls had come to play in Korean politics. As a result of increasing reliance on poll results, populism among politicians increased.

Regionalism

From the early days of the Republic, the ideological spectrum of Korean parties was conservative and orientated to the right. The American military government started a policy of persecuting 'communists and socialists', a policy that intensified in the First Republic, in particular after the Korean War. Even slightly 'leftist' or progressive ideas were outlawed. The National Security Law restricted the range of possible political advocacy in the name of 'national security' and was often used to subdue unwanted opposition. Due to these restrictions, an ideologically and programmatically pluralized party system did not develop in South Korea. Most parties had a conservative outlook but little more to offer in terms of political programme. The names of the numerous parties over the years usually were variations involving 'democratic', 'liberal' and 'Korea' in their name. In the Sixth Republic, more radical parties have been formed, in particular after 1998 with the abolishment of the law that banned unions from political activities. More radical parties, however, failed to gain a lager share of voters' support. In the local elections of 2002, the *Democratic Labour Party* (DLP) for the first time had an impact when it gained 8% of the national vote and came close to winning the position of mayor in the southeastern industrial city of Ulsan.[18] In times when both the number of industrial workers and the unionisation rate are falling, it remains to be seen whether the DLP can establish a permanent presence in the Korean political landscape.[19]

With little ideological diversity, parties had to rely on other identifiers and regionalism became the most observable. Regional interests became personified in charismatic leaders, although parties claimed to represent the whole country.[20] The regionalist feelings built on emotional identities, prejudice, historical grievances and uneven economic development. There have been regional differences throughout the cultural and social history of Korea but only in modern history have they played a role in politics. The division can be traced back to the era of the *Three Kingdoms* (57BC-668AD) when the kingdom of *Paekche* was established in the southeastern part and the *Shilla*-kingdom in the southwestern corner of the peninsula. This extended to the division of the Honam-area (the Cholla-provinces and Kwangju in the southwest) and the Yongnam-area (the Kyongsang-provinces, Pusan, Taegu and Ulsan in the southeast). Since the 1960s, the two regions developed along different trajectories. President Park Chung-hee showed a clear preference in terms of administrative appointments and economic development projects for his home province in the southeast, while Honam remained a largely agricultural region.[21] From 1960 to 2000, Honam lost about 12% of its population while Yongnam's population increased by nearly 63%.[22] Yongnam produced nearly 27% of the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Honam just under 10% in 2001, again showing the lower level of industrial development in the southwest.[23]

Regionalism as the focal point in elections was first used in the 1971 presidential elections when Kim Dae-jung, based in Honam, challenged President Park Chung-hee who hailed from Yongnam. Honam already had the reputation as a hotbed of opposition, exemplified by the candidacy of Kim Dae-jung. Regional conflicts were thus overshadowed by the confrontation of government and opposition. The policy of preferential treatment for Yongnam was continued in the Fifth Republic and into the Sixth Republic with the presidencies of Chun, Roh and Kim Young-sam who also hailed from Yongnam. Kim Dae-jung was the first president from Honam, bearing great expectations of his party and home region. He promised a policy of regional reconciliation and appointed more government members from his home region. While Honam saw this as a just move, many in Yongnam claimed that the government was showing regional preferences despite claiming the opposite (Korea Times, 27.09.2000). The conflict was not resolved during Kim's presidency and regionalism continued to play an important role in the next round of presidential elections in 2002.

Since 1988, political parties orientated themselves along these regional lines, with a third party representing central Korea (the Chungch'ong provinces). Voters in Seoul and the surrounding areas (Inch'on and Kyonggi Province), often recent migrants to the area, voted along the lines of their regional origin. The results of the last elections all fell into this pattern. In 2002, for example, the western half of the peninsula voted in majority for the MDP's Roh Moo-hyun while the eastern half voted for the GNP's Lee Hoi-chang (see Figure 1).

Although Yongnam's share of the population is larger than Honam's, it was not large enough to provide a locally based party a majority of votes in national elections. Voters in Seoul and Kyonggi Province usually cast the deciding votes in presidential elections since 1987. In the four rounds of presidential elections of the Sixth Republic, there were three main candidates and several outsiders. Given the higher number of candidates around 40% of the votes or even less were enough for electoral victory. Coalition agreements proved to be useful to accumulate enough votes for one candidate. Kim Young-sam was elected after his party merged with two others in 1990, resulting in a large ruling party that gave Kim electoral success. In 1997, Kim Dae-jung was victorious after forming a coalition with the conservative ULD, based in central Korea. The ULD was led by Kim Jong-pil, who was a co-conspirator of the 1961-coup and later prime minister and head of the Korean secret service under Park Chung-hee. This coalition of two former adversaries could only be explained by considerations of power and the chances of winning the elections. In the run-up to the 2002 elections, the ruling party again formed a coalition with another contender (see below) and was successful. In the National Assembly elections of 1992 and 1996, the then ruling GNP from Yongnam came close to an overall majority with over 48%. The ruling party was able to build a majority in the National Assembly by enticing independents and some opposition politicians to join

their party. In 2000, the MDP from Honam achieved a majority of seats in the National Assembly by a coalition with the ULD and in addition by attracting independents and members of other parties.

Figure 1. 1 Election Results in Yongnam and Honam, 2000-2002

NA= National Assembly elections in April 2000, local= local elections in June 2002, pres= presidential elections in December 2002.
Source: National Election Commission, www.nec.go.kr, various pages and access dates.

A majority in the National Assembly was important for the ruling party so that the executive could pass legislation and appointments easily. In the framework of the Korean constitution, the executive was endowed with far more power than the legislative, a phenomenon sometimes referred to as 'imperial presidency'. As members of the ruling party would unreservedly support legislation from the executive, a legislative majority allowed the government to pass legislation without much debate. The opposition often resorted to demonstrations outside the National Assembly to show its disapproval of policies. The deadlock was usually solved by a meeting of the president with the opposition leader.

The National Assembly had not developed a culture of negotiation and compromise necessary for a consolidated democracy. Parliamentary culture also lacked communication, co-operation and constructive engagement. Political parties tried to improve their profile by taking a clearly outlined position rather than seeking a workable compromise. In times of a *yoso-yadae* situation, the opposition used its majority to block government legislation and the appointment of important governmental positions. In 1998, it took six months before the Prime Minister was accepted by the National Assembly, while in 2002 two candidates for the Premier's post failed to be accepted in National Assembly hearings, showing the power of opposition

barriers. Under authoritarian regimes, the ruling government passed legisla-
tion several times when the opposition was absent from the National As-
sembly. Democratic presidents have also resorted to this method to pass
controversial legislation, much to the anger of the respective opposition
parties and civil groups. Kim Young-sam in January 1996 and Kim Dae-
jung in 1999 both showed their lack of respect for the National Assembly
when they resorted to this method to push through unpopular legislation.[24]

In the Sixth Republic, changes in party affiliation of representatives
were frequent occurrences and were a result of the lack of institutionalised
political parties. For the individual politician personal considerations could
be more important than party membership. A good example was Rhee In-je,
once a labour minister under Kim Young-sam and member of the NKP.
When he failed to win the party's presidential nomination race for the (by
then renamed) GNP, Rhee established a new body, the *New People's Party*,
to support his bid in the 1997 presidential election. Following his defeat,
Rhee and his party joined the new ruling party (MDP), but in December
2002 he left this party and joined forces with the ULD, based in Rhee's
home region of Chungch'ong. On occasion more than personal ambition
played a role in the change of affiliation. The methods used by parties to
entice a change to the opposite faction were sometimes controversial. The
ruling party (whether the GNP or MDP) resorted to using the threat of a
persecution by the National Election Commission (NEC) or the tax authori-
ties to ensure a change. Once the politician had changed sides, the charges
were quietly dropped (Kim, 2000: 895).

The NEC was founded in 1962 to organise and oversee electoral cam-
paigns, elections and vote counting. The NEC was an independent constitu-
tional agency with several thousand sub-national commissions. As election
legislation was tightened, the NEC played an increasingly important role in
guaranteeing free and fair elections that remained within a certain financial
framework. In order to control campaign-spending candidates had to submit
their financial details to the NEC at the time of their registration and their
expenses claims after the elections. Furthermore, the NEC also began to
disclose personal information including criminal records and tax payment
over the last three years.

Since the 1970s, elections in Korea had become very capital-intensive.
Campaign costs spiraled during the Sixth Republic, despite legislation to
limit spending. While vote buying was prevalent in the 1970s and early
1980s, in the Sixth Republic methods were somewhat subtler when votes
were attracted by free drinks, gifts or other types of entertainment. In 2000,
a widespread assumption concluded that at least 3 billion won (US$ 2.5
million) were necessary to win a seat in the National Assembly while 2
billion (US$ 1.67 million) would be insufficient to assure election victory
(Pai, 2000: 65). According to official data from the NEC, successful candi-
dates spent on average 86.6 million won (US$ 72,167).[25] In 2000, about
30% of successful candidates were suspected of election fraud but only a

small number actually lost their seats after the NEC brought their case to the courts.

Several measures were undertaken to curb the rising cost of election campaigns. This included the reduction of the campaign period to 15 days. Furthermore, a limit on the number of outdoor rallies (where attendees were often paid) was introduced and to some degree replaced by television debates. Moreover, the number of aides and volunteers and the financial retributions they received were limited, but the system remained open to fraud. In addition, TV-appearances encouraged the personalisation of the campaign, neglecting party representation over parties. This method was quite successful in presidential elections but in parliamentary elections the usefulness was restricted, as only the leaders of the big parties had a chance to participate.

Political Effects of Historical Experience

Democracies depend on widespread and continuous support from their citizens. This support is crucial for the legitimacy and effective performance of a democratic system. In Korea, the historical experience with elections and their changing rules had severe effects on the Sixth Republic. Until the 1980s, elections were largely staged to confirm the ruling regime. The government often interfered in the election process to guarantee its victory. Voters as a result were disillusioned, showed little interest in elections and did not feel that their involvement made any difference. In the Sixth Republic expectations for the new election system therefore were high, as was voter turnout. The increasing costs of election campaigns, corruption, broken promises and continued reports of election irregularities led to the disillusionment of many citizens who turned their back on politics and elections (figure 2). In some by-elections, voter turnout fell below 30%. The Korean government is planning to introduce e-voting in elections from 2005 to entice more citizens to vote, despite doubts about the security and reliability of the new technologies involved in e-voting.

In a consolidating democracy, citizens should support a democratic system not only as a theoretical construct but also a working democracy with its possible failures and shortcomings. In the *Korea Barometer* surveys, political scientist Shin Doh-Chull measured the attitudes and feelings of Koreans concerning democracy since 1988. During this period, the overall commitment to democratic ideals remained high but the number of supporters had fallen, especially since the economic crisis of 1997. While in 1996 70% of Korean considered 'democracy always preferable to any other kind of government', the number dropped steadily to 45% in 2001 (Shin et al, 2002: 17). This showed that Koreans have problems distinguishing between the legitimacy of democratic institutions from the performance of the government itself (ibid: 24).

Figure 1. 2 Voter Turnout in Elections since 1987

pres. = presidential elections, NA = National Assembly elections, local = local elections.

Under the Confucian rules of the Choson Dynasty (1392-1910), the king was a moral leader, ruling by virtue not laws. By the same token, modern Koreans expected politicians to be virtuous in their personal life and character. With politicians under scrutiny, numerous issues of contention occurred, including corruption cases, illegally acquired funds, changes in party affiliation and questions regarding dual citizenship.[26] In 2002, three quarters of Koreans saw corrupt political leaders as the top national problem, a far more important problem than moral decline and poor drinking water (38% respectively; PEW, 2002: 32). Many Koreans engage in some sort of corrupt behaviour, such as handing over envelopes with money to teachers so that their children receive proper attention and care, but they expect their leaders to act morally (Helgesen, 2002: 82). Given the frequency of scandals, trust in political institutions was low; in 1997, only 20% of Koreans trusted politicians while 47% showed little trust and 32% did not trust them at all (Shin, 2000: 8). The National Assembly did not fare much better in the same survey: 22% of Koreans had some trust in parliament, 45% expressed not much trust and 32% had no trust at all in the National Assembly (ibid).

The lack of trust in political institutions is explained by the lack of reform among the political class since the introduction of the democratic constitution in 1988. Politicians continue to adhere to informal rules established under authoritarian rules. These include the creation of parties as personal power bases and the perception of politics as a zero-sum game for power with no room for compromise. The constitution has remained open to discussion as it suits the needs of politicians, including the fundamental question of a presidential or prime ministerial governmental system. Following the long tradition started by Syngman Rhee, Korean politicians use changes in the election system mainly to their own advantage. The discus-

sion about possible changes is not led by objective criteria such as institutional efficiency and inclusiveness but by self-serving interests, i.e. politicians' and parties' chances under the new system. A typical example is the changes in the size of the National Assembly and constituency in early 2000 – both were last-minute compromises that were not thought through but needed further adjustment in the future. The same is expected to happen again in early 2004 – a hastily constructed set of laws to accommodate the rulings of the Constitutional Court with regard to electoral district size and proportional allocation but no long-term changes in the set-up of the election system.

An essential component of a democracy is a party system featuring free competition among multiple parties. Survey findings showed, however, that a substantial number of Koreans still needed to be convinced of the advantages of political competition. In 1993, just over half of the population favoured a competitive multi-party system while 15% thought no or only one party would be sufficient (Shin, 1999: 171). Due to the short lifespan of political party Koreans developed little sense of attachment to a party. At grass-root level, parties remained virtually invisible, as parties made few efforts to support the establishment of offices and branches at lower levels. The frequent name changes did not encourage party identification, so that only one in three Koreans identified with a political party in 1995 (Shin, 1995: 33). Political parties in Korea clearly had to change their behaviour to support the deepening of democracy in the country.

The importance of personalities in politics increased during the Sixth Republic. Asked about factors affecting the vote in National Assembly elections, there was a relatively even spread in 1988, with 30.2% of Koreans saying personality was important, while 31.8% put political parties first and 24.4% policies. In 2000, the importance of personality was most significant for 59.3%, but the importance of party identification and policy issues fell to 22.7% and 6.2% respectively.[27] As a candidate's personality became more important to the voters, contestants used campaigns to advertise the negative points of their opponents rather than expounding upon their own programmes and policies.

Since political parties did not fulfil their role in transmitting citizens' preferences and interests, other ways of gauging public opinion had to be found. Public opinion polls have played an increasing role since the mid-1990s. The media frequently published polls on a large variety of topics. Politicians used poll results to formulate public policy to the point where polls began to lead public opinion. In 2002, the candidate of the ruling party for the presidential elections was ultimately decided on the results of two telephone polls after a television debate. No party support was needed for this.

The increasing role of civil groups in Korean politics was another consequence of the underdeveloped functionality of political parties. Civil society in Korea underwent a dramatic change since the 1980s. During the

1970s and early 1980s, most activity was confrontational, anti-government and pro-democratisation. These groups were mostly based in the working class. With the transition to democracy, the number of civic groups increased rapidly as did their diversity and scope. Civil society groups cover all important areas of political, economic, social and cultural issues. At the same time, the middle-class began to dominate civil society. The new groups were more co-operational and aimed at reforming state policies and consolidating democracy. By 2003, there were well over 4,000 civil groups, a steep increase from 1987. The vast majority of environmental and human rights organisations were founded after 1987 (Han, 1997: 92).

The rapid quantitative expansion and qualitative transformation of civil groups was not without problems. Many groups were founded by intellectuals based in Seoul and had a small membership base. The majority of civil groups had less than 500 members, few local branches and only a small number of members of staff. Only the biggest groups made a conscious effort to establish a broad network of local branches. In the early 21st century, the combined membership in civil groups was estimated at about 1.5 million but only half of them were active duty-paying members (Moon, 2002: 493). Groups rooted in traditional values, in particular fraternal associations were popular among Koreans, with nearly two thirds being a member in one on 1994. Membership rates in modern types of civic association such as social, cultural or economic groups, however, failed to reach ten percent (Shin, 1999: 107-108). Most Koreans remained passive and left activities in social movements to a handful of campaigners. In 1997, over 80% of Koreans had never participated in voluntary services (NSO, 1997: 467). Korean citizens have not yet grasped the importance of participation in politics and society for the deepening of democracy in their country.

Given the low membership numbers the financial base of many groups tends to be weak. Membership fees covered only some of the costs running a civil group and, although many of the highly motivated and often well-educated staff work for little remuneration, most groups have to look for other sources of income, including financial contributions from businesses. Subsidies by the Korean government were introduced in 1998, but remain much lower than in other countries and reach only a limited number of organisations (Yeom, 2003: 10). In their lack of broad membership bases and financial support civil groups are actually comparable to political parties.

Given the inability of political parties to generate clean politics and a generational change civil groups intervened in the 2000 National Assembly elections and published a list of candidates who, for a variety of reasons, were considered unsuitable as representatives. The results of this intervention are described below.

The 2000 National Assembly Elections

The 2000 National Assembly elections were seen as a mid-term assessment of the Kim Dae-jung administration, its reform drive and its policies regarding North Korea. The voter turnout of 57.2%, the lowest in the history of parliamentary elections in Korea, was a sign of voter apathy and dissatisfaction with the current system, corruption, frequent scandals and inter-party-bickering. The ruling MDP suffered a setback and did not win a majority in the National Assembly. The opposition GNP gained 39% of the votes and 133 of the seats, four shy of a majority; the ruling MDP 35.9% and 115 seats. Compared to the previous parliament, both parties gained more votes, at the expense of the minor coalition partner ULD. This party only achieved 9.8% of the votes and 17 seats and performed poorly in its traditional home region of Ch'ungch'ong. The ULD thus initially failed to reach the necessary 20 seats to form a parliamentary negotiating group. Regionalism again played a major role in the elections. The GNP won all seats in Yongnam, bar one that went to an independent (64 out of 65 seats). Similarly, the GNP did not gain any seats in Honam, where the MDP gained 25 out of 29 possible seats. The four independent parliamentarians from Honam later joined the MDP.

In order to gain a majority of seats in the National Assembly, the MDP had to renew its coalition with the ULD. In addition, they enticed several independents and members of other parties to join the ruling camp. The position of the ULD was strengthened when four members of the MDP joined the ULD 'per forma' to allow the party to form a parliamentary negotiating group. In protest of these manoeuvres the GNP brought all work in the National Assembly to a standstill for four months. The ruling-party majority was lost again when the GNP was successful in several by-elections in the following year.

The election brought changes to the National Assembly; newcomers took up more than 46% of the seats, while nearly half of the incumbents who stood again lost their constituencies. The MDP brought in more new representatives than the opposition GNP. Women nearly doubled their share from three percent to 5.86% and their success rate as direct candidates increased from 9% to 15%. A small group of candidates in their thirties was successful, representing the so-called 386-generation (those in their thirties, who attended university in the 1980s and were born in the 1960s). It was hoped that they would bring a fresh approach to the National Assembly but this small group could not bring lasting changes to Korean politics within their first few years in parliament.[28] In several constituencies, the elections were a very close race; in nine cases a margin of less than 350 votes was decisive, and in a further six less than a thousand. The ruling party had tried to recruit leading members of civil groups to broaden their appeal. Kim Dae-jung appointed several leaders of civic groups as ministers and gov-

ernmental advisers. [29] While some accepted the offer, most civil groups saw this as an intrusion into their work and criticized the converts.

During the election campaign the ruling party's North Korea policy was contested. While Kim Dae-jung promoted his sunshine policy of engagement, the opposition decried it as 'sell-out' and appeasement. It promised a much harder stance towards the northern regime. Six days before the election date in April, the Korean government announced the date for a summit meeting in Pyongyang where President Kim Dae-jung was to meet the North Korean 'Dear Leader', Kim Jong-il. The opposition criticised this announcement as timed to influence the election results, claiming that the ruling party was 'abusing a national issue to better its pressing situation' (*Korea Herald*, 11 April 2000). The move was seen as an attempt to attract votes from citizens with family ties to the North. In 2003, it emerged that a group of the Hyundai conglomerate had remitted a large sum to the regime in Pyongyang prior to the announcement, a move the opposition was soon to condemn as an arrangement by the government in return for an agreement about the summit and better election results.

The most noteworthy event of the elections was, however, the increased role of civic groups in the elections. In the run-up to the elections, 475 civic groups united to observe the elections and report irregularities. This group, established in January 2000, called itself Citizens' Alliance for the 2000 General Elections' (CAGE, *Ch'ongson yondae*). Prior to the nomination sessions of the main parties, CAGE drew up a list of over 300 politicians they judged inappropriate as candidates. These politicians were considered 'tainted' because they had been in prison, convicted of offences against the election law or other criminal offences, suspected of corruption, evasion of conscription, or collaboration with previous authoritarian regimes. The most prominent name on the list was Kim Jong-pil, leader of the ULD, for his connections with the 1961 coup and the Park Chung-hee regime. This list was published on the Internet first and reproduced later in newspapers. Other civic groups also published negative lists. This negative campaign proved to be quite successful, in many cases listed individuals were not nominated. Out of the 86 candidates who stood for office despite being blacklisted, only 27 were elected. In Seoul and the surrounding area, only one candidate overcame the stigma of being blacklisted but in Yongnam voters were more forgiving and voted for these candidates despite their past. Regionalism thus limited the success of the campaign. The black list campaign was criticised for being negative rather than contributing to political change positively. Eventually, it was also declared unconstitutional by the courts. The campaign was, however, very popular among younger voters. It showed the power of civil society and its determination to reform politics, even against the will of political parties.

