

Chapter 6

Is There an Asian Style of Electoral Campaigning?

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When discussing the issue of standardizing electoral campaign practices, scholars usually refer to the adoption of the American style of political communication. This form of political communication requires the three participating actors (the candidate, the voter, and the journalist) to perform well-defined functions. Usually, political scientists first compare these functions with those existing in other countries. Based on the results, they then judge whether there is an observable standardization of campaign practices or not. A standardization of campaign practices, however, does not necessarily have to be equal to an Americanization of campaign practices. Moreover, there may be regional standards that differ from global standards. In this context, the author tries to discover whether there is a regional standard of electoral campaigning. The previous chapters are part of this attempt. This chapter is supplementary and should assist in the evaluation of the degree of standardization of campaign practices in East and Southeast Asia.

In general, several country specific factors influence the standardization process. These factors include the electoral system, the system of party competition, the legal boundaries of electoral campaign practices, the degree of professionalization of electoral campaigning, the media system, the national political culture, and the degree of modernization in society (Plasser and Plasser, 2002: 79). The most important of these factors are analyzed below before a conclusion is drawn.

Electoral system

Electoral systems have a tremendous impact on electoral campaign strategies. In the following, the current election systems applied in East and Southeast Asian countries are described to gain a better understanding of the similarities and variations between them (see Table 6.1 and Table 6.2).

During the last 15 years, Taiwan's electoral framework has been modified several times. The first important alteration to the composition of parliamentary members and the electoral formula came into effect in 1991.

Table 6.1 Electoral and political systems of selected Asian countries

Country	Parliament	Electoral System ^a	Presidential	Press Freedom ^b	Political Status ^c
Taiwan	Unicameral	113 seats: 79 SSDs (plurality) and 34 PR seats in one nationwide constituency (5% threshold). Two ballots. Term: 4 years	Plurality 4 years	Free (21)	Free (2,1)
South Korea	Unicameral	243 SSDs (plurality) and 56 PR seats in one nationwide constituency (3% threshold). Two ballots. Term: 4 years	Plurality 5 years	Free (29)	Free (1,2)
Mongolia	Unicameral	76 members elected in SSDs (plurality)	Majority 4 years	Partly Free (35)	Free (1,2)
Japan	Bicameral	Lower House (480 seats): 300 SSDs (plurality); 180 PR seats, elected from 11 large districts. Two ballots. Term: 3 years Upper House (252 seats): 126 members are elected every 3 years; 24 SSDs, 52 MMDs (SNTV), and 50 PR seats in a nationwide constituency. Two Ballots. Term: 6 years	n/a	Free (20)	Free (2,2)
Thailand	Bicameral	Lower House (500 seats): 400 SSDs (plurality) and 100 PR seats in one nationwide constituency (5% threshold). Two Ballots. Term: 4 years Upper House (200 seats): 22 SSDs (plurality) and the remaining in MMDs (SNTV). Term: 4 years	n/a	Partly Free (42)	Free (2,3)
Malaysia	Bicameral	Only the lower house is elected. All 219 members are elected in SSDs. Term: 5 years	n/a	Not Free (69)	Partly Free (4,4)
Philippines	Bicameral	Lower House: 212 SSDs (plurality), 24 PR in nationwide constituency. Two ballots. Term: 3 years Upper House (24 seats): half of the members are elected every 3 years in SSDs (plurality). Term: 6 years	Plurality 6 years	Partly Free (35)	Free (2,3)

Sources: Election commissions

a SSD: Single-Seat District; MMD: Multimember District; PR: Proportional Representation

b The degree to which each country permits the free flow of information determines the classification of its media as 'Free,' 'Partly Free,' or 'Not Free.' Countries scoring 0 to 30 are regarded as having 'Free' media, 31 to 60, 'Partly Free' media, and 61 to 100, 'Not Free' media (Freedom House (2005a), *Freedom of the Press 2005: A Global Survey of Media Independence*, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham).

c Using a catalogue of specific questions, Freedom House rates the existence of political rights and civil liberties (see numbers in brackets) in about two hundred countries and sixty related territories separately on a scale from one to seven, with one representing the existence and seven the non-existence of such rights and liberties. Finally, the observed countries and territories are assigned to one of three categories (free, partly free, not free) by averaging the ratings they received (Freedom House (2005b), *Freedom in the World 2005: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties*, Freedom House, Washington DC).

Table 6.2 Campaign regulations in selected Asian countries

Country	Paid TV Ads	Free TV Ads	Opinion Polls	Public Funding Campaigns	Spending Limits	Public Funding Political Parties
Taiwan	Unlimited	Number of candidates a party nominates	Silence last 10 days in presidential elections	Yes	Yes (circumvented)	Yes
South Korea	Limited	The state reimburses advertising fees to those candidates obtaining at least 20 percent of popular support at the polls.	Publication prohibited during campaign period; conducting of polls is prohibited for the period of 60 days before the election	Yes	Yes (circumvented)	Yes
Mongolia	Unlimited	Equal time	No regulations	Only for TV ads	No	Yes
Japan	Unlimited for political parties	Number of candidates a party nominates	Popularity polls are prohibited	Yes	Yes (circumvented)	Yes
Thailand	Prohibited	Current representation in the legislature	No regulations	Only for TV ads and rallies	Yes (circumvented)	Yes
Malaysia	Unlimited	Number of candidates a party nominates	No regulations	Only for TV ads	Yes (circumvented)	No
Philippines	Limited	Equal time	Silence last 15 days	Yes	Yes (circumvented)	No

Sources: Election commissions

The 1991 National Assembly, the upper house, consisted of 325 members; 219 members were elected in geographic constituencies, six members were elected to represent Taiwan's aboriginal tribes. These 225 members were elected under SNTV. Another 20 seats were elected to represent the overseas Taiwanese community and 80 in a nationwide constituency. These 100 seats were proportionally allocated to those parties gaining at least 5 percent of the votes cast for political parties, that is, the votes for independents were not included in the calculation of the quota. In the 1996 National Assembly election, the total number of members was increased to 334, with 228 members elected in geographic constituencies and six elected to represent aboriginal tribes. The number of proportional representation seats remained at 100. In the composition of the Legislative Yuan, the lower house, the electoral reforms of 1991 were similar: in total, there were 161 members elected in the 1992 Legislative Yuan election, 119 of whom were elected under SNTV in geographic constituencies and six in two aboriginal constituencies. Another 30 members were elected in a nationwide constituency and the remaining six to represent the overseas Taiwanese community. These 36 members were proportionally allocated to those parties gaining at least 5 percent of the popular votes cast for political parties. In the 1995 Legislative Yuan election, three members were added to be elected in geographic constituencies. The total number of members, thus, increased to 164. Constitutional reforms in 1997 changed the composition of the Legislative Yuan (LY) again. Article 4 of the Additional Articles stipulates that with the 1998 LY election, this chamber of parliament should consist of 225 members; 168 of these members should be elected in geographic constituencies and four to represent aboriginal tribes. The number of members representing the overseas Taiwanese community was increased by two and the proportional seats for the nationwide constituency to 41. Further constitutional amendments