The 2002 Presidential Elections

The preparations for the presidential elections in December 2002 began in the previous spring with the nomination races in the large parties. The GNP held a closed party conference to select its candidate. The ruling MDP attempted to make the process more open and democratic and introduced a system comparable to primaries in the USA. In spring 2002 they invited 70.000 participants to their nomination contest. Party members made up one half of the participants while the rest were randomly selected citizens. This move showed the importance party leaders gave public opinion, giving their party members only limited influence on the results. The surprise winner was Roh Moo-hyun (56), a poor farmer's son from southeast Korea without a large support-base in the party. After teaching himself law at night to pass the bar exam, Roh gained a reputation as a liberal lawyer. He worked on human rights cases in the 1980s and served time in prison as a result of his activities. In the 2002-election campaign, Roh's main concerns were clean politics, the eradication of corruption and an end to regional rivalries. He also pledged to reduce the gap between rich and poor and increase social welfare. Roh expressed an independent view regarding Korea's relationship with the USA and favoured a 'more equal' relationship between the two countries. These promises attracted the support of younger voters who were fed up with the old-style 'money politics' that benefited mostly politicians and business and also dissatisfied with the American military presence in the country. Roh also had a younger campaign team that used television advertisements and the Internet to their advantage. Their new and fresh strategies made a special effort to reach out to the younger generation.

In April 2002, Roh's popularity rating stood at 55% but in June 2002, the MDP experienced an overwhelming defeat in both local elections and parliamentary by-elections. Many party members blamed Roh for the bad results and demanded another nomination race. Roh resisted pressure to step down but his popularity ratings continuously declined during the summer, dropping to 20%. This drop reflected the disappointment among Koreans with the ruling government that was entangled in corruption scandals. Roh's anti-American comments upset the more moderate parts of the population, fearing a withdrawal of US forces.

Roh's main challenger was Lee Hoi-chang (67). This was Lee's second attempt to win the presidential elections, after narrowly losing to Kim Dae-jung in 1997. Lee had entered politics relatively late after a career in the country's judicial service. He had a reputation of honesty and integrity with conservative values while others called him dry and boring. Lee tried to overcome his dull image by wearing more casual clothes and dyeing his hair brown. His family hailed from North Korea, so he was not directly connected to either of the two rival regions. Lee pledged clean politics and support for market economy. His campaign was not without scandals, mostly concerning his two sons who were accused of avoiding military

service by loosing weight before the necessary examination. Lee criticized Kim Dae-jung's engagement policy with North Korea harshly and promised a more hard-line course with the northern regime, closer to the policy of American President George W. Bush. He was also seen as pro-American, an issue that evolved during the election campaign when several anti-American rallies were held in Seoul. Lee was supported by the ULD, although this party had previously formed a coalition with the MDP.

A third strong contender emerged over the summer of 2002. Polls found that an independent member of the National Assembly, Chung Mong-joon, achieved higher popularity ratings than Roh. Chung (51) was the manager of *Hyundai Heavy Industries*, a son of the founder of one of the largest *chaebol* (large conglomerates) in Korea. He was also a FIFA-vice president and involved in the organisation of the Football World Cup in Korea earlier that year. The success of both the event organisation and the Korean team brought him a wave of support. Seeing Chung's popularity, members of the MDP demanded the withdrawal of Roh and the selection of Chung as the MDP candidate. This was another example of the populism driving Korean parties: Chung and Roh had rather different programmes and came from different backgrounds. While Roh came, as described, from a farming family with little formal education, Chung belonged to the clan owing one of the largest *chaebol* and held a PhD from an American university. Roh was running on a progressive reformist programme, whereas Chung was a moderate middle-of-the-roader. The only purpose they shared was their desire to beat Lee Hoi-chang and the GNP.

Rather than joining the MDP, Chung announced his own bid for presidency in September and founded a new support party, *National Alliance 21*, in November 2002. Some MDP-members joined the new party. Chung's programme remained vague, promising clean politics and national reunification. During the autumn, Chung's popularity began to wane, while Roh's increased. Again Chung's entry into the presidential race split the vote of more liberal voters, while Lee had the full support of conservative voters. This situation resembled the pattern of previous elections, where the victor had benefited from a split opposition.[30] Realising that only a joint bid would give them any chance to beat Lee, Roh and Chung agreed on a coalition in November 2002. The two candidates participated in a television debate and independent companies conducted two telephone polls. In these, Roh gathered 46.8% of the votes while Chung achieved 42.2%. Roh was thus chosen as presidential candidate, to be supported by Chung. On the day before the election, Chung suddenly withdrew his support of Roh, thus losing his influence in the future government. The *National Alliance 21* seems unlikely to survive to the next parliamentary elections in 2004.

Beside the two main candidates, there were several other minor candidates. Kwon Young Ghil was the most prominent contestant, making a second attempt after 1997. Kwon stood as a candidate of the *Democratic Labour Party* (DLP) and was well known as the leader of the *Korean Con-*

federation of Trade Unions (KCTU), a radical alliance of trade unions. In 2002, Kwon won 3.9% of the vote, an increase from 1.2% in the previous election. Former home-minister Lee Han-dong represented the small *Hanaro National Union*. Kim Young-Kyu stood for the radical *Socialist Party of Korea*. Lastly, the Buddhist monk Kim Kil-su campaigned for the *Hoguk Dang* ('Party for the Defence of the Fatherland').

Like the previous elections, the 2002 campaign was dominated by regionalism. The MDP's support basis was firmly in Honam but, by choosing a candidate from Yongnam, the party hoped to become more acceptable to voters in that area. This plan did not succeed; voters in Yongnam continued to support the GNP and shunned the MDP. Roh claimed over 90% of the votes in Kwangju and the surrounding Cholla Provinces, while Lee was supported by over two thirds of the Yongnam voters. The regionalist trend was weaker among the voters under 40 years who were more likely to vote for Roh.

During the election campaign, the presence of American troops in the country became a major issue. In a tragic accident in summer 2002, a US military vehicle killed two Korean teenagers. The Korean public was un-happy with the American response (the drivers were acquitted in a court martial) and demonstrations outside the US embassy in Seoul and military installations were staged during the autumn. Throughout his campaign Roh favoured an independent stance towards the USA but after his election Roh had to tone down his criticism given the security needs of South Korea.

After his second defeat Lee Hoi-chang retired from politics while Roh Moo-hyun had to deal with a party that was riddled by factional in-fighting. By September 2003, the MDP split in two factions and the rump-MDP distanced itself from Roh Moo-hyun. The smaller group of Roh-supporters formed a new party in November 2003, the *Uridang* ('our party'). In September 2003, a close aid to the president was involved in a corruption scandal that severely damaged Roh's credibility. His popularity dropped below 30% within six months of his presidency. Roh relied on a populist image and promised to hold a referendum to let the people decide on his fate. The constitutionality of this step was doubted, as referenda were reserved for questions of national importance, so the issue remained unresolved at the time of writing (November 2003).

The 2002 Local Elections

In June 2002, while the Football World Cup was staged in South Korea and Japan, local elections were held in South Korea. The voter turnout reached a low 46.4% as many voters preferred to watch the World Cup Football matches or use the public holiday granted for the election for leisure activities. The conservative GNP won a landslide victory by winning 11 of the 16 gubernatorial positions, including the position of mayor in Seoul. The defeat

of the ruling party was attributed to voters' disappointment with the MDP and its achievements so far. In particular, corruption scandals involving two of the President Kim Dae-jung's sons gave the party a negative image. The loss threatened the position of Roh Moo-hyun as presidential candidate for the MDP.

These events after the election showed how little the local elections were appreciated in their own right. Local issues played only a minor role in the campaign where national policies, personalities and the upcoming presidential elections played a major role. Observers accused candidates of being generally indistinguishable and of making unfeasible promises. Many candidates seemed to have spent more money than in previous years in order to attract attention (*Chosun Ilbo*, 9 June 2002). The reported instances of campaign irregularities were higher than in previous elections in 1998. Prior to the election, the NEC stated that already the number of reported vote-buying incidents was four times higher than in 1998 (*Korea Herald*, 14 June 2002). The mayor of In'chon and the governor of Jeju-do were the most high-ranking suspects accused of violating the election law (*Korea Herald*, 14 October 2002).

In the local elections, candidates used party tickets only at the regional level while at lower levels, there was no party endorsement. In the selection process, little progress was made in making the process more transparent and democratic. In the case party conventions were held, local members often only approved of lists already decided on by the leadership. Newcomers who had no support base within the organisation found it difficult to be selected. Although they paid lip service to a 30%-quota for women, both of the big parties nominated less than that and rejected two thirds of possible female candidates in the nomination process. In the elections, women candidates were successful in increasing their share of seats, from 5.9% to 9.2% in the higher councils. The majority of these women came into the councils on the proportional lists rather than directly elected seats. In the lower level councils, women increased their share from 1.6% to 2.2% of seats. At regional level, 3.8% of positions went to independent candidates.

The most interesting contest was for the position of mayor in Ulsan, an industrial town with a high percentage of workers among the voters. In surveys in the run-up to the elections the DLP candidate was in the lead but in the end he was beaten by a GNP candidate by a 10% margin (53.1% to 43.6%). The DLP had a strong showing in Ulsan, attracting over 28% of the votes. Nationwide, the DLP won over 8%. The GNP managed to win over 60% of the council seats nationwide, but the distribution represented each of the parties' regional strongholds. In the two Kyongsang provinces, Pusan, Taegu and Ulsan, the MDP was totally unsuccessful. In two Cholla Provinces and Kwangju, on the other hand, the GNP did not win any seats. The GNP also gained overwhelming majorities in Seoul, Inch'on and Kyonggi Province. In Seoul, the MDP had selected a 38 year-old candidate who had been involved in the pro-democracy movement in the 1980s, but the 61

year-old candidate of the GNP defeated the younger candidate. More than half of the chief executives—both at regional and local level—were newcomers. It remains to be seen whether these novices can bring changes to local government, as their opportunities to initiate changes remains very limited, given the prevailing influence of the central government.

Summary and Outlook

At the beginning of the 21st century, the Korean electoral system was undergoing profound changes. Since the inauguration of the Sixth Republic in 1988, there were demands for modifications but these accelerated after the turn of the century. The discussion touched all aspects of the political system, including the question of the governmental system (presidential or prime ministerial), the number of proportionally allocated seats in the National Assembly and the number and size of electoral districts. As political parties seemed to be unable to bring substantial reform, civic groups became more involved in political society. The 'negative campaign' of 2000, where unsuitable candidates were blacklisted, was just one example of such initiatives. In addition, the Constitutional Court demanded several changes in the proportional allocation of seats and the size of electoral districts.

Although different electoral systems had been discussed by politicians, the media, and political scientists, no solution was reached by November 2003. One of the problems is that the changes in the system have to be initiated by the same people who are affected by them, the politicians. In the past, when considering political changes, politicians were concerned with their short-term interests rather than the long-term sustainability of the constitution and the development of democracy in Korea. During the First Republic, President Rhee repeatedly changed electoral rules to his advantage and many politicians followed that tradition in the following decades. Discussions about the new constitution for the Sixth Republic were influenced by considerations of the likelihood of electoral success.[31] This behaviour continued into the Sixth Republic, as the discussion about the division of power between president and premier showed. It looks increasingly likely that politicians will reach a compromise shortly before the elections; again trying to find a solution to their advantage.

Elections can only represent the citizens' will if political parties are responsible, mature and cohesive as well as independent from their leading personality. In Korea, the attitudes and behaviour of the political establishment have changed little since 1988 and authoritarian traits continue to cohabit with the institutional procedures of democratic rule. A generation change seems the only way to indoctrinate democratic values and behaviour in the politicians. The end of the era of the 'Three Kims' (Kim Dae-jung, Kin Jong-pil and Kim Young-sam) in 2003 was the first step in that direction. Korea's volatile party system based on regional cleavages remains an

obstacle to democratic development. Under the current electoral system effective and efficient political institutions, such as inclusive political parties, have problems in developing. Single member districts favour regionally based parties, strengthening an already existing trend in Korean politics. The process of selection by simple majority has induced a 'winner-takes-it-all'-mentality that fails to support compromise. Furthermore, the system favours personalities over parties.

Local elections have not fulfilled their promise after three rounds of elections. With the prevalence of regionalism, many elected councils have been dominated by just one party, leaving little room for the development of democratic skills such as negotiation and co-operation. The councils have little power compared to the head of the administration, restricting their ability to influence local policies. The head of the administration, in turn, is constrained by central government supervision and restrictions. Local autonomy is also limited by the lack of financial provisions. Many local authorities remain dependent on allocations from the central government, which often come with restrictions regarding their use. Without further decentralisation, local autonomy and local democracy are destined to remain an unfulfilled promise.

The outcome of the 2004 parliamentary elections is difficult to predict at the time of writing (November 2003). It appears likely that some political alignment within the existing party system could take place. A pro-Roh faction of the MDP already left the party to form a new organisation in November 2003. Citizens are tired of the factional fighting and thus a low voter turnout can be expected. Apathy and disillusionment with democracy were at high levels in the early 21st century. No democracy can survive without the support of citizens. An increase in political education could be useful to demonstrate to Koreans that a democratic system needs active citizens in both political and civil society. It seems the political establishment would introduce profound changes only when they felt the persistent pressure of the population. The blacklist campaign in the 2000 elections was a step in that direction but as a negative campaign had little to offer to improve democracy. The elections in 2004 will show if they have more to contribute. The elections will also be an indicator of the direction Korean democracy is taking – towards maturity or stagnation in a prolonged consolidation phase.

Note

1. In 1998, as a result of the Asian financial crisis, per capita national income dropped by nearly a third to US$ 6,700 but reached the US$ 10,000-mark again in 2002.

2. For example Norwegian Nobel Committee (2000), Diamond, Kim (2000), Oh (1999).

3. In the earlier democracies such as the United States and Britain, the right to vote was initially defined by gender, social status and the possession of property. Over the next 150 years, the franchise was gradually extended to include those without property, farmers, and eventually even women. The struggle for the right to vote was important for the formation of political and civil society.

4. In 1988, an exception was made to allow the candidacy of Kim Dae-jung who returned from exile in the USA only in 1985.

5. In 1992, it was feared that three separate election campaigns - for the National Assembly, the presidency and for local executives - in one year would lead to economic overheating, given the high costs of campaigning (Lee, 1992: 218).

6. In 1998, an unsuccessful local election candidate in Pusan committed suicide because he faced bankruptcy when his deposit was not repaid.

7. Shown are only countries with a similar population size to Korea; Japan and USA with a much higher population had higher ratios. Proportional seats were included in the calculation for simplicity.

8. The relationship between elections system, political parties and electoral outcome has been studied widely in political science. Duverger (1964) for example provides a theoretical view, Rae (1967), Lijphard (1999) and Taagepera and Shugart (1989) are empirical works.

9. See Randall and Svåsand (2000) for a thorough discussion of party institutionalisation.

10. In March 1946, there were already 134 political parties and social organisations; the number had increased to 354 by 1947 (Pak, 1980: 20).

11. Independents often joined the ruling party to 'achieve more for their constituency' (personal communication with one representative). In several cases, representatives had run as independent after not being selected for their party and were then convinced by their former colleagues to re-join.

12. See Sartori (1976) for a discussion of the relevance of political parties and the use of a 3% threshold.

13. This sum is an average of the lengths of party lifespan between December 1987 and December 2002. If the time of existence prior to the presidential elections in 1987 is included the average reaches 44 months, mostly due to the *Democratic Justice Party* (DJP), the party of Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, which was created in 1981.

14. A typical example of party formation was the 'Korean Coalition for the Future', founded by Park Geun-hae, the daughter of Park Chung-hee, in May 2002. Park had become disenchanted with the GNP and its leader and left to form her own party, taking into account her popularity in polls for the upcoming presidential elections. By November 2002, it was clear she had no chance of winning the election and thus decided not to stand. Park took her party back to the folds of the GNP.

15. For a study of different types of electioneering see Butler and Ranney (1992).

16. See Duverger for a description of caucus parties (1964: 18).

17. In 1996, the NKP for example stated that the monthly membership fees for a member of the National Assembly were more than 150,000 won (US$ 187.50 at the time) and a provincial governor more than 300,000 won (US$ 375). The party president was expected to contribute more than 1 million won per month (US$ 1250). Ordinary members were expected to pay 1000 won (US$ 1.20) monthly but there was no enforcement of payment (NKP, 1996: 443-444).

18. In Ulsan, the DLP-nominee won 43.6% of the votes in the race for mayor, while the GNP-candidate won 53.1%.

19. In 1987, 27% of workers were employed in manufacturing, by 2001 this had dropped to 20% (data from http://laborstat.ilo.org; August 2003). While in 1987 19.8% of workers were member of a union, the number had fallen to 12% by 2002 (data from www.koilaf.org; August 2003).

20. The New Korea Party stated for example: "The NKP is not a party that speaks for the interests of a specific class or regions, but a national party that works for the interests of all the people." (NKP, 1996: 29). The majority of its votes, however, came from southeast Korea.

21. Yang provided data about the regional backgrounds of elites (1994: 515-543).

22. An increase of 54% was the national average over those four decades (data from NSO, www.nso.go.kr; August 2003).

23. Data from NSO, www.nso.or.kr; August 2003.

24. In both cases, there was severe criticism and demonstrations against the legislation. Kim Young-sam had to retract his labour legislation after a general strike in January 1997.

25. In 2002, successful gubernatorial candidates spent between 277 million and 2.2 billion won (US$ 231,000 to 1.8 million; data from NEC, www.nec.or.kr; August 2003). These number relied on data submitted to the NEC, informal spending was thus not included and was probably much higher.

26. When a candidate for the position of prime minister was questioned in the National Assembly, the fact that her son held US-citizenship in addition to his Korean passport was held against her. For the same reason, there was outrage when the daughter-in-law of one of the presidential contenders flew to Hawaii to give birth to her child there, presumably to secure dual citizenship.

27. Park, 2000: 6, quoting Lee Gap-Yun and Lee Hyun Woo (2000) 'Influence of Candidate Factor in Parliamentary Election' (in Korean), *Korean Political Science Review*, Vol. 34, No. 2.

28. See also Kang (2001) for the need of generational change.

29. In 1999, Professor Kim Myung-ja for example was appointed Minister of the Environment. She had been in the Board of Directors of the *Citizens' Movement for Environmental Justice*, which was at this time part of one of the largest civic groups, the *Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice* (CCEJ).

30. In 1987, Roh Tae-woo was elected by less than 37% of the votes, while Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam gained 27 and 28% respectively. In 1997, the conservative vote was divided between Lee Hoi-chang and Rhee In-je, leaving the victory to Kim Dae-jung.

31. See Brady and Mo (1992) for a more detailed discussion.

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2

Local and National Elections in Taiwan

Christian Schafferer

On 1 December 2001, ten million voters went to the polls in Taiwan to elect 225 members of the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan's law-making body, and the chief executives of eighteen counties and five provincial municipalities. The parliamentary election was a further major defeat for the Kuomintang (KMT), which had dominated parliament for over fifty years. President Chen Shui-bian's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) became the largest party in parliament for the first time in history, but fell short of achieving a majority. Nevertheless, it is expected that the DPP will in future be more successful in pushing through its policies than it was prior to the election. In local elections, the KMT did better than in the past, but failed to drive the DPP out of Taipei County, Taiwan's most populated local constituency.

A year later, on 7 December 2002, about 1.3 million people in the city of Taipei and some 800.000 people in the city of Kaoshiung went to the polls to elect a new mayor and city councillors. In Taipei, incumbent mayor Ma Ying-jeou from the Kuomintang (KMT) won his re-election bid with 64 percent of the votes cast. In the Kaoshiung race, incumbent mayor Frank Hsieh from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party won the election by a narrow margin of 25,000 votes (three percentage points). In the city council elections, the KMT still succeeded in remaining the largest party in the Taipei city council, whereas in Kaoshiung the DPP emerged as the strongest political group.

The 2001 National and Local elections

Parliamentary Election: Prior to constitutional reforms in recent years, Taiwan's parliament consisted of three chambers: the law-making body, the Legislative Yuan, the constitution-drafting National Assembly, and a

watchdog organ know as the Control Yuan. Members of the former two bodies were elected by universal suffrage and the latter by local council members. The 1997 constitutional amendments excluded the Control Yuan from parliament and increased the number of Legislative Yuan members from 161 to 225. Three-quarters of these seats, 168 to be exact, are elected in geographic constituencies and a further eight by eight aboriginal tribes that account for less than two percent of the population. These 176 seats are elected under SNTV (Single Non-transferable Vote). The remaining 49 seats are allocated to those parties which capture at least five percent of the total votes cast for candidates of all political parties. Eight of these proportionally allocated seats represent the overseas Taiwanese community and 41 are "at-large" seats. Further constitutional amendments in May 2000 turned Taiwan's parliament into a semi-bicameral one, with the Legislative Yuan being the only chamber regularly elected by universal suffrage.[1]

Local Elections: Council members and chief local executives have been directly elected in Taiwan since shortly after the Second World War.[2] The most important local elections comprise the elections of county magistrates and provincial municipality mayors. Taiwan has sixteen counties and five provincial municipalities. In addition, two counties of China's Fukien province are also under the jurisdiction of the Taiwan government. Elections of chief executives in these two counties have been held since 1993. The term of county magistrates and provincial municipality mayors is four years. The last election was held in November 1997 and was a watershed in Taiwan's history, as it was the first time the DPP polled more votes in an election than the then ruling KMT.[3]

Pre-election Development
The last presidential election held in March 2000 significantly changed the political landscape in Taiwan: The KMT leadership under President Lee Teng-hui insisted on the nomination of the then Vice-president and Premier Lien Chan as the party's candidate in the presidential race, which annoyed many hardliners and pro-China members such as James Soong, who consequently left the party and ran in the election as an independent candidate. Chen Shui-bian of the DPP finally won the election, closely followed by James Soong. Lien Chan, however, came in well behind his two rivals, and the KMT was forced to admit a major defeat. No sooner had the fiasco been made public than thousands of KMT members and, ironically, supporters of James Soong gathered outside the KMT party headquarters demanding the resignation of Chairman Lee Teng-hui. Finally, Lee stepped down and Lien Chan was elected new KMT chairman. In the meantime, James Soong established his own political party, the People First Party (PFP), which was expected to emerge as a third major political force in Taiwan politics. It was obvious at that point that the KMT would lose its majority in parliament in the upcoming election, given the fact that Soong enjoyed far greater popu-

larity than Lien Chan. To make things worse for the KMT, numerous party members withdrew their support in favor of Soong's new party.

Chen Shui-bian's election victory in the presidential race was seen internationally as a major step towards a consolidated democracy.[4] Nevertheless, the DPP faced difficulties in implementing its proposed polices as parliament was dominated by the blue camp, the KMT, the NP and the newly formed PFP. Chen Shui-bian, aware of his minority in parliament, chose Tang Fei of the KMT, then minister of defense, as the new premier. There was optimism that Tang Fei might be able to help the DPP secure a majority in parliament, especially as he was popular with both political camps.[5] The first major crisis occurred soon after the new cabinet was formed when President Chen Shui-bian asked the minister of economic affairs to rethink the construction of the fourth nuclear power plant. The DPP had long opposed the construction of a further nuclear power plant, whereas the KMT had been a long-term advocate of nuclear energy.[6] In September, the premier remarked that he personally felt there was no need to scrap the project and indicated that he would consider resigning if his opinion conflicted with that of the DPP and the presidential office. The nuclear debate soon caused a political stalemate and Premier Tang resigned, ostensibly for health reasons. Given the fact that Tang had undergone chest surgery a few months earlier, his decision appeared plausible to the public. It seems, however, that the ongoing dispute over the future of the fourth nuclear plant had contributed to his early resignation. Chang Chun-hsiung of the DPP became the new premier in early October, and at the end of that month he announced the government's decision to scrap the nuclear project. The KMT, consequently, threatened to recall the president or to pass a vote of no confidence in parliament, where it had a substantial majority. Taiwan's society soon polarized on the issue and on 12 November 2000 large-scale anti-nuclear demonstrations with over 100,000 protesters were held in Taipei and Kaoshiung, Taiwan's two largest cities. It was not before mid-February the following year that an agreement between the ruling party and the KMT was finally reached, ending the political deadlock. The government agreed to proceed with the construction of the fourth nuclear power plant but made clear its intention to phase out the three others by 2050. Nevertheless, the ruling DPP still faced difficulties in having its proposed laws passed in parliament due to the dominance of the KMT, whose members were reluctant to cooperate with the DPP. Former president Lee Teng-hui responded by announcing his intention to return the country to normality by establishing a new political party, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). Lee said that the new political party would support the Chen administration and help the DPP to secure a majority in parliament. At the founding ceremony on 12 August, Lee released the names of thirty-nine well-known politicians who had decided to run in the year-end parliamentary election under the banner of the TSU. None of the nominees had held a parliamentary seat prior to the December election. Lee Teng-hui's move hurt the KMT badly

and the party responded by expelling the *traitors*. Taiwan's media welcomed Lee's initiative. The weekly magazine *Journalist* had a cover story calling Lee "the father of Taiwan," appraising his commitment to a stable and democratic Taiwan nation-state.[7] There were high expectations that Lee would be able to help the ruling DPP to achieve a majority in parliament, especially after his announcement that there would be a number of mainstream KMT legislators either supporting his coalition for national stabilization or even changing camps after the election.

Apart from the political dispute, Taiwan's economy was challenged by a recession. GDP shrank considerably throughout the year, and the nation's economists spoke of the steepest GDP decline since the oil crisis of the 1970s. Although there were several reasons for this development, they mainly blamed the world economy and the increase in the number of Taiwanese companies moving their production facilities to the People's Republic of China, where labor costs are lower and environmental protection laws virtually non-existent. What worried the nation even more was the fact that unemployment had reached a record high of 5.2 percent. The KMT and the PFP used Taiwan's poor economic performance to attack the DPP government. Meanwhile, local media reports claimed that companies affiliated with the KMT had withdrawn capital and manipulated the stock market in order to discredit the DPP. With regard to cross-straits relations, claims of a destructive KMT were even made by foreign institutions. In August, for instance, the Center for Strategic and International Studies released a report citing Chinese analysts as saying that the KMT had consistently urged Beijing not to engage in a dialogue with the new government in Taipei in an effort to weaken the position of the DPP and increase the chances of a KMT election victory.[8]

Candidates and Their Affiliation
Taiwan nationals aged 23 or older may register as candidates in parliamentary elections; candidates in local elections must be 35 or older. Hopefuls must pay a deposit of NT$ 200,000 to the election commission, which will be returned if the candidate polls at least 10 percent of the quotient obtained by dividing the number of voters by the district magnitude.

Local Elections: A total of eighty-nine hopefuls stood in the election for the chief executives of five provincial municipalities and eighteen counties, 60 percent of whom had been nominated by political parties. The KMT nominated one candidate in each of the twenty-three constituencies with the exception of Nantou County, where two candidates ran under the KMT banner. The ruling DPP also nominated one candidate in each of the constituencies, except for Lienchang County. The New Party significantly decreased its number of candidates, having learned a lesson from the previous election in which none of its seven candidates was elected. This time, the party concentrated on Kinmen County, a tiny offshore island. The PFP and the Green Party took part in mayoral elections for the first time, presenting

six candidates and one candidate respectively. Compared with the previous election held four years earlier, there was a significant increase in the number of independent candidates. However, only three of these were believed to have chances of success: incumbent Miaoli County magistrate Fu Shue-peng, Chen Li-chen of Chiayi City and Wang Jian-shuan, who was jointly nominated by the KMT, NP and PFP as their candidate in the Taipei County race. Two minor parties, the Taiwan Independence Party and the Society Reform Party, nominated no candidates at all this time.

Table 2.1 Comparison of candidates in the 2001 and 1997 local elections

Affiliation	2001		1997	
	Candidates	%	Candidates	%
Kuomintang	24	26.97	25	31.25
Democratic Progressive Party	22	24.72	21	26.25
People First Party	6	6.74	-	-
New Party	1	1.12	7	8.75
Green Party	1	1.12	-	-
Independent	35	39.33	23	28.75
Other parties	-	-	4	5.00
Total	89	100.00	80	100.00

Source: Central Election Commission, Ministry of Interior, Taiwan

Parliamentary Election: In the parliamentary race 434 hopefuls contested 168 seats in twenty-nine geographic constituencies, and 21 contested 8 seats in two aboriginal constituencies.

Seven out of ten candidates were nominated by political parties. Compared with the previous election, all parties nominated fewer candidates due both to the emergence of the PFP and to their experience in the previous election, which was the first after constitutional amendments had increased the number of parliamentary seats from 161 to 225. Moreover, there were five new political parties and four established parties which did not put forward a single candidate in this election. The latter parties are the China Youth Party, the National Democratic Party, the Democratic Union and the New Nation Alliance (see Table 2. 2). However, five former hopefuls from the Democratic Union stood again, two as independent candidates and the others under the banner of the Taiwan Solidarity Union. The New Nation Alliance had practically dissolved soon after its election defeat in 1998, and the only successful candidate, Hsu Tian-tsai, was nominated by the DPP as the party's hopeful in the Tainan mayoral race (see Table 2. 3).

The five new parties were the PFP, TSU, the Taiwan No.1 Party, the Wisdom Action Party and the Great Chinese Battle Line of Unification. The PFP nominated 61 hopefuls and the TSU 39. These candidates accounted for about 20 percent of the 455 participants. All other new parties did not nominate more than three candidates (see Table 2. 2), and their chances of success were viewed as only very slight.

Table 2. 2 Comparison of candidates in the 2001 and 1998 Legislative Yuan elections

	2001		1998	
Affiliation	Candidates	%	Candidates	%
Kuomintang	97	21.32	161	32.33
Democratic Progressive Party	83	18.24	112	22.49
People First Party	61	13.41	-	-
New Party	32	7.03	51	10.24
Taiwan Solidarity Union	39	8.50	-	-
Nationwide Democratic Nonpartisan Alliance	1	0.22	5	1.00
Taiwan No. 1	3	0.66	-	-
Wisdom Action Party	1	0.22	-	-
Taiwan Independence Party	3	0.66	20	4.02
Green Party	1	0.2	1	0.20
Chinese Taiwan Aborigine Democratic Party	1	0.22	1	0.20
Great Chinese Battle Line of Unification	1	0.22	-	-
Independents	132	29.01	108	21.69
Other parties	-	-	39	7.83
Total	455	100.00	498	100.00

Source: Central Election Commission, Ministry of Interior, Taiwan

Table 2. 3 Election result of political groups in the 1998 parliamentary election

Party	Candidates	Elected	Current state
China Youth Party	1	0	dissolving
National Democratic Party	1	1	dissolving
Democratic Union	25	4	dissolved
New Nation Alliance	12	1	dissolved

Source: Author's own research

The Campaign

Taiwan has the most liberal election law of all democracies in East Asia, and restrictions on campaigning are minor. The law limits the campaign period for parliamentary and local elections to ten days and allows each candidate to spend up to NT$ 7 million on parliamentary elections and between NT$ 7 million and NT$ 26 million on local elections. Candidates may apply for campaign subsidies. Each candidate is subsidized to the tune of NT$ 30 for each ballot exceeding one-third of the votes sufficient to win in the respective single-seat constituency or half the votes sufficient to win in the respective multi-seat constituency. Political parties receive subsidies of NT$ 5 for each ballot exceeding 5 percent of the total number of valid votes.

Despite these restrictions, both political parties and individual candidates usually find loopholes in the law. Activities officially described as campaigning, such as placing ads in the mass media, are much in evidence prior to the official campaign period. Moreover, hopefuls usually spend far more money on their campaigning activities than is legally permitted. Actual figures are astronomical: Candidates running in county magistrate, mayoral and presidential elections may spend not only millions of NT$ but billions on their campaign. The last presidential election in March 2000 was described as the most expensive in the nation-state's history, with candidates allegedly spending more than NT$ 3 billion on advertisements in Taiwan's mass media.[9] With Taiwan's economy hard hit by the worldwide economic decline, big corporations, such as United Microelectronics, refrained from donating money to political parties and individual candidates this time.

Table 2. 4 Total spending of political parties on advertisements (1998-2001)[a]

| | Type of election | | |
Media	1998 Parliament	2000 Presidential	2001 Parliament
Television	115	3,127	746
Newspaper	144	461	72
Magazines	7	17	8
Total	266	3,602	826

Source: Rainmaker, *tai wan di qu 1998 nian da xuan te bie bao dao* [Taiwan 1998 Election Special Report], (Rainmaker: Taipei, 1998). Rainmaker, *tai wan di qu 2000 nian da xuan te bie bao dao* [Taiwan 2000 Election Special Report], (Rainmaker: Taipei, 2000). Rainmaker, *tai wan di qu 2001 nian da xuan te bie bao dao* [Taiwan 2001 Election Special Report], (Rainmaker: Taipei, 2001).
[a] million NT$

Nevertheless, compared with the previous parliamentary election, the amount of money spent by political parties on advertisements increased significantly, but still only accounts for about 20 percent of the amount spent in the last presidential election (see Table 2. 4). The total expenditure by political parties on political ads in Taiwan's media accounted for NT$ 826 million, almost half of it was spent by the KMT, 25 percent by the PFP and 20 percent by the ruling DPP.

In addition, Rainmaker, a leading local media research company, estimates that in addition to the money spent by political parties, candidates in the local race spent another NT$309 million and parliamentary hopefuls NT$ 387 million on advertisements on television, in newspapers and magazines.[10]

In total, the KMT had nine different party political broadcasts aired, the DPP seven, the PFP ten short ones and the TSU three.[11] Seven of the KMT ads were mainly designed to attack the opponent, one for image creation and another to rebut criticism. Three of the DPP ads were political attacks and

the others image-building. Half of the PFP ads were attacks and half image-building, whereas TSU ads were image-building only. Advertising experts have criticized the KMT for focusing too much on originality at the expense of content. The DPP's ads were said to be less original but had a clearer message. The good character of chairman James Soong was the major theme of almost all PFP ads, which reinforced the impression of the PFP being a one-man band.[12] The internet was a less important campaign tool than in the previous presidential election of March 2000 and the last parliamentary election in 1998, when almost every candidate had his or her own website offering the electorate information about the candidate's previous political achievements, platforms, and in several cases short movie and audio clips. In this election few candidates made an effort to create websites, and all major political parties had less information on their sites than in the previous elections. The PFP even considered the internet more of a kids' paradise and designed its website accordingly.[13]

Table 2. 5 Total spending of political parties on advertisements (2001)[a]

Party	Media			Total	%
	TV	Newspaper	Magazine		
KMT	351.13	30.99	6.79	388.91	47.07
PFP	204.01	6.63	0.85	211.49	25.60
DPP	153.47	9.46	-	162.93	19.72
TSU	32.93	11.2	0.54	44.67	5.41
NP	-	12.81	-	12.81	1.55
TAIP	4.87	-	-	4.87	0.59
TN1	-	0.57	-	0.57	0.07
Total	746.41	71.67	8.18	826.25	100.00

Source: Rainmaker, *tai wan di qu 2001 nian da xuan te bie bao dao* [Taiwan 2001 Election Special Report], (Rainmaker: Taipei, 2001).
[a] million NT$

In spite of the economic situation, the KMT admitted to having offered NT$ 1.5 billion in subsidies to its candidates, although estimates put the figure nearer NT$ 5 billion. The DPP, on the other hand, kept a low profile and is said to have offered its candidates NT$ 100 million.[14]

The economy was, of course, the main election issue. Opposition parties took advantage of the recession and pinned the blame on the new government. KMT chairman Lien Chan strongly criticized the DPP and its economic policies. He claimed that Taiwan's troubled economy was due solely to the DPP. At the beginning of November, the KMT organized demonstrations in all major cities around the island to protest against the DPP government's handling of the economy. It was the first time in history that the KMT had organized a demonstration and that Lien Chan, former vice-president and premier, had actively supported such activities. Lien Chan again blamed the DPP for the record unemployment and called for a cut in

the unemployment rate to three percent. Tens of thousands of KMT support-
ers chanted slogans saying that a DPP government guaranteed unemploy-
ment. Most campaign speeches, newspaper and TV ads attempted to create
the image of the nation being on the verge of bankruptcy as a direct result of
DPP policies. Several candidates of the DPP and the Green Party in their
speeches and campaign literature criticized Lien Chan for leading these
demonstrations and argued that if the KMT was so worried about the unem-
ployed, it could simply use its illegally obtained assets to finance job train-
ing and educational programs and accused Lien Chan of just making big
noise. DPP leaders even made fun of KMT chair Lien Chan and his party
saying that the KMT should leave demonstrations to the DPP since it had
more experience in this field.[15] James Soong, chair of the PFP, joined Lien
Chan in his argument that the DPP was to blame for the poor economy. The
major theme of the PFP was "save the economy, vote for Soong." The DPP
reacted quickly to the accusations made by the PFP and the KMT. Premier
Chang Chun-hsiung told the media at a press conference that the DPP had
achieved many reforms which the KMT had been unable to implement dur-
ing its fifty years in power. He said that the current government policies, for
instance, attempted to balance the development of northern and southern
Taiwan, while the KMT had ignored the south. The premier stressed that
even though the opposition claimed that Taiwan's economic performance
had become one of the region's worst, international surveys proved the
opposite. Chang referred to the World Competitiveness Report, which
ranked Taiwan eighth in terms of global competitiveness, ahead of Japan,
South Korea and the People's Republic of China. Another survey released
by the World Economic Forum ranked Taiwan seventh worldwide for com-
petitiveness, up from eleventh a year earlier. Moreover, the DPP used the
accusations of the KMT by making counter accusations a major theme in
their advertisements and public speeches. In a series of televised ads, the
party referred to KMT and PFP legislators as "barbaric and irresponsible
budget cutters." The ads claimed that opposition legislators had impeded
local development by cutting funds earmarked for public building, child
welfare and computer lessons for schoolchildren. One ad even mentioned
the names of the "barbaric cutters", two of whom were members of the
KMT and one a member of the PFP. The accused politicians denied the
allegations and filed lawsuits against the DPP. Taiwan's media focused
extensively on the issue and the DPP's accusations were supported by par-
liamentary records.[16] The ads also highlighted the problem of a minority
DPP in parliament. President Chen Shui-bian and ranking officials of the
DPP thus appealed to the electorate in emotional speeches to give the DPP a
majority in parliament.

The DPP also attacked the way in which the KMT had acquired its as-
sets. During its fifty years of rule, the KMT had allegedly mixed its own
funds with government funds. The party is considered to be the world's
richest, with assets estimated at between US$ 7 billion and US$ 16 billion.[17]

Civil groups as well as the DPP would like to see a thorough investigation into the legality of the party's assets. In several newspaper ads the DPP described the KMT as being worse than the Communist Party of East Germany, since the latter accepted a fair investigation into its assets, whereas the KMT has fiercely resisted attempts by the Control Yuan, Taiwan's watchdog body, to set up an independent board to look into the issue.

TSU hopefuls raised the issue of cutting the Legislative Yuan by half in order to make it more efficient. While the idea was backed by the DPP, other parties refrained from voicing an opinion during the election campaign.

During the closing days of the election campaign, President Chen Shui-bian made public his idea of a cross-party alliance for national stabilization, further stressing his commitment to a stable political system. His idea was supported by the TSU and its spiritual leader Lee Teng-hui, who had pursued similar ideas. Opposition parties on the other hand continued to blame the government for the recession and claimed that the only way to resolve the crisis was to vote for them. The leaders of the PFP and KMT mentioned that the relationship with the People's Republic of China had deteriorated under the DPP government and some candidates even claimed that there would soon be war should the DPP be allowed to continue ruling the country.

Results and Implications

Lien Chan, chair of the KMT, said during a press conference that he was confident his party would secure at least ninety seats. Frank Hsieh, chair of the DPP, predicted that his party would secure at least two seats more than the KMT, while the PFP said it would win more than forty seats.[18] Shu Chin-chiang, TSU spokesman, announced that his party would poll at least ten percent of the votes, which is equivalent to approximately twenty seats.[19] Political analysts expected the lowest turnout in Taiwan's election history, as a significant part of the electorate might not see the point of going to the polls again given that the last presidential election had brought about the long-awaited transfer of power from the KMT to the DPP.[20]

Local Elections: In the 2001 county magistrate and provincial municipality mayor elections, the DPP increased its share of votes by 4 percent compared with the previous election held in 1997 and reached an all-time high of 45 percent. The KMT, on the other hand, lost 17 percent of its 1997 share of votes and lagged ten percentage points behind the DPP, a historic low (see Table 2. 6). The PFP, a newcomer in local elections, polled slightly more than 2 percent of the votes. The Green Party's only nominee received about 1,200 votes, and the only candidate of the NP some 14,000 votes, enough to be elected county magistrate of the tiny offshore island of Kinmen.

In terms of elected candidates, the KMT could boast victory in nine con-stituencies, one more than in the previous election. Although the number of votes for the DPP was higher this time, the party could not hold on to all of the twelve chief executive positions it won in 1997 (see Table 2. 7). It lost the counties of Taoyuan, the second largest constituency, Hsinchu and Taichung, and the cities of Keelung, Hsinchu and Taichung to the KMT.

Table 2. 6 Election results of local elections 2001 and 1997

Party	2001		1997		Change
	Votes	%	Votes	%	%
DPP	3,799,709	45.19	3,322,087	43.32	+4.31
KMT	2,950,217	35.09	3,229,635	42.12	-16.69
PFP	197,707	2.35	-	-	-
NP	14,148	0.17	108,812	1.42	+88.14
GP	1,299	0.02	-	-	-
Independent	1,445,172	17.19	987,247	12.87	+33.50
other parties	-	-	20,294	0.26	-
Total	8,408,252	100.00	7,668,075	100.00	0.00

Source: Central Election Commission, Ministry of Interior, Taiwan

It could be argued that the DPP lost because of the economic recession and the KMT's success in putting the economy on the agenda of the daily politi-cal debates in these constituencies.[21] The DPP, on the other hand, gained control over the previously KMT-governed counties of Changhua and Chiayi, and the county of Nantou, which had been previously controlled by an independent. The party also succeeded in defending its magistracy of Taipei County, Taiwan's most highly populated magistracy. The county has been governed by the DPP since 1989, when the party's hopeful You Ching won the election by a narrow margin of 4,000 votes. The PFP succeeded in ousting the KMT from the counties of Taitung and Lienchiang; and the NP took over the KMT magistracy of Kinmen County.

Table 2. 7 Election results of local elections 2001 and 1997

Party	2001		1997		Change
	Elected	%	Elected	%	%
DPP	9	39.13	12	52.17	-25.00
KMT	9	39.13	8	34.78	+12.50
PFP	2	8.70	-	-	-
NP	1	4.35	-	-	-
Independents	2	8.70	3	13.04	-33.33
Total	23	100.00	23	100.00	+0.00

Source: Central Election Commission, Ministry of Interior, Taiwan

Parliamentary Election: The elections turned out to be another victory for
the DPP and a further serious setback for the KMT. For the first time in
Taiwan's history, the DPP polled more votes in a national election than the
KMT. About 33 percent of the votes went to the DPP and 29 percent to the
KMT. Compared with the previous election held in 1998, the DPP suc-
ceeded in increasing its share by about three percentage points whereas the
KMT suffered heavy losses. Its share dropped from 46 percent to a meager
29 percent (see Table 2. 8).

Public support for the NP plummeted this time, falling below the five
percentage threshold necessary for "at-large" seats. The PFP, on the other
hand, was another big winner in this election, polling nineteen percent of
votes, and the TSU passed the five percent threshold as expected. TAIP lost
its seat in parliament and with just 1,382 votes in this election, it left the
political stage. The future of Taiwan's greens is not rosy either. The party
succeeded in entering parliament in 1996 when one of its candidates was
elected in Yunlin County. In 1998, the party had filed one candidate in
Taipei's second district and received about 8,000 votes, only one-third of
the required amount. In this election, the party nominated the same candi-
date in the same district and polled only 1,000 votes.

Table 2. 8 Result of the Legislative Yuan election 2001 and 1998

Affiliation	2001		1998		Change
	votes	%	votes	%	%
DPP	3,447,740	33.38	2,966,834	29.56	+12.92
KMT	2,949,371	28.56	4,659,679	46.43	-38.49
PFP	1,917,836	18.57	-	-	-
TSU	801,560	7.76	-	-	-
NP	269,620	2.61	708,465	7.06	-63.02
Independent	899,254	8.71	946,431	9.43	-7.67
other party	42,474	0.41	754,420	7.52	-94.53
Total	10,327,855	100.00	10,035,829	100.00	0.00

Source: Central Election Commission, Ministry of Interior, Taiwan

Six of the twelve political parties competing in this parliamentary election
won at least one seat and four met the criteria for the proportional represen-
tation seats (Table 2. 9). The NP captured only one seat on the offshore
island of Kinmen and the TN1 one in the aboriginal constituency. Independ-
ent candidates took eight seats in geographic constituencies and one in the
aboriginal constituency.

Compared with the 1998 election, the DPP increased its share of seats
from seventy to eighty-seven, while the KMT lost almost one-half its seats
and the NP ten of its eleven seats. The DPP had far more of its candidates
elected than any other party (see Table 2. 10). The TSU is the only party to
have intentionally nominated far too many candidates. It did so in an at-

tempt to enhance its chances of passing the five-percent threshold necessary for "at-large" seats .

Table 2. 9 Seat distribution Legislative Yuan election 2001

Affiliation	PR-seats		Constituencies		Total
	At large	Overseas	Geographic	Aborigine	
DPP	15	3	69	0	87
KMT	13	2	49	4	68
PFP	9	2	34	1	46
TSU	4	1	8	0	13
NP	-	-	1	-	1
TN1	-	-	0	1	1
Independents	-	-	8	1	9
Total	41	8	169	7	225

Source: Central Election Commission, Ministry of Interior, Taiwan

The KMT lost the parliamentary race because of its highly unpopular leader, Lien Chan, and the emergence of the PFP. In addition, candidates of the blue camp, in general, could not benefit from the issue of cross-straits relations in this election, since the People's Republic of China refrained from interfering: The Chinese media did not even report on the election.[22] Moreover, the KMT electoral strategies did not work as well as those of the DPP. Under the current electoral system, twenty-five out of twenty-nine geographic and both of the two aboriginal constituencies are multi-member districts with an average seven seats. The remaining four constituencies, three small islands and the thinly populated county of Taitung, are single-seat constituencies.

Multi-seat constituencies require each political party to make an assessment of how many votes it could reasonably hope to poll a certain constituency. If the party nominates too many candidates in this constituency, party votes may be split to the extent that rival candidates take the seats away. By nominating too few candidates, the party runs the risk of wasting votes. In this election and in the 1995 election, the KMT nominated far too many candidates in key constituencies such as in Taipei City. Moreover, the party network did not support each candidate with the same degree of enthusiasm. It has been the KMT strategy to support party candidates with higher popularity ratings in opinion surveys. The DPP, on the other hand, has for a long time practiced the so-called *pei piao* system (forced vote distribution). *Pei piao* is a rational system based on the fact that the chance of someone being born on Monday is the same as of someone being born on Tuesday. In this election, for instance, the DPP nominated five candidates in the second district of Taipei City. The party gave each of its five candidates two single-digit numbers, i.e. zero and one to the first candidate, two and three to the second and so forth. Party supporters were urged to vote for the candidate

whose number coincides with the last digit of their National Identity Number.[23] If most DPP supporters followed the strategy, each candidate should receive an equal amount of votes.[24] The *pei piao* system has been regarded as one of the key reasons for the party's success in this election. Political analysts agree that a further factor contributing to the success of the DPP was President Chen Shui-bian's promise that there would be a more efficient government if the people gave the DPP a majority in parliament. Moreover, the electorate in general did not believe in Lien Chan's claim that he would revive Taiwan's economy, especially after a press conference where he had had to admit that the KMT's economic policies did not differ much from those of the DPP.

Table 2. 10 Election results Legislative Yuan election 2001 and 1998

	2001		1998		Change	
Affiliation	seats	% of hopefuls	seats	% of hopefuls	seats	%
DPP	87	77.53	70	65.82	+17	+24.29
KMT	68	54.64	123	73.91	-55	-44.72
PFP	46	57.38	-	-	-	-
TSU	13	20,51	-	-	-	-
NP	1	3.13	11	19.44	-10	-90.91
TN1	1	33.33	-	-	-	-
Independent	9	6.82	12	11.11	-3	-25.00
other party	-	-	9	9.89	-9	-100.00
Total	225	41.54	225	47.61	0	0.00

Source: Central Election Commission, Ministry of Interior, Taiwan

The election made the NP the ruler of Kinmen, an offshore island with a population of about 50,000 people, as it won the only parliamentary seat there and succeeded in having its candidate elected as the county's magistrate. The NP emerged as a rising star in the mid-1990s, when it first took part in national elections and captured thirteen percent of the seats. Its support dropped considerably in the 1998 parliamentary election due to a number of internal disputes. The recent election has been a further serious defeat for the party. There seems to be little doubt that the party will soon disappear from Taiwan's political arena.[25]

Voter turnout averaged 66.16 percent and was two percentage points lower than in the previous election. In Taiwan's two largest cities, Taipei and Kaoshiung, it was down to 65 percent, fifteen percentage points lower than in the previous election. In other areas, such as in the cities of Keelung and Hsinchu, it increased from about 50 percent to approximately 63 percent. In these two constituencies the increase was most dramatic. This phenomenon was caused by a mass mobilization of KMT supporters. In both cities, the KMT consequently succeeded in ousting the incumbent DPP mayors.[26]

This parliamentary election not only marked the end of KMT dominance but also ended the political careers of many long-term legislative

stalwarts and prominent politicians such as former DPP chair Shih Ming-teh, NP legislative whip Lai Shih-pao, influential Taipei County independent Lin Chih-jia and media star Chu Mei-fong.[27]

The election gave the green camp a so-called "working majority" of one hundred out of 225 seats, since former president and spiritual leader of the TSU announced that several independents, KMT and PFP legislators would support the green camp, giving it a *de-facto* majority in the law-making body. Soon after the election, the green camp elaborated on proposed constitutional amendments aimed at preventing further deadlocks in parliament: Lee Teng-hui and the DPP leadership would like to transform Taiwan's semi-presidential system into a presidential one, to halve the number of parliamentary seats and to introduce a single-member, two-ballot election system.[28] There is optimism that a strengthened DPP government will be more likely to implement its policies this time.

The Taipei and Kaoshiung Municipal Elections 2002

City council elections: In 1967, the provincial municipality of Taipei was elevated to the status of a special municipality. Kaoshiung became a special municipality in 1979. Special municipalities are under the direct jurisdiction of the central government. First election of council members took place in November 1969 in Taipei and in November 1981 in Kaoshiung. Since then, city council elections have been held every four years. Since then, the number of seats has been increased from 48 to 52 in Taipei and from 42 to 44 in Kaoshiung due to population growth. In elections of city councillors the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) formula is applied. Under this system, Taipei city is divided into six geographic constituencies with a district magnitude between seven to eleven (=number of seats) and one aboriginal constituency with one seat only. In Kaoshiung, there are five constituencies with district magnitudes ranging from five to ten and one aboriginal constituency with one seat.

In this election, political parties nominated seventy percent of the 113 candidates in Taipei, and about half of the candidates in Kaoshiung. The DPP nominated 27 of the 113 candidates in Taipei and only 18 of the 114 hopefuls in Kaoshiung. The Kuomintang nominated far fewer candidates this time due to the emergence of the People First Party, which fielded seventeen in the Taipei and nine in the Kaoshiung race (see Table 2. 11).

Two political parties took part in city council elections for the first time: the People First Party (PFP) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). The PFP was founded by James Soong after his defeat in the presidential race of March 2000. The new party caused a deep split within the KMT with a significant number of members switching sides. In the national election of December 2001, the PFP garnered 19 percent of votes (46 out of 225 seats). The party thus proved to be a new major political force in Taiwan's political

landscape. The Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) was founded under the spiritual leadership of former president and KMT chair Lee Teng-hui in August 2001 after Lee had announced some time earlier that a new party would bring back stability to Taiwan by supporting incumbent president Chen Shui-bian (DPP). Taiwan experienced a political deadlock that lasted for several months after the government made public its plan to scrap the fourth nuclear power plant project (see also Taiwan's 2001 National and Local Elections). TSU garnered 8 percent of votes (thirteen seats) in national elections held in December 2001.

Table 2. 11 Candidates by party affiliation 2002 and 1998

	2002		1998	
Affiliation	candidates	%	candidates	%
Taipei				
Democratic Progressive Party	27	23.89	27	24.55
Kuomintang	21	18.58	32	29.09
People First Party	17	15.04	-	-
Taiwan Solidarity Union	7	6.19	-	-
New Party	6	5.31	16	14.55
Green Party	1	0.88	4	3.64
other parties[a]	-	-	10	9.09
independents	34	30.09	21	19.09
Total	113	100.00	110	100.00
Kaoshiung				
Democratic Progressive Party	18	15.79	20	19.05
Kuomintang	21	18.42	34	32.38
People First Party	9	7.89	-	-
Taiwan Solidarity Union	7	6.14	-	-
New Party	1	0.88	6	5.71
other parties[b]	-	0.00	5	4.76
independents	58	50.88	40	38.10
Total	114	100.00	105	100.00

Source: Compiled by the author; data provided by the Central Election Commission
[a] other parties: New Nation Alliance (5), Taiwan Independence Party (4), China Women Party (1)
[b] other parties: Taiwan Independence Party (5)

Mayoral elections: Chief executives of special municipalities had been appointed by the premier prior to the passing of the Special Municipality Autonomy Law in July 1994. The first direct election of the mayors of

Taipei and Kaoshiung was held in 1994. Voter turnout averaged 80 percent. There were four candidates in Taipei and five in Kaoshiung. In Taipei, KMT candidate and incumbent mayor Huang Ta-chou received 26 percent of the votes cast, NP candidate Jaw Shau-kang 30 percent, DPP hopeful Chen Shui-bian 44 percent, and independent Jih Rong-ze less than 1 percent. This was a crucial victory for the DPP. In Kaoshiung, however, the KMT proved to be more successful. KMT candidate and then incumbent mayor Wu Den-yih garnered 55 percent of the votes, DPP's Chang Chun-hsiung 39 percent, NP hopeful Tang A-ken 3 percent, and the other candidates 3 percent.

In December 1998, the second direct mayoral election took place. There were three candidates in Taipei. Former justice minister Ma Ying-jeou was nominated by the KMT, incumbent mayor Chen Shui-bian by the DPP, and Wang Chien by the NP. Ma won with 51.1 percent of the votes. Incumbent mayor Chen received 45.9 percent and the New Party's hopeful the remaining 3 percent. Voter turnout was 80 percent in both Taipei and Kaoshiung, where four candidates contested. Incumbent mayor Wu Den-yi (KMT) received 48.13 percent and was voted out of office by a margin of 78,000 votes by former legislator Frank Hsieh of the DPP. The NP candidate Wu Chien-kuo received only 0.8 percent and independent Cheng Teh-yao 2.4 percent of the valid votes cast.

In this election, there were two candidates in Taipei. The KMT nominated incumbent mayor Ma Ying-jeou, and the DPP former political prisoner and legislator Lee Ying-yuan. In Kaoshiung, five hopefuls took part in the election. Incumbent mayor Frank Hsieh was nominated by the ruling DPP, and Huang Jun-ying by the KMT. Three independent candidates took also part in the Kaoshiung race: Chang Po-ya, Shih Ming-teh, and Huang Tien-shen.

Election Results

The mayoral election results were a foregone conclusion in Taipei and a small surprise in Kaohsiung. Incumbent mayor Ma Ying-jeou (KMT) won the race in Taipei with 64.11 percent of the votes, and in Kaoshiung incumbent mayor Frank Hsieh (DPP) received slightly more votes (24,838 votes) than his main rival Huang Jun-ying (KMT) despite opinion polls that suggested Hsieh would lose the battle (see Table 2. 12).

Ma Ying-jeou's strategy was not to talk too much about specific future policies nor go into details of what has been achieved during his term. Instead, he tried to give the voters the impression that there are many problems but there is no need to worry because there is still Ma, who cares about the people. His campaign ads in Taiwan's media, for instance, frequently focused on the issue of rising unemployment and the lack of unity among the electorate due to the polarization of the populace between the blue and green camps, urging the electorate to be united and support him. In his cam-

paign speech on election eve, Ma spent most of his time telling the audience that we all work hard everyday and that life sometimes is difficult but we still have Ma to rely on, giving the electorate once again the impression of a good brother who will always be here if help is needed. Ma relied on his charisma whereas his opponent, Lee Ying-yuan, relied on history and on offering "beef," that is more social welfare to the residents of Taipei. His campaign team, for instance, placed a series of ads in Taiwan's mass media promising every unemployed person between 35 and 50 years of age a monthly subsidy of NT$10,000 for the period of one year, and every single mother with a child under 12 years of age a monthly stipend of NT$5,000.

Table 2. 12 Results mayoral elections 2002

	Votes	%
Taipei		
Ma Ying-jeou (Kuomintang)	873,102	64.11
Lee Ying-yuan (Democratic Progressive Party)	488,811	35.89
Total	1,361,913	100.00
Kaoshiung		
Frank Hsieh (Democratic Progressive Party)	386,384	50.04
Huang Jun-ying (Kuomintang)	361,546	46.82
Chang Po-ya	13,479	1.75
Shih Ming-teh	8,750	1.13
Huang Tien-shen	1,998	0.26
Total	772,157	100.00

Source: Compiled by Christian Schafferer; data provided by the Central Election Commission

Apart from social welfare policies, history was again a key element in the DPP's mayoral campaign strategy. In his campaign speeches and televised ads, Lee once again stressed his suffering during the white terror that lasted until the early 1990s. Televised ads tried to remind the voters of the dark times and of the fact that Lee Ying-yuan was blacklisted by the KMT government for his involvement in anti-KMT activities. A group of former schoolmates also put ads in mass-circulating daily newspapers showing a large photo of KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou and claiming that he was a spy for the KMT government while studying in the US. The group strongly criticized Ma for being on the side of the dictator during the most crucial period of time in Taiwan's history of democratic development. Nevertheless, the electorate seemed to care little about Ma's alleged spying activities. It may be important for the people of Taiwan to discuss their history and the involvement of current politicians in the suffering of political opponents during the reign of white terror, but election campaigns are no longer the

right place to talk about history. People in Taipei have heard too much of such stories during the last 10 years and are no longer willing to talk about the old times.

The DPP's campaign strategy in the Taipei race changed compared with previous elections in the sense that Lee campaign team refrained from relying on traditional campaign methods such as large street rallies. There maybe various reasons for this, but one of the key ones is simply that voters do not know why they should join such rallies. The support of civil groups for the DPP seems to be vanishing, especially after the farmers and fishermen's demonstration of Nov. 23 when over 100,000 people took to the streets of Taipei. Numerous former civil groups that supported the DPP in the past turned out this time urging the electorate not to vote for DPP candidates. Full-page ads in mass-circulating newspapers requesting the voters not to vote green were common. This all made Ma Ying-jeou's election victory a foregone conclusion.

In Kaohsiung, the election victory of DPP candidate Frank Hsieh was more of a surprise given the fact that claims of Hsieh's involvement in the Zanadau scandal seemed to do him serious harm. Apart from the scandal, the public in general feels discontent with current government economic policies. Taiwan's economy has been challenged by a recession and record unemployment. GDP has shrunk considerably throughout the last years while the nation's economists speak of the steepest GDP decline since the oil crisis of the 1970s. Much blame for the poor economy had been pinned on the DPP government. In addition, the farmer and fishermen's demonstration and the subsequent resignation of key government members once again conveyed the message of an inefficient government. Perhaps dissatisfied voters did not go to the polls instead of voting for the KMT. With election turnout averaging 71 percent, the Kaohsiung election had the lowest turnout ever.

But whatever the turnout, the KMT candidate lost the election, leaving James Soong standing in the rain after his ridiculous performance in Taipei, when he kneeled down begging for votes in support of Ma. James Soong's party refrained from nominating its own candidates in the mayoral race. The party decided to support the KMT candidates instead. In Taipei his support was unnecessary since Ma Ying-yeou enjoys far higher popularity than Soong, and in Kaoshiung his appearance at several campaign rallies did not change the election mood there. Soong's chances of becoming president in 2004 seem to be gradually disappearing.

In the city council elections, the DPP and the KMT received one third of the seats each in Taipei, and in Kaoshiung the DPP won more seats than the KMT for the first time in history. TSU performed poorly in Taipei and in Kaoshiung. In total, only two out of the fourteen candidates got elected. Surprisingly, the New Party had five out seven hopefuls elected. James Soong's People First Party had a meagre showing in Taipei where fewer than half of the party's candidates were voted into office. The Green Party

once again failed to get enough popular support (see Table 2. 13 and Table 2. 14).

Table 2. 13 Election results city council elections 2002 and 1998

| | 2002 | | 1998 | | Change |
Party	Seats	%	Seats	%	%
Taipei					
Democratic Progressive Party	17	32.69	19	36.54	-10.53
Kuomintang	20	38.46	23	44.23	-13.04
People First Party	8	15.38	-	-	-
Taiwan Solidarity Union	0	0.00	-	-	-
New Party	5	9.62	9	17.31	-44.44
Green Party	0	0.00	0	0.00	0.00
other parties[a]	-	-	0	0.00	-
independents	2	3.85	1	1.92	100.00
Total	52	100.00	52	100.00	0.00
Kaoshiung					
Democratic Progressive Party	14	31.82	9	20.45	55.56
Kuomintang	12	27.27	25	56.82	-52.00
People First Party	7	15.91	-	-	-
Taiwan Solidarity Union	2	4.55	-	-	-
New Party	0	0.00	1	2.27	-100.00
other parties[b]	-	-	0	0.00	-
independents	9	20.45	9	20.45	0.00
Total	44	100.00	44	100.00	0.00

Source: Compiled by Christian Schafferer; data provided by the Central Election Commission
[a] other parties: New Nation Alliance, Taiwan Independence Party, China Women Party.
[b] other parties: Taiwan Independence Party.

It is interesting to note that the KMT for the first time practised the forced vote distribution system (*pei piao*). In previous elections, it had been the party's strategy to support those candidates with higher popularity ratings in opinion surveys and to neglect the others. The KMT obviously has learned from its previous election defeats. Only one of the 21 KMT candidates in Taipei was not elected. In this election, for instance, the KMT nominated five candidates in the third district of Taipei. The party gave each of its five candidates two single-digit numbers, i.e. zero and one to the first candidate, two and three to the second and so forth. Party supporters were urged to vote for the candidate whose number coincides with the last digit of their National Identity Number (*shenfenzheng zihao)*. If most KMT supporters

followed the strategy, each candidate should receive an equal amount of votes. In other districts, the KMT nominated two, three or four candidates. In these cases, the party instructed the supporters to cast their votes according to the month in which they were born.

Table 2. 14 Election results city council elections 2002 and 1998 (votes)

	2002		1998		Changes
Party	Votes	%	Votes	%	%
Taipei					
Democratic Progressive Party	383,905	28.52	455,613	30.96	-7.87
Kuomintang	431,830	32.08	589,907	40.08	-19.96
People First Party	236,418	17.56	-	-	-
Taiwan Solidarity Union	50,015	3.72	-	-	-
New Party	121,399	9.02	273,195	18.56	-51.41
Green Party	1,807	0.13	22,274	1.51	-91.13
other parties[a]	-	-	37,838	2.57	-
independents	120,734	8.97	92,966	6.32	41.99
Total	1,346,108	100.00	1,471,793	100.00	-
Kaoshiung					
Democratic Progressive Party	191,913	25.03	211,954	26.81	-6.66
Kuomintang	197,506	25.76	357,163	45.18	-42.99
People First Party	91,903	11.98	-	-	-
Taiwan Solidarity Union	51,500	6.72	-	-	-
New Party	4,807	0.63	30,363	3.84	-83.68
Taiwan Independence Party	-	-	14,707	1.86	-
independents	229,189	29.89	176,308	22.30	34.01
Total	766,818	100.00	790,495	100.00	-

Source: Compiled by the author; data provided by the Central Election Commission
[a] other parties: New Nation Alliance (27,282), Taiwan Independence Party (9,633), China Women Party (923).

Notes

1. The term of all National Assembly members expired on 19 May 2000. With effect from that date, 300 Assembly members will be elected within three months of the expiration of a six-month period following the public announcement of a proposal by the LY to amend the Constitution or to alter the national territory, or within three months of a petition initiated by the LY for the impeachment of the president or the vice-president. Elected members have to convene of their own accord within

ten days after the confirmation of the election result and have to remain in session not longer than one month, with the term of office expiring on the last day of the convention.

2. For a detailed analysis on Taiwan's local elections see: Christian Schafferer, *The Power of the Ballot Box: Political Development and Election Campaigning in Taiwan* (Lanham: Lexington, 2003).

3. For a detailed analysis on this election see: Christian Schafferer, *The Power of the Ballot Box: Political Development and Election Campaigning in Taiwan* (Lanham: Lexington, 2003).

4. Freedom House upgraded its rating on Taiwan in its latest annual report (political rights: 1; civil rights: 2) and thus gave Taiwan the same ratings as most member states of the European Union, such as Germany, France and Italy. Moreover, it outperformed the European Union member state of Greece in terms of civil liberties (political rights: 1; civil liberties: 3). By international standards, Japan (political rights: 1; civil liberties: 2) and Taiwan are thus East Asia's most democratic countries (Freedom House, "Freedom in the World," <http://216.119.117.183/research/freeworld/2001/table1.htm> (4 December 2001).

5. There are two main political 'camps' in Taiwan: the blue and the green. The name derives from the main color in the party flag of the KMT and the DPP respectively. The blue camp comprises the KMT, PFP and NP, the green camp the DPP and TSU. The blue camp is pro-unification, whereas the green camp is not interested in unifying with the PRC.

6. See Christian Schafferer, "Taiwan's Nuclear Policy and Anti-nuclear Movement," in *Understanding Modern Taiwan*, ed. Christian Aspalter, (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2001), pp. 97-126.

7. *Journalist*, 6 September 2001.

8. Bonnie Glaser, "China's Taiwan Policy: Still Listening and Watching," <http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0133.htm> (20 November 2001).

9. Rainmaker, *tai wan di qu 2000 nian da xuan te bie bao dao* [Taiwan 2000 Election Special Report], (Rainmaker: Taipei, 2000).

10. Rainmaker, *tai wan di qu 2001 nian da xuan te bie bao dao* [Taiwan 2001 Election Special Report], (Rainmaker: Taipei, 2001).

11. Chen-Chia Huang, "xuan zhan wen xuan de mi mi" [The Secrets of Election Propaganda], Brain, December 2001, pp. 30-35.

12. Tsu-leong Cheng, "hu zhi ni ba, bu jian niu rou" [Mudslinging, no Beef in Sight], Brain, December 2001, pp. 24-29.

13. see www.pfp.org.tw

14. *Liberty Times*, 29 November 2001; *Taipei Times*, 17 November 2001

15. *Liberty Times*, 11 November 2001

16. Huang, "xuan zhan wen xuan de mi mi," pp. 30-35.

17. *Taipei Times*, 17 November 2001; *Liberty Times*, 17 November 2001

18. *Taipei Times*, 30 November 2001

19. *Taipei Times*, 21 November 2001

20. *United Daily News*, 29 November 2001

21. *United Daily News*, 2 December 2001

22. In past elections, China's state media warned about dire consequences should the DPP or other pro-independence figures gain substantial popular support.

23. Similar to the social security number in other countries.

24. The NP used the same system in the 1995 parliamentary election in the city of Taipei and in the counties of Taipei and Taoyuan. Twelve out of their fourteen candidates were elected as a result. (Cheng-hao Pao, "xin dang ping jun pei piao ce lüe jiao jie zhi yan jiu: yi ba shi si nian li fa wei yuan xuan ju wei li," [The Effectiveness of the New Party's Strategy of Forced Vote Distribution in the 1995 Legislative Election]," *Journal of Electoral Studies* 5, no. 1 (May 1998): pp. 95-138).
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3

Elections and Political Development
in Mongolia

Hollis S. Liao

Mongolia, a land locked country, occupies a vast territory of 1.56 million square kilometers and has 2.4 million inhabitants in this vast open land.

In the thirteenth century, the Mongols formed a steppe empire and became the emperors of theYuan dynasty in China. It wasn't until early in 1921, that part of the Mongols, the Khalkha Mongols, established their own country again and declared the independence of Mongolia. At that time, Mongolia was ruled under a constitutional monarchy system led by a religious head, the 8th Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu, who passed away in May 1924. On November 26, 1924, Mongolia's first constitution was adopted, the country's official name became "People's Republic of Mongolia" (PRM), and Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) became the ruling power.

Mongolia was the second country after the Soviet Union to establish a communist system, and it was the first communist country in Asia. As a satellite of the Soviet Union, Mongolia did not enjoy complete independence until 1990.

The Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party was the only political party and had the sole power in its hands. It controlled the legislative, administrative, and juridical systems until the late 1980s, when large-scale demonstrations and hunger strikes forced the MPRP Politburo to resign and to legalize a political opposition. During the process of democratization that started in 1990, Mongolia's achievements are manifold. The country began to pursue an independent foreign policy and successfully established ties with far more countries than during communist rule. As to the domestic political environment, the Party Law was passed in 1990, forcing the then

ruling MPRP to give away its privileges and to compete with other political parties for political power. The legislative body, Ulsiin Yehe Khural (national great assembly, hereafter the State Great Khural or Khural) is composed of the representatives elected by be people in open, free, and equal elections held every four years. The government and all government officers are responsible to and checked by the legislative body. All these changes have without doubt given Mongolia a completely different political life if compared with that of previous years.

Mongolia and Democracy

From the Greek period to the present time, the definition of democracy has changed. David Held summarizes the theories of democratic development into nine categories, and considers that in the twentieth century competitive elites, multi-ism, legislative democracy, democratic autonomy, and global democracy are the most important of these categories.[1] It is understood that the political life in a democratic society has at least the following features:

(a) There are two or more political parties, which compete fairly in elections.
(b) The political system in the country is guided by party politics.
(c) In addition, there is a check and balance function between the legislative, administrative, and juridical branches. Therefore, capable professional elites take the responsibility of policy-making and also abide by the rules outlined in constitution and other laws.

From this point of view, the newly established democracies in the late 1980s and early 1990s all intended to establish a constitutional democracy, and Mongolia is no exception here. Former minister of foreign affairs, N. Tuya, mentioned in her speech at the 54th UN General Assembly meeting in December 1999 that in the past ten years, Mongolia had taken certain measures to build up a democratic system. She said that the preliminary achievements of Mongolia in the development of democracy were its market oriented economic system and its cooperation with the international community.[2]

However, democratization means more than changes in economy and foreign relations. As a matter of fact, the political system plays an important role. This paper looks into the Mongolia's constitutional changes, legislative initiatives, and government administration as to give the reader an idea about Mongolia's political changes.

A New Constitution: From Socialist to Democratic

After the collapse of the communist regime in the early 1990s, Mongolia's ruling party, the MPRP agreed to a peaceful transition to democracy and in doing so ended seventy years of one party rule. In 1990 the first democratic general election was held. The MPRP gained the majority of seats in both of the houses of parliament: 84.6 percent in the Great Khural, and 61.7 percent in the Baga Khural. The elected Great Khural passed a new constitution on 13 January 1992. This was the fourth constitution of Mongolia. The first constitution was passed on 26 November 1924. The second was enacted on 30 June 1940 and amended subsequently in 1944, 1949, 1952, and 1959.[3] The third Constitution was adopted on 6 July 1960.

The major difference between the 1992 Constitution and the previous ones is the diminishing importance of communist ideology and role of the MPRP. For instance, the phrase "the guiding and directing force of society and the state in the MPR is the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, which is guided in its activity by the all-triumphant Marxist-Leninist theory"[4] in the preamble of the 1960 Constitution was removed. The new constitution consists of six chapters and seventy articles, in which there are special chapters dealing with human rights issues, the power of the president, the constitutional court, and other issues relevant to democratic rule.

Over four hundred members of the People's Great Khural took part in the discussion of a new constitution in 1990 and a semi-presidential system was preferred.[5] The concept of administrative, legislative, and juridical separation was taken from the western idea of constitutional spirit. According to the new constitution, government officials are required to submit reports to the State Great Khural and answer questions raised by its members. This is the check and balance mechanism usually found in democracies. In Mongolian history, the semi-presidential system was a new experience. According to this system, legislative power resides in the parliament, whereas the president and the government share administrative power. H. Hulan, a former member of the Khural, considers this semi-presidential system a compromise between the democratic forces and the MPRP. The new system satisfied the conservative wing in the MPRP who insisted on a presidential system, and also included the democratic ideas of human rights and personal property demanded by progressive forces within the party.[6] A semi-presidential system gives the president the right of vetoing any law passed by the State Great Khural. If there is, however, a two-thirds majority in the Khural rejecting the veto, the law has to be accepted by the president. The president is also granted the right to negotiate with the prime minister to resolve the State Great Khural in accordance with the consent of two thirds of the members of the Khural. The president in Mongolia does not have ultimate and unlimited power. Since 1997, certain disagreements have occurred between the president and the State Great Khural, especially when the majority of the Khural and the president had different party affiliations.

The Democratic Coalition government was asked to resign three times in the first three years in power. There was also an awkward situation when the president kept rejecting the nominees for the position of prime minister, who were proposed by the State Great Khural in 1999.

There is also a new phenomenon in Mongolia's political domain that has to do with the constitutional court that was established to solve any arguments or to clarify the true meaning of all articles comprising the constitution. As a matter of fact, since the new constitution went into force, there have occurred several situations not accounted for in the original version of the constitution. Thus, there has been the necessity of amending the constitution. According to the constitution, government officials and organizations that enjoy the right of legislative initiative may initiate amendments to constitution. (Article 68). Two thirds of the members of the State Great Khural have to support such an amendment (Article 69).

As can be seen in the case of the tug of war between the president and the Khural in the nomination of the Prime Minister in 1999, the 1992 Mongolian Constitution does have imperfections. It fails to provide clear explanations for various unforeseeable situations that could come up in future. One problem lies in the unclear division of power between the president and the Khural. Another question left unanswered is whether the members of the Khural may concurrently serve as cabinet members.

On 16 January 1998, the Democratic Coalition proposed an amendment to the constitution in order to allow the members of the Khural to concurrently hold government positions, but the proposal was rejected. The dispute continued and two years later an agreement was reached. The Khural passed the draft of an amendment to the Constitution on 13 December 2000.[7] The content of the amendment is that the prime minister and one third of the government officials may be members of the Khural. The State Great Khural and the constitutional court approved the amendments but the president vetoed the amendment giving his reasons by quoting Article 22 #1, Article 33 #1-2, and Article 27 of the Constitution.[8] The State Great Khural did, however, not accept the presidential veto. Thus, the president had no choice but accept the amendment. From this case it can seen that the Mongolian president wields restricted power. It seems possible that further conflicts between the president and the State Great Khural may arise on other issues in future. It can be seen as a shortcoming of the 1992 Mongolian Constitution that the document fails to give anyone or any organization the authority to resolve disputes between the president and the State Great Khural.

Forming a Multi-party System

Like other communist countries, Mongolia had a one party-state system before 1990. The MPRP was the only legal party in the country. With democratization changes occurred. The government mouthpiece Unen (lit.

truth), for instance, became the organ of the party. Moreover, many privileges that party leaders obtained from the state were abolished. All symbolic signs propagandizing the party were removed from many public sites. Nevertheless, the most important change was the promulgation of the Part Law, which allows the formation of opposition parties.

In a democratic political system, political parties have the following characteristics: being an enduring organization, having the aim of ruling the country; and obtaining public support through elections.[9]

The Party Law was adopted and became effective on 10 May 1990. Within one year, there were several new parties formed: The Mongolian National Development Party (MNDP), the Mongolian Free Labor Party (MFLP), the Mongolian Democratic Party (MDP), the Mongolian Social Democratic Party (MSDP), and the Mongolian Green Party (MGP).[10] They all stated that their aim was to search for ways to enhance political reform, to unify Mongolia and to develop a humanistic and democratic society. The MPRP was the only party to insist on the creation of a socialist society rather than a democratic one.

In the first half of 1994, nine more parties registered.[11] Party competition became a phenomenon in Mongolia. This competition can be best observed during elections. Since 1990, Mongolia has held three elections at the national level (the Khural) in 1992, 1996, and 2000, three presidential elections in 1993, 1997 and 2001, and two local elections in 1997 and 2001, respectively. Many newly founded parties took part in these campaigns. The new parties lost in the first State Great Khural election and realized that they would not be able to compete with the MPRP without forming a coalition. Therefore, they started to cooperate with each other since then and finally merged. Between 1992 and 1996, the Republican Party, MFLP, and the right wing of the MDP merged and became the Party of Unity. Later the Party of Unity, MDP, the Mongolian Renaissance Party, and the Mongolian National Development Party merged and became the Mongolian National Democratic Party. The Mongolian Peasants and Herders United Party, the Mongolian Independent Party, and Mongolian Owners of Private Property United Party merged into the Mongolian Traditional Unity Party.[12] Sometimes, parties merged into a big party for a while then for some reason separated from each other again. For example, the Republic Party and the Party for Mongolia merged in May 1999,[13] but in early 2000 they decided to become independent parties again.[14] In late February of 1998, the chairmen of the MSDP and MNDP sent out an invitation appealing for a merger of the two parties.[15] Nevertheless, influential party members did not support their plans.[16] Although the merger would have turned Mongolia's political system into a two-party one, the majority of party members still supported the current party system with two plus one—two big powerful parties and one small party.[17]

Thus, the issue of party mergence was put aside until the "Democratic Coalition" lost the campaign in the election of 2000. The general secretary

of the MNDP B. Delgermaa admitted that their failure came from the split of the democratic forces.[18] In view of the votes that the MPRP members obtained were just little over 50%, but the MPRP got 94.7% of the seats in the State Great Khural, the chairmen of these two parties again appealed for a party merger.[19] In October, a preparatory work team including representatives from the MNDP, the MSDP, the Mongolian Religious Democratic Party, the Mongolian Democratic Party, and the Mongolian Democratic Renaissance Party was formed. After two months of preparation, the MNDP and the MSDP held party congresses respectively and decided on the leadership and whom to nominate for presidential race of 2001.[20] On 6 December 2000, the great convention of the five parties mentioned above was held in Ulaanbaatar. One thousand five hundred representatives from these five parties attended the meeting. After chairmen of the parties gave speeches, G. Gankhuyag who chaired the convention declared the merger of the parties. The Democratic Party, the new party, registered under the original registration number and emblem of the MSDP, and the flag of the MNDP. All properties of the five parties were transferred to the new party.[21]

Apart from party mergers, there are also new parties established from time to time. In 1998 and 1999, eight more political parties were registered. They are the Mongolian Democratic Social Party, the Youth Party, the Mongolian New Democratic Social Party, the Mongolian Countryside Development Party, the Mongolian Communist Party, Local Development Party, the Mongolian Democratic Party (was merged into the MNDP in 1992 but in early 2000 registered as an independent party again), and the Civil Will Party.[22]

The number of political parties cannot be considered a variable to evaluate the quality of democratization in a country. In the early 1990s, 20-30 people could form a political party in Yugoslavia, therefore there were a couple of hundred political parties but none of them protected democracy and human rights. In the case of Mongolia, at the inception of Party Law, many newly founded parties only had 801 members to meet the basic requirement to form a party. In view of the Mongolian population being only 2.4 million, it is unnecessary to have this many political parties to function. From the standpoint of the party platforms and plans, there is actually not much difference between the parties. Many parties appeal for social needs rather than seek a political goal. As to the names of the parties, the words 'democratic', 'social democratic', 'democratic social', and 'new democratic social' have become mainstream. In terms of political ideology, there is no difference among all parties. The multi-party system in Mongolia encourages political and social community based on various appeals to form political parties. In more than ten years, political parties in Mongolia number more than ten. In future, new parties may emerge via either new establishment or mergers. As scholar S. Bold mentioned, although Mongolia has a new multi-party system, the standpoint of the ruling party and major opposition parties are not stable and concrete. Thus, conflicts among them are

problematic and enormous, which will have a negative impact on the social and economic development. He therefore suggests that all parties negotiate to make concessions and to cooperate for the sake of national interests. Only then may the democratic seeds planted in the 1990s be harvested.[23] Here are the problems that Mongolia has to face in the process of political democratization and multi-party development.

Composition and Performance of the State Great Khural

The State Great Khural is the legislative body at the national level. It had the former name of the Yehe Khural (big assembly) and was renamed Ardiin Yehe Khural (people's great khural) in 1951. Since 1992, it has a new name: Ulsiin Yehe Khural and its functions are similar to parliaments in western countries.

The first Mongolian Constitution overruled the electoral rights of secular and ecclesiastical feudal rulers, permanent residents of temples and monasteries, moneylenders, and those who lived on the labor of others.[24] The second Constitution (1940) was amended in 1949 to introduce direct elections, a secret ballot and universal suffrage, but the candidates had to be approved by the MPRP.[25] According to article 21 of Mongolia's 1960 Constitution, citizens of the MPR were given rights to elect the representatives to the People's Great Khural, but prior to 1981, the Khural elections were no more than a rubber stamp as the candidates were all chosen by the monoparty, the MPRP. In mid-March 1990, the eighth plenum of the MPRP's Nineteenth central committee, under pressure from the democracy movement, decided to hold a general election for the People's Great Khural later that year. On June 16, the Presidium of the Khural decided to amend the new Election Law to allow for direct elections. The first poll was postponed from early June to July 8, and then to July 22. The MPRP won 85% of the seats in the People's Great Khural and was able to retain its position as ruling party.

The first State Great Khural election was held after the new democratic Constitution became effective in 1992. There were twelve parties enrolled for the campaign. The MPRP still won the election and obtained seventy out of seventy-six seats in the State Great Khural. By the time of the election in 1996, there were twelve legal political parties and 14,5000 people had registered as party members in Mongolia.[26] In the Khural election of 1996, there were candidates from 11 parties to run for seats. Parties either campaigned independently or joined forces with each other. The Democratic Coalition won fifty seats of the State Great Khural, but the MPRP obtained only twenty-five seats, which made it pass the ruling power to the opposition forces. This was the beginning of a new era in the democratic development of Mongolian political life.

According to the Mongolian Constitution, the State Great Khural is the highest organ of State, and legislative power shall be vested solely therein (article 20). It has one chamber and consists of seventy-six members. Mongolian citizens reaching the age of twenty-five have the right to run for seats in the State Great Khural on the basis of universal, free, direct suffrage by secret ballot for the term of four years (Article 21). According to Article 25 of the Constitution, the State Great Khural has several powers. These include adopting, supplementing and amending laws; determining the basis of the State's domestic and foreign policies; determining and changing the structure and composition of the Standing Committees of the Parliament, the Government and other bodies directly accountable to it under the law; passing a law validating the election of the President and recognizing his powers, releasing him from his duties or recalling him; appointing, replacing or removing the Prime Minister, members of the Government and other bodies responsible and accountable to the Parliament as provided for by law; issuing acts of amnesty; ratifying and denouncing international agreements to which Mongolia is a party, establishing and severing diplomatic relations with foreign States at the suggestion of the Government; declaring a state of war in the event that sovereignty and independence of the State are threatened by armed actions of a foreign power, and ending it; and declaring a state of emergency or martial law. The Parliament convenes regular sessions every six months, and each session shall not be less than seventy-five days (Article 27). The Khural seems to be given a great deal of responsibilities besides rights. It is also clear that the members of Khural have to attend session meetings about half a year. In the transition of "being ruled by party" to "being ruled by law", the Khural seems to be playing a very important role. Since 1992, the members of the Khural have been occupied with passing and amending laws, which are demanded to accommodate the situation of transition. Between 1992 and 1996, the Parliament approved one hundred fifty new laws, amended one hundred twenty laws, invalidated fifty-two laws and declared three hundred thirty-one orders.[27]

When the Democratic Coalition became the majority in the State Great Khural in 1996, there were several manifestations that deserve to be mentioned. The members of the Khural were highly educated and young (their average age was about forty-one). More than two thirds of them were elected to the Khural for the first time. The ratio of male to female members was 69:7. The structure of the State Great Khural had been expanded and the groups of majority and minority were formed under the regulation of law for the first time.[28] In terms of its performance, the second State Great Khural focused on amending laws other than passing laws. The speed of amending laws was also amazing. For instance, the Law for the Rights of State Great Khural Representatives was approved in one session, but the following session had it amended. We also notice that the Law of Casino was passed but then became null and void even before it was ever carried

out. The second State Great Khural was also criticized for the very low attendance of its members.[29]

In the year of 2000, the MPRP won an overwhelming victory in the State Great Khural election. In seventy-two constituencies, the average ballots the MPRP attained was 52.94%. Moreover, in those four constituencies that the party lost, the number of votes that the MPRP candidates obtained were second to the elected ones. In twenty constituencies of Ulaanbaatar city, the MPRP won nineteen and the average number votes accounted for 53.16%.[30] The MPRP obviously won more than half of the voters' support. The victory in Ulaanbaatar changed the stereotyped image of the MPRP only being able to mobilize in the countryside.

The MPRP thus again became the majority party in the State Great Khural. According to the Law of the State Great Khural, a party with more than eight seats may form a party group in the State Great Khural. The opposition forces only won two seats in the Khural and were unable to form any alliance. The function of check and balance in the State Great Khural certainly dwindled. On the positive side, the law making and amending will be passed without prolonged debating because any law with the approval of two thirds of attendant members will be enacted. The MPRP members in the Khural are beyond this number. Any boycott effort by the opposition against the majority of the Khural seems difficult. However, when a party becomes a mighty power in the Khural, the party interests may be considered prior to anything else. After the members of the Khural took oaths, the MPRP members were asked by the party to sign an agreement, which requires all of them not to disobey any decisions of the baga khural (regular meeting) and the "guiding committee". The latter, consequently, became the absolute decision making body, and the MPRP members were no longer the representatives of the electors.

Forming New Type of Government

Before March 1990, Mongolia was a communist state model of Soviet political structures. The highly centralized governmental structure was divided into three major parts: the executive branch, presided over by the Council of Ministers; the legislative branch, represented at the national level by the unicameral People's Great Khural; and the judicial branch, with a supreme Court presiding over a system of law administered by courts and by an Office of the Procurator of the Republic.

In the 1992 Constitution the highest executive body of the state is called 'government' instead of the Council of Ministers. Before the new Constitution was adopted, the first free, multiparty, multi-candidate election was held on July 22, 1990. The MPRP won 85% of the seats in the Khural and 60% of the party preference votes.[31] The MPRP had a majority in the Khural and retained its position as ruling party. For the first time in Mongolian history, the chairman of the MPRP invited the opposition parties to join the

MPRP in a coalition government. Chairman of the MSDP Radnassurengiyn Gonchigdorj became the first vice president in Mongolia.

Prime Minister Deshiyn Byambasuren proposed in a meeting of the Little Khural[32] that Mongolia should establish a multi-party government which would reflect the views of all parties concerning the country's future development and the interests of all sectors of the population. It would take the form of a cabinet, in that all its members would share responsibility for policy; if that policy should fail, the entire government would step down. He also added that the cabinet would set up highly specialized organizations and make efforts to maintain steady and harmonious relations with the Khural, while retaining its independence. Government policies would reflect public opinion and the party affiliation of government members would not matter.[33] The whole idea about the formation of government became the basic content of chapter three in the 1992 Constitution.

Streamlining the structure of government was also a major concern of the coalition government. First of all, the number of ministries was cut from twenty to eleven, plus one national commission. Cabinet membership was also reduced to sixteen: the premier, three deputy premiers, eleven ministers, and the chairman of the national commission.[34] The three deputy premiers were from the MPRP, the MDP, and the National Progress Party respectively. Among eleven ministers, there were only four from the MPRP. Sharing power with the opposition parties was a good gesture by the MPRP that showed its commitment to democratization in Mongolia. Nevertheless, in the cabinet there was only one member from the MDP, the most powerful opposition party. Some observers considered that the MPRP did this based on the strategy of isolating its major rival by giving favors to the minor parties.

Most of the high-ranking members in the coalition government were young technocrats between the ages of thirty and fifty; half of them had a college education. The main task set out for the new government was to recover from the economic decline. The performance of these technocrats would have impacted the social, political and economic development in Mongolia.

Nevertheless, before the second government formed in 1992, the coalition government only had about two years to implement its policies. During this crucial transition time, in terms of economic development the government policy of privatization was one that should win the coalition government praise.

In 1992, the MPRP retained its ruling power. It was also the time to show its strength to lead the country as it marched forward toward democracy. Facing a totally different situation from that in the period of time ruled by communist ideology, the MPRP was on its own to rule the country now. How to solve the economic recession in the country? How to carry out an independent foreign policy, which puts the national interests as the first priority? Although the MPRP had experiences of ruling a country for more

than seventy years, without the assistance of the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, these tasks became a great challenge to the MPRP. After four years in power the MPRP was still unable to increase its reputation because the lagging economy did not improve too much; unemployment increased; the crime rate was soaring. The inflation rate in 1993 was 183%. Although it fell to 53% in 1995, there was still 25% of the population living below the poverty line (ten dollars of monthly income). All these social and economic problems made people lose their confidence in the MPRP. The result was the MPRP's loss in the 1996 election of the State Great Khural.

The Democratic Coalition won the election and formed a new government in July of 1996. The young democrats for the first time had an opportunity to rule the country and had the ambition to improve the economic and political situation of the country in terms of democratization. As soon as he became the first Prime Minister of the new government, M. Enkhsaikhan set out a 'shock therapy' policy to shape government organizations and to accelerate economic reforms. The original fourteen ministries of the government were reduced to nine. The radical policies included zero customs for imported goods, housing privatization, and speeding privatization of national enterprises. However, the government was unable to lower the inflation rate and the numbers of unemployed and the poor increased. In addition to this the Mongolian currency was devalued. In October of 1997 the State Great Khural asked the Enkhsaikhan government to take responsibility for the failure of government policies and resign but did not succeed. As the government did not change its policies, Enkhsainkhan was asked in April of 1998 to resign for the second time. This time he was not as lucky as before.

Ts. Elbegdor replaced Enkhsaikhan but was not in the position too long before he was asked to resign in July 1998. This resulted from his concealed decision to merge the state owned Sergen Bank into a commerce bank, Golomot Bank. After he resigned, he still served as a deputy for five months until president Bagbandi finally approved the new Prime Minister nominee. President Bagbandi had rejected the nominee Da. Ganbold who was proposed by the Democratic Coalition group in the State Great Khural seven times.

Finally, the former Ulaanbaatar city mayor J. Narantsatsralt took the position of Prime Minister in December of 1998. He certainly did not foresee that he would become the third Prime Minister in the Democratic Coalition government to resign. He stepped down as he was criticized for his wrongdoings on the issue of privatizing the Mongolia and Russia joint venture, the Erdenet Company.

The frequent replacement of Prime Ministers is unusual in democratic countries even if it is a sign to show the officials' responsibility for their policies or decisions. In the case of Mongolia, it reflected the instability in politics at that period of time or at least some foreign investors in Mongolia considered it so.

When the MPRP became the ruling party again in 2000, N. Enkhbayar became the Prime Minister and started the task of restructuring his government. Nine ministries were expanded into eleven,[35] in which the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of National Development were newly established. The Ministry of Infrastructure was divided into Ministry of Mineral Resources and Ministry of Transportation and Communication.[36] Agencies, which had affiliations with the government, were reduced from fifty-seven to forty-seven.[37] In addition, there were some shifts in job assignments in some ministries. Nevertheless, it didn't have much significance except as a sign that the current government differed from the previous government in appearance.

In terms of education and work experiences, the cabinet members were all well educated and possessed professional specialties. The oldest minister was fifty-seven; the youngest one was only thirty-six. Their former professions included economist, engineer, lawyer, teacher, physician, veterinarian, and professional diplomat. In view of the MPRP campaign commitment, the economic and social problems would be their priority to deal with. This commitment also became the work plan of the government. In the past two years, the Enkhbayar government has been making efforts at improving economic development. To attract foreign investment in Mongolia, a forum for foreign investors was held in Ulaanbaatar in August 2002. The government also provided several tax deduction policies for long-term foreign investors. As many favored policies in the economic field are released, there are also signs of political stability in the MPRP government. In view of this, if the economic and political situations in the country are getting better, the chance for opposition parties to regain power to rule the country in 2004 seems slim.

Conclusion

After having been ruled by the communists for over seventy years, Mongolia chose a different path in its political life in the 90s. The great significance of political development in Mongolia since 1990 is its reform pace and depth of democratization both in its economy and its politics. A new democratic constitution paves the path for Mongolia to march to democracy. The State Great Khural as a legislative body has been making new laws to meet the situation of being ruled by law. Performances of the governments administered by different parties deserve credit, because they all tried to find the best for the Mongolian people. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the ultimate goal of being ruled by law has undergone severe challenges during the past twelve years.

While the rest of world appraises the achievements of Mongolia in the field of politics, we all have to give credit to the reformers and the opposition to the MPRP. Nevertheless, if we notice the significance of the nineteenth congress of the MPRP which paved the path of renewal in Mongolia,

we will understand that without the awareness of the MPRP that it was necessary to reshape the political system, as well as society's social and intellectual life, democratization in Mongolia certainly would not have been undertaken this smoothly.

Because of its communist background and the fact that the MPRP was still under attack for its political ideology and viewpoints, the party chairman N. Enkhbayar declared openly right after the party's victory in the 2000 election that the MPRP is not a communist party anymore. The loss of the MPRP in 1996 election and the loss of the Democratic Coalition in 2000 election clearly indicate that the Mongolian voters certainly do know what they want from their government. They want further reform and democratization in social, economic and political aspects and these may be the only alternatives that Mongolian politicians have to choose from in the future.

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4

Northeast Asia: The Less than Liberal Peace
Kay Möller

The breakdown of global bipolarity and a lack of multilateral security re-gimes notwithstanding, Northeast Asia has been at peace since the "end of history." Latent conflicts in the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean Peninsula have not turned acute. (Neo-) Realists have explained this with the existence of stable subregional power balances. (Neo-) Liberals have pointed to an ever increasing economic interdependence. Reflectivists have emphasised shared norms and identities.

Most of the same observers would concur that the peaceful impression could be misleading. Social disorder in China could fuel tensions in the Taiwan Strait. A continued meltdown of the North Korean state could lead to war on the peninsula. Competing nationalisms in China and Japan could provoke conflict. Much as in other parts of the world, the disappearance of bipolarity has had the double effect of increasing the domestic impact of globalisation while projecting certain domestic dynamics on the regional, if not international screens.

This analysis proposes to test the 'inside-out' proposition in the Taiwan Strait, on the Korean Peninsula, and in China-Japan relations, and to thus contribute to the contemporary debate on the interrelationships between actor and system, relative and absolute gains.

Trade, Democracy, and Conflict

Granted some overlap, classical Liberal approaches to questions of war and peace can be roughly divided into a Manchester School (the trading state peace proposition) and a Kantian School (the democratic peace proposition). Whereas the former has been somewhat modified in analyses of early twen-

tieth century intra-European relations[1] and the latter has been criticised, among other things, for postulating the kind of mature democracies that hardly exist outside North America and Western Europe,[2] both have been revived and refined since the early 1970s in a Liberal-Institutionalist context. Foremost among the "descendants" of the Manchester School is Richard Rosecrance who believes that incentives to wage war are absent under conditions of high interdependence.[3] Dale Copeland has suggested that trade expectations rather than actual trade act as constraints upon states.[4] Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye further elaborated on the theme by arguing that the effects of economic interdependence depend not so much on how much two states trade, but on how affected their respective policies are by price and income developments in other states, as well as by those states' policies. When the costs of avoiding the consequences of interdependence are too high, "it may seem more sensible, rather than changing its level, to alter its form, i.e., to institute a joint decision-making structure or procedure."[5] Neo-Realists have adopted the opposite approach in arguing that asymmetric interdependence actually raises the likelihood of war because the more dependent state will try to break out of it.[6]

Whereas the abovementioned scholars have focused their analyses on the systemic level, proponents of the "democratic peace proposition" have frequently referred to the importance of domestic institutions and norms. Michael Doyle, for instance, has argued that free speech, electoral cycles, and the public policy process act as restraints on the ability of democratic leaders to apply force vis-à-vis fellow democracies.[7] At the same time, according to mainstream representatives of the proposition, democracies are more prone to apply force vis-à-vis non-democracies for both normative and institutional reasons.[8] And lastly, transitions from authoritarianism to democracy can frequently result in assertive, if not aggressive, nationalism.[9]

Whereas both trading state Liberals and democratic Liberals by and large tend to view their respective states as a black boxes, others have proposed to differentiate between domestic structure (i.e. the nature of state institutions, societal characteristics, and institutional and organisational arrangements linking state and society) on the one hand and coalition-building processes (i.e. non-institutional policy networks that link the society to the political system) on the other. Whereas 'structure' would be the major criterion to distinguish strong from weak states (the latter having fragmented political institutions and lending themselves to pressure by social interest groups), coalition-building focuses on policy networks that help political actors to create an intra-elite consensus in support of their policies.[10] A combined approach would then assume that "[p]olitical decisions are being modified and substantiated...through domestic processes taking place among the political systems (on the one hand) and their societal environments (on the other) that transform domestic requirements."[11] In this context, Gourevitch has recommended to analyse (1) the nature of political institutions and their degree of centralisation, (2) the structure of society,

and (3) the nature of the coalition-building processes (state-dominated, societal control, or democratic corporatism, i.e. continuous bargaining processes among political and societal actors).[12]

At the same time, the complexity of the model would preclude any easy conclusions with regard to the issue of interstate conflict resolution. Whereas one is tempted to assume, for example, that a high degree of institutionalised market liberalisation would be conducive to a trading state peace, this would largely depend on the domestic impact potential losers could make through institutions and networks (the same would apply to states opting for a non-institutionalised export orientation which tries to isolate the internal from the external economy).

This study proposes to test (Neo-) Liberal and (Neo-) Realists assumptions about national approaches to conflict in the Taiwan Strait, on the Korean Peninsula, and across the East China Sea at both the systemic and actor levels. It suggests that the two paradigms, rather than contradicting each other, are mutually conditional.

Zero-Sum in the Taiwan Strait

Through their respective constitutions, both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC) claim jurisdiction over the entire Chinese territory.[13] Technically, both sides remain in a state of civil war. Since 1971, the PRC claim has been recognised by a majority of states, and Peking has replaced Taipei in the UN General Assembly and Security Council. In the early 1990s, Taiwan effectively abandoned its claim by, for example, establishing unofficial relations with countries that had recognised the PRC as the sole representative of China. Previously (in 1954, 1958, and 1962) both sides had engaged in armed conflict (i.e. artillery shelling) that was most of the time provoked by the Taiwan side. In the 1970s, Peking offered the island negotiations on a unification involving certain privileges while ruling out equality (i.e. basically the one country-two systems formula that was later applied to Hong Kong). At the same time, however, the PRC preserved an option to resort to force should Taiwan formalise its de facto-independence (over time, other scenarios were added, among which Taiwan developing nuclear weapons, third party interference, internal chaos in Taiwan or—most recently—Taipei's persistent refusal to engage in negotiations on unification). Between 1993 and 1995, several rounds of informal cross-Strait negotiations, while resulting in agreement on certain technical issues, did not achieve progress on the unification problem. Once Taiwan had started asserting its own separate identity on the international scene, Peking twice (in 1995 and 1996) tried to influence Taiwanese elections through large-scale manoeuvres and missile tests.

Trading State Peace?

Since allowing indirect trade (mostly via Hong Kong) with the PRC in the late 1980s, Taiwan's overall trade surplus has been increasingly rooted in the island's mainland trade, which in 2001 reached a volume of US$ 247 billion.[14] By 2000, Taiwan's China-trade dependency had reached 16.9 per cent on the export side and 4.4 per cent on the import side (corresponding shares for China were 2 per cent on exports and 12.1 per cent on imports.) At the same time, Taiwanese firms had invested approximately US$ 45 billion in the PRC, the greatest share of which was associated with the production of electronics and electrical appliances.[15]

Cross-Strait economic relations have not been a one-way street. During the 1990s, Taiwan was China's most important source of foreign investment, and it was only through this investment that the PRC succeeded in overtaking the island as the world's number three exporter of information technology hardware. Furthermore, the mainland has served as a reexport-base for many Taiwanese companies. These trends are expected to intensify following the accession of both sides, in late 2001 and early 2002, respectively, to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). At the same time, Taiwan's recent recession has shown that the island's economic future is on the world market for hightech products rather than on a Chinese market that remains dominated by low and medium technologies.

Since the mid-1980s, Peking has tried to make use of the new interdependency with a view to promoting its national unification agenda. In this framework, the PRC has repeatedly tried to mobilise the Taiwanese business community against their own government.[16] In the 1990s, the Lee Teng-hui administration (1988-2000) proposed to counter the trend by imposing ceilings on individual investment in the mainland, prohibiting such investment in certain "strategic" sectors and promoting Southeast Asian countries as alternative destinations. Whereas the latter initiative was hampered by the 1997/98 East Asian crisis,[17] the former has met with criticism since the beginning of the global downturn in e-commerce and Taiwan's 2001 recession.

Following his victory in the March 2000 presidential elections, President Chen Shuibian responded to the resulting dilemma by lifting (or offer to lift) certain restrictions on cross-Strait economic relations while shifting the dispute with Peking to the political arena. In 2001, Taipei thus launched the so-called "three mini-links" in trade, transport, and postal services between its islands of Kinmen and Matsu and the nearby mainland coast. The following year, direct trade was legalised as a matter of principle, and 2000 agricultural and industrial PRC-products were cleared for import. Since August 2002, Taiwan companies can invest in the mainland without the involvement of subsidiaries in third countries. Remaining restrictions relate to total investment and security-sensitive technology transfers. In 2002, both sides made (thus far inconclusive) proposals for the establishment of direct trade, transport, and postal links.[18]

As a matter of principle, the trading state peace proposition would thus appear to apply to the Taiwan Strait case as far as both present trade and medium-term trade expectations are concerned. If, nevertheless, politics regularly interfere with this mechanism and keeps evoking the possibility of armed conflict, this would not come as a surprise to mainstream proponents of the rival democratic peace proposition.

Democratic Peace?
According to recent assessments made by the US non-governmental Free-domhouse organisation,[19] Taiwan was rated 2.2 (free) and China 7.6 (non-free) with 1 representing the highest possible rating. Economic opening notwithstanding, the PRC remains an authoritarian one-party state, whereas Taipei has introduced democratic liberties since the late 1980s which today make the Republic of China one of the freest countries in East Asia. It is the resulting antagonism, or, in the words of François Godement, ‚competition for legitimacy‘[20] which keeps irritating cross-Strait relations while preventing an optimisation of economic interdependence. It was thus that President Lee Teng-hui, while paying lip-service to the one-China-principle, and launching a semi-official dialogue in 1992, introduced a "special state-to-state" formula in 1999. His successor Chen Shuibian on the one hand has ruled out both a declaration of independence and a return to Lee's formula, yet on the other has constantly refused to accept the one-China-principle as a basis for cross-Strait negotiations.

At the same time, Chen has continued his predecessor's policy of low-intensity provocations designed to consolidate Taiwan's distinct identity and to test the island republic's cross-Strait and international margin of manoeuvre. Among the latter were unsuccessful annual bids to return to the UN General Assembly, a 2002 unsuccessful bid to join the World Health Organisation (WHO) as an observer, and the decision, to print "issued in Taiwan" on the covers of passports issued by the Republic of China. Also in 2002, a historical territorial claim to Mongolia was dropped, and Vice President Annette Lu met Indonesian cabinet members in Bali. In August 2002, Chen reacted to persistent PRC attempts to restrict Taipei's international space by publicly speculating about a future referendum on the independence issue. It is particularly the hopeless UN-exercise that emphasises the linkage with domestic considerations (not least related to the president's own Democratic Progressive Party [DPP], the constitution of which stipulates a formalisation of independence). As a matter of principle, the potentially conflictual elements of a democratic-authoritarian dyad have worked against a better cross-Strait relationship. It was thus that in a 2000 public opinion poll, 60.89 per cent of local respondents agreed that Taiwan should be an independent country if peace can be maintained, whereas 56.07 per cent favoured unification provided that both sides became politically, economically, and socially compatible.[21] In practice, this combination supports the status quo and its present (reluctant) guarantor Chen Shuibian, as could

be seen in the December 2001 parliamentary elections, when the DPP, a severe recession notwithstanding, won a majority of seats.

On the other side of the Strait, the Peking leadership had sufficient confidence in the growing attraction of the mainland market to ignore Chen and his administration while engaging in dialogue with the Taiwanese business community and the opposition Nationalist (Kuomintang) and People First Party (PFP). Nevertheless, this confidence was not strong enough to accept the latters' proposals for common markets or confederations, and it was certainly not strong enough to desist from repeatedly threatening use of force and occasional sabre rattling. It was thus that the PRC has insisted on negotiating direct trade and other links outside the WTO[22] and on the basis of the one-China-principle and that Chen's speculating about future referendums has been answered with more military threats. Whereas Peking has realised, for the time being, that large-scale demonstrations of military power are counterproductive with the island's electorate[23] and has so far not repeated its March 1996 missile tests and manoeuvres, less visible threats (such as the increase in short-range missiles deployed in the PRC's southeastern provinces and incursions into Taiwan's airspace) have continued. At the same time, occasional overtures made towards Chen and his party by leading PRC politicians have been regularly modified at lower administrative levels.[24]

It would thus appear that whereas both the trading state peace proposition and the (mainstream) democratic peace proposition apply as a matter of principle, they tend to mutually neutralise each other in output terms with the result that the Keohane/Nye scenario has not materialised. As a next step, one would have to ask whether this phenomenon can be further analysed at domestic levels.

Domestic Structure and Coalition Building

Given the antagonism between the economic and political imperatives in export-dependent Taiwan, one would expect the kind of continuous bargaining processes that characterise democratic-corporatist states such as Germany.[25] As a matter of fact, due to the country's fragmented industrial structure and a weak civil society,[26] state institutions during the 1990s ‚displayed a relatively high degree of organisational cohesion' and have ‚guaranteed that the play of particularist interests could be minimised and the scope for rent-seeking activities curtailed.'[27] Among the results were an at least partly effective reform of the financial sector,[28] as well as encouragement of a separate Taiwan identity that at some stage could be translated into assertive nationalism.[29]

In terms of outcome, Chen Shui-bian's combination of less restricted trade and no one-China has become political mainstream and would preclude rising cross-Strait tension, were it not for the uncertainties on the other side (and, to some extent, at the DPP grassroots). PRC politics are characterised by highly centralised political institutions and a weakly organised and

fragmented society. Coalition building is restricted to political elites and by and large excludes both societal actors and public opinion. At the same time, a significant part of China's growth in the 1980s and 1990s was domestically generated, a commitment in principle to market liberalisation has met with resistance among central and local elites, and resulting deficits in legitimacy could lead to the kind of institutional failure that was characteristic of South Korea in the 1990s (see below). If that happens, the economic imperative thus far applied to cross-Strait relations would be severely damaged, and probably even more so in a context of incipient democratisation.

Relative Gains on the Korean Peninsula

North and South Korea are technically at war. Since 1953, the military status quo on the Korean peninsula has been guaranteed by an armistice agreement signed by the American commander-in-chief of a UN-mandated alliance (but not by South Korea[30]) and his counterparts from North Korea and the PRC. In 1954, Washington and Seoul signed a mutual defence treaty. Pyongyang followed suit with defence agreements concluded with the USSR (1961, abrogated in 2000) and China (1961). Up to this day, the peninsula remains effectively divided along the 38th parallel which has emerged as the most fortified border in the world. Because of the global and regional Cold War settings, attempts at engagement and reconciliation failed in the 1970s and 1980s.

Both the Republic of (South-) Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of (North) Korea (DPRK) have publicly upheld the vision of a united peninsula. In 1991, they simultaneously joined the UN and signed two basic treaties, one on non-aggression and reconciliation, the other one on the denuclearisation of both sides. In June 2000, their bilateral dialogue culminated in a historic visit by ROK-President Kim Dae-jung (1998-2002) to Pyongyang. Upon assuming office in 1998, Kim had launched what became generally known as his sunshine diplomacy, an attempt at confidence building through economic cooperation and societal contacts.

The preceding normalisation process had not been linear and could hardly be described as détente at all. The 1991 agreements had been suspended by Pyongyang after US intelligence had made public suspicions in 1993 that the DPRK was secretly developing nuclear weapons, and after Kim Dae-jung's predecessor Kim Young-sam (1993-97) had once again raised the pressure on the North. Having negotiated a nuclear agreement (the so-called Agreed Framework) with the US in October 1994 Pyongyang, under the new leadership of Kim Chung-il, did its best to preserve the Cold War on the peninsula through propaganda and armed provocations. Eventually, a continuously deterring economic situation, culminating in the starvation of 1-2 million people and complicated relationships with the US and Japan led the North to accept Kim Dae-jung's offer. This acceptance of

sunshine diplomacy has remained conditional, however. Whereas the DPRK permitted temporary reunions of families separated by the Korean War and took first steps to reconnect road and railway links through the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) on both sides of the 38th parallel, it would not let itself be engaged in the very military confidence and security building that was the ultimate goal of Kim Dae-jung's initiative. In the meantime, Pyongyang launched complex military, diplomatic, and propagandistic manoeuvres designed to play Seoul against Washington or vice versa and, at a second level, Russia against China, China against Japan, etc. It was only after the Bush Jr. administration had decided to treat North Korea with a benign neglect and, after some 20 months of stagnation in North-South relations that the DPRK, in July 2002, made new overtures towards Seoul and Tokyo that increasingly threatened to isolate the US. At this point, Washington had made a resumption of contacts contingent upon an agenda that would include Pyongyang's testing and exporting of missiles, the concentration of conventional forces along the DMZ and, most importantly, inspections of suspected nuclear sites by the International Atomic Energy (IAEA) as stipulated in the 1994 Agreed Framework. North Korea refuted these demands as preconditions and, in October 2002, officially informed the US about its nuclear weapons programme, thus making the 1994 agreement obsolete as a matter of principle.

Trading State Peace?

Nascent dependence would be a better term than interdependence to describe intra-Korean economic relations at the turn of the century,[31] and the main motivation for Pyongyang to return to the negotiation table during the 1990s was an increasingly critical economic situation. During that decade, North Korea's economy shrank by one third, and today it represents only about five per cent of the size of the southern economy. Whereas total North-South trade remained insignificant at US$ 400,000 in 2001 and did not create major dependencies on either side,[32] sizeable foreign investment in the DPRK has increasingly come from the ROK,[33] has often been politically motivated and thus loss-making.[34] Precluding a Chinese-style economic opening, this situation is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

Speculations about such an opening have been rampant since July 2002, when the DPRK apparently substituted sectoral markets for food, clothing, fuels, and housing for its traditional rationing system. Ailing state enterprises were allegedly instructed to survive without subsidies. The parallel devaluation of the won, while benefiting potential foreign investors, risks to even further shift the country's economic burden to consumers through rising inflation and growing income disparities. Immediately after the introduction of the new measures, consumer prices allegedly increased by at least 50 per cent. The government tried to alleviate the burden by raising salaries, with soldiers and civil servants benefiting most.

In the absence of a consumers' lobby, it is from the latter quarters that resistance against a consequent marketisation can be expected. Even if such resistance could be overcome, however, Kim Chung-il is unlikely to follow the Chinese lead. First of all, economic opening would nurture a new class of local entrepreneurs and technocrats that would at some point challenge the present oligarchy. Secondly, conditions in Kim's North Korea differ from Deng Xiaoping's 1978 China in several important respects. Most importantly, the DPRK economy is dominated by heavy industry with only about 20 per cent of the workforce employed in the agricultural sector, which provided the first growth impulses in the PRC.

In the general framework of sunshine diplomacy, the DPRK has received substantial southern assistance, most of which rice and fertiliser made available as humanitarian aid. Furthermore, Seoul has been the major contributor to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO), charged under the 1994 Agreed Framework to build two light water reactors in North Korea which produce less weapons-grade plutonium than the DPRK's present conventional reactors. Although South Korea is not the only international donor, there have been signs of fatigue among others, with the ROK continuing to be the most reliable source of foreign assistance.

Under such circumstances, and even when taking future developments into account, the current situation in the Korean peninsula can hardly be described as a trading state peace. If the North-South dialogue has nevertheless survived plenty of provocations and setbacks, thus suggesting a win-win situation as a matter of principle, the explanation would have to be found elsewhere.

Democratic Peace?

The 1999/2000 Freedomhouse rating for North and South Korea are 7.7 ("non-free") and 2.2 ("free"), respectively.[35] The DPRK constitutes one of the last totalitarian regimes worldwide. In Pyongyang's propaganda, the ROK remains a puppet of US imperialism, and the people of South Korea should be liberated from capitalist oppression. Prior to sunshine diplomacy, there were only two occasions (in 1974 and 1990, respectively), when North Korea, for reasons related to change in its international environment (see below), appeared ready to engage in serious dialogue with the South.

Much as Taiwan, South Korea went through a top-down democratisation process from the late 1980s onwards. In 1988, the first freely elected president in more than 25 years assumed office and subsequently launched a détente initiative which, in analogy to Germany's 1970s Ostpolitik, became known as 'Nordpolitik.' Similar to the later sunshine diplomacy, the objectives were the establishment of economic and social contacts, encouraging the establishment of economic relations between Pyongyang and third parties, an end to confrontative diplomacy, tying the DPRK into the international community, and facilitating contacts between North Korea and Japan.

Pyongyang at the time insisted on the withdrawal of all American troops from the ROK as a precondition for negotiations, thus effectively precluding a dialogue. Two years later, an increasingly critical economic situation and new international challenges brought the DPRK to the negotiating table, until the same factors inspired another change of mind in the North (see below).

ROK President Kim Young-sam was the first civilian president since 1961 to be elected on the ruling party's ticket. He began his term with a commitment to Nordpolitik, and lifted restrictions on direct intra-Korean business contacts, but increasingly tried to pressure the North both militarily and rhetorically once Pyongyang's economic problems and nuclear brink-manship had come to the open. It was only when the leader of the opposi-tion, former dissident and political prisoner Kim Dae-jung took over in 1998 that détente was conceptualised and comprehensively implicated to the point that the (new) opposition accused the president of giving away more than receiving, thus compromising national security. Kim had been awarded the Nobel peace price in 2000 and, in defending his achievements, had come close to bargaining away certain aspects of South Korea's democracy by stifling criticism of the more sinister aspects of DPRK policies. Towards the end of Kim's term, with an opposition takeover appearing increasingly likely, Pyongyang surprisingly returned to the negotiating table it had left when the Bush Jr. administration had raised the ante on North Korea in 2001 (see below). It is generally expected that any new South Korean administra-tion, while trying to ensure a better balance of mutual concessions, will maintain sunshine diplomacy as a general framework.

It would thus appear that neither the trading state proposition nor the mainstream democratic peace proposition apply in the Korean case and that the emergence of joint structures or procedures can be ruled out for the foreseeable future. On the one hand, this could strengthen the argument of scholars who believe that democracies, by definition, hesitate to apply force in solving their conflicts. On the other, it could underline the necessity of distinguishing different types of democracies.

Domestic Structure and Coalition Building
Since assuming power upon the death of his father in 1994, Kim Chung-il has increasingly relied on the military leadership rather than the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) as a power basis. Military expenses consume about one quarter of Pyongyang's annual budget, and highranking officers have enjoyed privileges such as better housing, better education for their children, and business opportunities. It is believed that major parts of international humanitarian aid made available in the second half of the 1990s were di-verted to the armed forces. The development of weapons of mass destruc-tion, armed forays into the ROK's territory and coastal waters, as well as a constantly high level of bellicose propaganda can be attributed to military as much as civilian political influences. At the same time, the regime has been

cynically oblivious to the fate of ordinary North Koreans. To the extent that there were coup attempts in the past, they have been isolated and unsuccessful.[36]

South of the DMZ, the picture is obviously different in terms of economic and political systems. At the same time, a highly localised party system and instances of presidential authoritarianism signal the survival of older patterns. If the ROK's democracy appears less mature than, for instance, the Taiwanese, then because of a long tradition of institutional failure, including dependence of the bureaucracy on vested economic and political interests. The result was that public-private interactions deteriorated into rent-seeking networks and that the reform process was subject to recurrent intervention and corruption. Together, these problems severely compromised policy-making coherence and efficiency and generated highly detrimental effects on financial stability and economic performance[37] during the 1990s. Financial liberalisation, launched primarily in response to external pressures, was captured by domestic elites as a vehicle for pursuing particularistic interests.[38]

Given the dominant role of politically-connected conglomerates in South Korea's economy, emerging middle classes and entrepreneurial classes have had problems to make themselves heard and have generally chosen to tread carefully among the established players. In the early 1990s, following German unification, they thus more or less accepted the emerging elite consensus that the potential costs of reunification could, after all, be unacceptable.[39] A few years later, Kim Dae-jung's sunshine diplomacy was mostly welcomed as a means to defer such an event as well as its potentially conflictual ramifications. At this point, the Asian financial crisis had compelled Seoul to ask the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for emergency assistance. With representatives of the middle classes being most affected by the crisis, they had reason to view reunification as an even less attractive option.

It was thus South Korea's civil society as organised in trade unions, student associations, and churches became the standard bearer of a new (pro-unification, anti-IMF) nationalism. These social strata had become stronger than its Taiwanese counterparts, if only because of a long history of anti-establishment struggles. Relations between the relatively strong civil society and the strong state have frequently been contentious. Until the end of the Cold War, the state prevailed both through developmentalism and anti-communism. In the second half of the 1990s, both instruments had suffered serious blows. The resulting weakening of the old elite and the emergence of a new nationalism once again made sunshine diplomacy look as a win-win situation, even if it required material sacrifices, and even if representatives of business and civil society lent their support for the opposite reasons.

The obvious problem in this calculus was North Korea itself. With Kim Chung-il remaining reluctant to risk his own demise even for the sake of the

redefined nation, and the DPRK thus requiring ever increasing assistance while offering ever smaller concessions, Kim Dae-jung, at the end of his term, had come close to losing both big business and middle classes while, through economic liberalisation prescribed by the IMF, alienating important sectors of civil society. The opposition, although ready to turn the clock backwards in many respects, could not ignore the power of the new nationalism that had already started affecting relations with Tokyo and Washington. Rather than win-win, the result in terms of North-South relations thus increasingly looked like a stalemate.

Suspense across the East China Sea

Since the end of the Pacific War, China-Japan relations have been characterised by a mixture of mutual admiration (for China's civilisational impact and Japan's economic success, respectively) and lingering suspicion (caused by Japan's war atrocities and China's military modernisation in the 1990s.) Tokyo's 1954 mutual defence assistance agreement with the US, although initially directed against the PRC as much as against the USSR, became increasingly acceptable to Peking as a means to prevent Japanese military unilateralism after Richard Nixon's 1972 visit to Shanghai (which had come as a shock to the Japanese government and had prompted it to establish diplomatic relations with China shortly afterwards.) In the early 1980s, the PRC went as far as encouraging Tokyo to assume a higher military profile with a view to jointly opposing the Soviet Union. As far as Peking was concerned, the 1978 Sino-Japanese friendship treaty committed Japan to China's own anti-hegemonial (anti-Soviet) struggle. This policy was abandoned after 1982, with China declaring an independent (equidistant) stance between Moscow and Washington. Since then, Peking has repeatedly criticised militaristic tendencies in Japan, a critique that gained new momentum following the revision of US-Japan guidelines for bilateral defence cooperation in 1997. In the new guidelines, Tokyo assumed greater responsibilities in cases of conflict in the areas surrounding Japan, a region that China instinctively associated with the Taiwan Strait. To further fuel the suspicion, Tokyo in 1998 agreed to jointly develop a regional missile umbrella with the US in response to North Korea's test of a long-range ballistic missile. China viewed Japan's increasing participation in UN peacekeeping activities rather critically and only grudgingly accepted the Japanese Self Defence Force's (SDF) participation in operation 'Enduring Freedom' after 11 September 2001.

Japan had become China's most important trading partner in the early 1960s and occupied an almost monopolistic position in the PRC's foreign trade until Deng Xiaoping opened the Chinese market to the world. In the 1990s, bilateral trade picked up once again, due to increases in Japanese investment and a high degree of competitiveness of suppliers on both sides

that has been explained, among other things, with the latters' political con-nections.[40] It was only in 2000 that it was overtaken by the US as the PRC's most important export destination.

In the early 1990s, Japan had started to voice its concerns about China's military modernisation and to use this development as a justification for building up power projection capacities of its own. Between 1995 and 1997, Tokyo cut its development aid in response to the PRC's continuing nuclear tests. A bilateral security dialogue, launched in 1993, has so far not resulted in greater mutual transparency.

In February 1992, China had passed a maritime law defining, among other islands, Taiwan and the Diaoyutai as parts of its territory and thus as points of departure for the definition of coastal waters and contingent zones. This initiative almost foiled the first visit of a Japanese emperor to the PRC. The (uninhabited) Diaoyutai (jap. Senkaku) archipelago in the East China Sea had been annexed by Japan together with Taiwan in 1895 and had been returned to Tokyo by the US together with Okinawa and the Ryukyu chain in 1972. Since then, both China and Taiwan have repeatedly dispatched civilian boats to the area to be regularly driven away by the Japanese coast-guard. In 1993, Peking and Tokyo agreed on the joint exploitation of natural resources in certain sectors of the adjacent waters, with Japan acknow-ledging PRC sovereignty over some maritime areas, albeit not over the islands proper.

In 1998, China's president Jiang Zemin returned the emperor's visit, warning Tokyo not to support Taiwan and (unsuccessfully) insisting on a written apology for warcrimes of the past. At the same time, PRC research vessels repeatedly intruded into Japan's coastal waters. In 2001, the Japa-nese finance minister called for cuts in assistance to "rising military powers" such as China[41] (subsequent cuts were explained with Japan's own eco-nomic problems rather than Peking's armament). Shortly afterwards, the Chinese ambassador to Tokyo commented that bilateral relations had reached their lowest point in thirty years.[42]

Trading State Peace?
Among the dyads presented here, Japan and China come closest to what has been termed as a trading state peace. Their economies have been highly complementary and mutually beneficial, with Japan, both through foreign direct investment (FDI) and official development assistance (ODA) contrib-uting to China's industrial modernisation and thus to bilateral trade.[43] It is expected that Peking's WTO membership will give economic relations an additional boost. In 1999, Japan was China's third most important source of FDI after Hong Kong and the US. Up to this day, Peking remains the largest recipient of Japanese ODA. In 2000, Japan depended on the Chinese market (excluding Hong Kong) for 5.6 per cent of its exports and 13 per cent of its imports. Conversely, the PRC's dependency rate was 14 per cent on exports and 20 per cent on imports. It will take decades rather than years of high

economic growth until China's comparative advantage lies in the sphere of capital-intensive or skill-intensive products.[44] turning the PRC into an economic challenge. Nevertheless, the recent increase in manufacturing imports from China has already stimulated protectionist sentiments in Japan, leading to a brief trade war in early 2001.[45] These frictions are signs of Japanese domestic problems (see below) rather than arguments against the trading state peace proposition. According to Western observers, however, "...as long as the mutual relations remain ambiguous and unresolved conflict elements linger on, the full potential of the economic relationship will not be realized."[46]

Democratic Peace?

The Japanese society stands out as basically pacifist, risk-averse, and non-patriotic.[47] Japan is a constitutional monarchy and has received high marks (1.1) in recent Freedom House rankings. Since 1955, the country has nevertheless almost constantly[48] been governed by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) which consists of personal networks and bases its power on vested interests in the bureaucracy, agriculture, and construction industry. Since the late 1980s, when Japan's bubble economy finally burst, these lobbies have successfully opposed structural reforms. At the same time, the freedom of individual citizens vis-à-vis the state [49] has not resulted in major domestic tension.

During the 1980s, a still self-confident Japan offered China cooperation as a kind of junior partner in East Asian regionalism.[50] Following the June 1989 massacre on Tiananmen Square, Tokyo was the first G-7 member to renounce sanctions and to try mediating between China and the West. Japan subsequently played an important role in Peking's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other regimes on proliferation and disarmament.[51] In the framework of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), both sides opposed US demands for a fast and comprehensive trade liberalisation. The emperor's 1992 visit was meant to focus the bilateral relationship on a common future while terminating the debate on Japan's wartime record.

Unfortunately, PRC nationalism, prompted by double-digit growth, was also on the rise, and Peking appeared increasingly frustrated in its attempt to lure Tokyo out of the US embrace.[52] When, in 1994, several LDP-politicians publicly uttered revisionist views about the war and the occupation of China, the response was straightforward. In October 1995, Jiang Zemin, speaking in South Korea, said that the quality of the future bilateral relationship would depend on Tokyo "adopting a correct view of its former militarism" and on the extent to which a "militarist minority in Japan" would gain in influence. [53] Two months earlier, and almost exactly 50 years after Hiroshima, the PRC, a moratorium by other nuclear powers notwithstanding, tested another atom bomb, thus provoking (rather symbolic) cuts in Tokyo's development assistance. Also in 1995, Peking launched the first in a series

of large-scale military manoeuvres to impress the Taiwanese electorate (for both historical and strategic reasons, Taiwan has occupied a special place in Tokyo's informal foreign relations.) Since then, Japan's economic stagnation has dampened hopes for a more prominent role in regional and international affairs, and Chinese nationalism and Japanese conservatism have been mutually reinforcing. At the same time, Tokyo opted for upgrading its military relationship with the US which, nevertheless, had come to view the PRC as the more promising candidate for regional leadership.

Jiang Zemin's 1998 visit was a "public relations disaster" and inspired an increasing disaffection of the Japanese public with its giant neighbour.[54] Both governments subsequently tried to limit the damage, with Japan actively supporting Peking's WTO-bid. However, when Tokyo in 1997 suggested to create an Asian Monetary Fund (AWF) to be financed from mostly Japanese sources, the PRC joined the US in opposing the initiative. Since then, Japan and China have been competing for a leading role in projects of East Asian regionalism.

After assuming office, the Bush Jr. administration, in the broader context of undoing ist predecessor's policies, promoted Tokyo to cornerstone of its Asia-Pacific strategy[55] while continuing to urge revisions to Japan's 1947 peace constitution.[56] The government of Junichiro Koizumi, while initially irritated, subsequently made use of the offer to relaunch a discussion on collective defence[57] and to assume a higher military profile following September 11, 2001. At that point, China had no choice but to accept the SDF's participation in 'Operation Enduring Freedom,' but Jiang Zemin did not miss the occasion to remind Koizumi of the suspicions harboured by the Asian countries.[58]

Whereas a majority of the Japanese public remains opposed to revising article 9 of the constitution which prohibits the country from possessing war potential,[59] Koizumi's approval ratings further increased following his November 2001 decision to dispatch warships to the Arabian Sea and to thus go beyond the 1997 formula 'areas surrounding Japan.'[60]

Earlier, Sino-Japanese relations had suffered a further setback when the Japanese ministry of education had approved the use of revisionist textbooks at junior highschools, Koizumi had visited the Yasukuni shrine where, among others, Japanese war criminals are being honoured, and Tokyo had issued a visa to Taiwan's former president Lee Teng-hui. When China and Japan, in the absence of their leaders, celebrated thirty years of diplomatic relations in September 2002, their relationship remained in suspense. For the time being, trading state peace has prevailed over (mainstream) democratic peace, and joint decision-making or procedure remains limited to a few technical issues, sometimes debated at the regional level. Given the slow pace of Japan's economic and political reforms, nationalism will only grow in the framework of a US-Japan alliance that China, also for the time being, has come to view as a given. As far as the PRC itself is concerned, Peking leaders have learnt from history that the mobilisation of anti-foreign, in this

case anti-Japanese resentment can easily turn against themselves for as long as words are not being followed up with deeds. For this state of affairs to change, China would have to witness a major socio-economic meltdown.

Domestic Structure and Coalition Building
At the micro-level, the a.m. findings are confirmed by the dominance of the ministry of finance over both the ministry of foreign affairs and the defence agency, reflecting "the predominance of economic over defence issues in Japanese foreign policy. While the Japanese parliament...plays only a minor role in foreign affairs, the...LDP...is among the most important actors in Japanese foreign policy."[61] Thomas Risse-Kappen mentions a corporatist model, in which the importance of consensus building among relevant players accounts for the impression of slow moving and low key...A firm national consensus including all relevant elite factions, the opposition, and society insures that Japanese security policy has been first and foremost a matter of foreign economic policy.[62]

At the same time, Risse-Kappen points to a cleavage between the public at large and the LDP's conservative leaders on issues of foreign and security policies, with the public exerting constraints on policy implementation during much of the 1980s. This gap somewhat narrowed during the following decade, with the result that Koizumi has been trying to capture rightwing support, mostly through symbolical acts such as repeated visits to the Yasukuni shrine. At the same time, Japanese conservatives remain the most pro-American element in Japanese society.[63] Whereas present trends therefore suggest ongoing irritations with Tokyo's neighbours, including China, they do not signal the kind of unilateralism that could spark military conflict.

Inside-Out and Outside-In

Our analysis of the relevance of (Neo-) Liberal theories for international relations in Northeast Asia would imply that neither the trading state peace proposition nor the mainstream democratic peace proposition, while applying in principle, and while suggesting a possibility of future conflict, can sufficiently account for the present absence of conflict either in the Taiwan Strait or on the Korean Peninsula. If, in contrast, Japan-China relations basically reflect a economic imperative, then not least because of the absence of far-reaching territorial claims and the perseverance of an economic win-win-situation. Even in the latter case, however, the absence of either deep or broad joint structures or procedures remains a reason for concern.

At the same time, examination of domestic structure and coalition building, including the nature of different nationalisms, would suggest that 'weak-strong' dyads (such as between South Korea and North Korea) are more conducive to peace than 'strong-strong dyads' (such as between Taiwan and China, with Japan-China coming in somewhere in between), but here again a final verdict remains to be passed.

Structure and coalition building are themselves outcomes of history, both domestic and external. The picture therefore becomes clearer when external factors are introduced into the equation in an attempt to reconcile Liberalism and Realism. Arguably, Taiwan's relative institutional cohesion, relatively open economy, and democratisation can also be attributed to the persistence of the mainland threat, and arguably, the quality of cross-Strait relations has been significantly influenced by the quality of the regional and international environments. Peking first sought a dialogue with Taiwan following Richard Nixon's visit to Shanghai in 1972 and made concrete proposals for unification once the US had derecognised Taiwan in late 1978. Taipei opened up its political system and losened restrictions on mainland visits after Michail Gorbachev had committed himself to bury the Sino-Soviet conflict in the late 1980s. Both sides engaged in informal contacts once the West and Japan had started revoking post-Tiananmen sanctions in 1992. Peking abandoned the talks after President Lee had visited the US in 1995, and Lee himself became more assertive after the Clinton administration in 1996 had dispatched two carrier groups to prevent PRC manoeuvres from escalating into aggression. Whereas external inputs have occasionally motivated both Taiwan and China to test the resolve of the American intermediator, good or relatively good Peking-Washington relations have normally made the PRC more assertive and the ROC more cautious.

On the Korean peninsula, the outside-inside linkage has been even more obvious with Seoul compensating for its weak output vis-à-vis the DPRK by drawing third parties into the equation. Among the latter, the American ally has obviously been the most important, but Washington's global security considerations have frequently clashed with the ROK's narrower security interests, and democratisation in South Korea, while benefiting from the end of the global Cold War, has complicated this relationship even further.

At the time of the Sino-Soviet conflict, North Korea had been rather more successful in playing a similar game, because both Peking and Moscow were eager to win the DPRK over to their respective sides. However, this 'fence-sitting' had its limitations, too. It was thus that in 1974, when the US and the USSR as well as the US and the PRC were engaged in détente, Pyongyang appeared willing to enter into dialogue with Seoul. The initiative eventually failed because Seoul was called back by Washington. In 1990, the US encouraged North-South reconciliation while both Moscow and Peking were cutting assistance to the DPRK and seeking relations with Seoul. If these influences, from 1992 onwards, produced the opposite result, then because of the strong nature of the North Korean state. Since then, Pyongyang has accepted dialogue with Seoul at least partly because Washington had accepted dialogue with Pyongyang, because these two and others could be played against each other, and because of the PRC's resumption of aid, viewed by the DPRK leadership as a last resort in future conflictual senarios.[64] If, in the Taiwan Strait, the Bush Jr. administration has been partly successful in disentangling itself from triangular games and domestic

dynamics by spelling out a de facto-security guarantee for Taipei,[65] respective efforts have failed on the Korean Peninsula with the result that the US, at least for the time being, has revoked earlier threats to attack the DPRK.[66] In Korea, we thus continue to deal with an ad hoc and issue-specific concert relationship aimed at defusing high-level tensions.[67]

Oscillations in Japan's foreign and security posture have frequently been a reflex of its alliance with the US, with regionalist ambitions increasing when Tokyo felt confident enough to confront Washington over bilateral trade issues as during the early 1990s. At the same time, with neighbours such as China, both Koreas, and Russia trying to benefit from this kind of alienation and adopting an arrogant stance of their own, Japan has regularly mended its American links with the alliance remaining the defining framework for Tokyo's foreign relations, if not domestic politics. Koizumi's present attempt at incremental change still relies on the US umbrella to accommodate both the rightwing minority and the pacifist majority.

Whereas Realists would explain the present peace in the Taiwan Strait, on the Korean Peninsula, and in the East China Sea with rather stable power balances at both the subregional and international levels, they would probably not view this as a lasting state of affairs, giving the dynamics prevalent in both regional and international relations since the end of history. Supposed that these dynamics, as has been shown, are increasingly being fuelled by domestic developments, the complementary character of Realism and Liberalism becomes obvious. Should China try to avoid institutional failure by turning aggressively nationalist, this would increase the risk of conflict in the Taiwan Strait and with Japan while provoking a military response by a US trying to preserve the regional, and thus the international balance of powers. Should China continue to play on time while reforming, and thus initially weaken its institutions, incentives for cross-Strait détente and improved relations with Japan would increase on all sides, with joint structures and procedures eventually resulting. Should North Korea try to avoid institutional failure by striking more deals with either the US or South Korea at the expense of either of the two, the regional, and thus the international balance of powers would be ultimately changed in the absence of meaningful (in this case transregional) joint structures and procedures. Should North Korea try to avoid institutional failure by turning even more aggressively nationalist, the US would be tempted to bring the DPRK to its knees but would be restrained by a regional coalition trying to contain the secondary effects of an unavoidable change in the regional, and thus the international balance of powers. At the same time, the regional coalition would be pressured to bring about a change of regime in Pyongyang through non-military means. It is such a scenario that dramatically improves the perspectives for creating joint structures and procedures. In the meantime, today's Northeast Asian peace remains less than Liberal, and thus precarious.

Notes

1. Dale C. Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War. A Theory of Trade Expectations," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 5-41.

2. Robert L. Rothstein, *The Weak in the World of the Strong: The Developing Countries in the International System* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1992).

3. Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (New York, Basic Books, 1986), pp. 13/4.

4. Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War."

5. Robert O. Keohane/Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Transgovernmental Relations and International Organisation," *World Politics*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1975), pp. 39-62 (40).

6. E.g. Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York, Random House, 1979), p. 106.

7. Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 80, No. 1 (1986), pp. 151-68 (160).

8. Roger Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1994), pp. 87-125 (103).

9. Edward D. Mansfield/Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 3 (May/June 1995), pp. 79-97.

10. Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies," *World Politics*, Vol. 43, (July 1991), pp. 479-512.

11. Harald Müller/Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Internationale Umwelt, gesellschaftliches Umfeld und außenpolitischer Prozeß in liberaldemokratischen Industrienationen," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Vol. 31, special issue no. 21 (1990), pp. 376-400 (382; my translation).

12. Peter Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times* (Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press, 1986).

13. The delimitations of the respective claims have varied over time with Taiwan, for example, until recently viewing Outer Mongolia as part of China.

14. In 2000, Taiwan's overall trade surplus totalled US$ 19.9 billion (1990: US$ 12.50 billion), whereas the bilateral surplus with China stood at US$ 8.36 billion (1990: 7.04 billion). Republic of China, Ministry of Economic Affairs, annual statistics (http://www.trade.gov.tw/prc&hk/bi_ch/mo_index.htm).

15. Paul J. Bolt, "Economic Ties across the Taiwan Strait: Buying Time for Compromise," *Issues and Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 2 (March/April 2001), pp. 80-105 (92/3). Taiwanese investment in the mainland had been legalised in 1992. The island has banned mainland investment in Taiwan.

16. Bolt, "Economic Ties across the Taiwan Strait."

17. According to a Taiwanese businessman and member of the opposition Kuomintang-Party, 57 per cent of Taiwanese investment that could have gone to Southeast Asia in the first half of 2002 went to the PRC instead. Lawrence Chung, "Investors Flock from Taiwan to China," *The Straits Times*, 22 August 2002, as quoted in *Taiwan Security Research* (http://www.taiwansecurity.org/News/2002/ST-082202.htm).

18. In this context, the issue of direct airlinks has emerged as the major obstacle. Whereas Taiwan has been pushing for official negotiations on "non-governmental" air services along the lines of its Hong Kong flights, Peking has insisted on qualifying flights as "domestic" and letting respective agreements be negotiated by non-governmental entities.

19. *Freedomhouse* (Washington D.C., 2001; http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings).

20. François Godement, "Mutual Reassurance: A Strategic Prerequisite to Solving the China-Taiwan Issue," *China Perspectives*, No. 37 (September-October 2001), pp. 4-12.

21. Brett Benson/Emerson Niou, *Public Opinion and the Taiwan Strait Conflict*, (Durham, NC, Duke University, 12 February 2002, http://www.duke.edu/~niou/MyPapers/public%20opinion.pdf).

22. This position is currently being reconsidered in Peking.

23. Speaking at the Communist Party of China's 16th congress in November 2002, Secretary-General Jiang Zemin said that the threat of force was not directed ,at our Taiwan compatriots, but aimed at the foreign forces' attempts to interfere in China's reunification and the Taiwan separatist forces' schemes for "Taiwan independence". *Xinhua News Agency*, 8 November 2002, as quoted by *China Internet Information Centre* (http://www.china.org.cn).

24. This fate was suffered by two offers made by Vice Premier Qian Qichen, who in early 2001 had proposed a new political framework to be agreed upon by two equal partners and in early 2002 had invited DPP-members to visit the mainland.

25. Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies."

26. This phenomenon has been explained with the legacy of the (one-) party state. Thomas B. Gold, *Civil Society and Taiwan's Quest for Identity* (http://www.sil.org/~radneyr/humanities/politics/TaiwanQ.htm, 1994). Among the consequences have been a top-bottom approach to democratisation, an administration monopoly on interpreting Taiwan's identity, and an inability to form grand coalitions.

27. Xiaoke *Zhang*, "Domestic Institutions, Liberalisation Patterns, and Uneven Crises in Korea and Taiwan," *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2002), pp. 409-42 (434).

28. Ibid.

29. Carl K.Y. Shaw, "Modulations of Nationalism across the Taiwan Strait, " *Issues and Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (June 2002), pp. 122-47.

30. Seoul had refused to sign the agreement in protest against the continued partition of the peninsula. South Korea nevertheless declared its readiness to respect the conditions of the armistice.

31. This, among other things, explains North Koreas recent readiness to normalise relations with the US, Japan, and much of Western Europe.

32. The DPRK's major trading partners were Japan and China.

33. Altogether, 50 southern projects were approved between 1992 and 2001. *Companies Approved for South-North Korean Cooperation* (Seoul, Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency, 2002, http://www.kotra.or.kr/main/info/nk/eng/sntrade/cooperative.php3).

34. The most spectacular case so far remains the Hyundai group's Mount Kumgang tourism project. Apart from that, North Korea has been somewhat successful in attracting South Korean interest in infrastructure development (e.g. in energy and telecommunications) which has occasionally been viewed by the US as sensitive from a security angle. Earlier attempts to promote isolated re-export zones have thus far been disappointing.

35. *Freedomhouse*, 2001.

36. Interview of the senior North Korean defecto Hwang Chang-yop, *Le Monde*, March 14/15 1999, p. 2.

37. Zhang, "Crises in Korea and Taiwan," p. 432.

38. Ibid., p. 433.

39. Chul Yang Sung, "United Germany for Divided Korea," *Korean and World Affairs*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Fall 1992), pp. 436-62.

40. Hanns Günter Hilpert, "China and Japan: Conflict or Cooperation? What Does Trade Data Say? Idem/René Haak, *Japan and China. Cooperation, Competition, and Conflict* (Basingstoke and New York, palgrave, 2002), pp. 32-51 (44).

41. *Agence-France-Presse*, 17 July 2001, as quoted in *Asia-Pacific Media Brief*, 17 July 2001.

42. *Associated Press*, 31 August 2001, as quoted in *Napsnet Daily Report*, 31 August 2001.

43. Hilpert, "China and Japan," p. 45.

44. Ibid., p. 47.

45. Ibid., pp. 46/7.

46 Hanns Günther Hilpert/René Haak, Introduction, in: idem, *Japan and China*, pp. 1-11 (8).

47. Masaru Tamamoto, "A Land without Patriots. The Yasukuni Controversy and Japanese Nationalism," *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Fall 2001), pp. 33-40 (33-5).

48. The exception being 1993/94, when a coalition of small parties took over. In 1994, the LDP joined a coalition led by the Social Democrat Party. In 1996, it was back in power.

49. Tamamoto, "A Land without Patriots," pp. 37/8.

50. Gilbert Rozman, "Japan's Quest for Great Power Identity," *Orbis*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 2002), pp. 73-91 (78).

51. Robert A. Manning, Burdens of the Past, Dilemmas of the Future: Sino-Japanese Relations in the Emerging International System, *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1993), pp. 45-58 (53).

52. Gaye Christoffersen, "China and the Asia-Pacific: Need for a Grand Strategy," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 36, No. 11 (November 1996), pp. 1067-85).

53. *Yonhap*, 14 November 1995, as quoted in *Summary of World Broadcasts*, FE/2461/D/4-5, 15 November 1995.

54. *Rozman*, Japan's Quest for Great Power Identity, p. 84.

55. Secretary of State Colin Powell as quoted by the Office of International Information Programme, Washington, 10 September 2001.

56. *International Herald Tribune* (http://www.iht.com), 18 July 2001.

57. In 2000, committees had been created in both houses of parliament to debate a possible revision of the 1947 constitution.

58. *The China Daily*, 7 November 2001, p. 12.

59. *The Taipei Times* (http://www.taipeitimes.com), 7 January 2002.

60. "Japan's Response to Terrorism and Implications for the Taiwan Strait Issue," *Japan-Taiwan Research Forum* (http://taiwansecurity.org/TS/2002/JRF/Shinoda-0102.htm), 22 January 2002.

61. Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies," p. 488.

62. Ibid., p. 491/2.

63. *Tamamoto*, "A Land without Patriots," p. 39.

64. China's importance in this context can be deduced from the latter's apparent role in the 1994 Agreed Framework process and Pyongyang's 1999 declaration of a moratorium on missile tests.

65. In April 2001, Bush in an interview said he would ‚do what it takes' to defend Taiwan in case of a mainland aggression. *The Washington Post*, 26 April 2001 as quoted in Asia-Pacific Media Brief, 26 April 2001.

66. In November 2002, US Secretary of State Colin Powell said that the US had no intention of invading North Korea and was willing to help North Korea if it abandoned its nuclear weapons programme. *The China Daily*, 20 November 2002, p.12.

67. Amitav Acharya, "International Relations Theory and Cross-Strait Relations,“ *International Forum on Peace and Security in the Taiwan Strait* (Taipei, 26-28 July 1999, http://www.taiwansecurity.org/IS/Acha...ry-and-Cross-Strait-Relations.htm), p. 3.

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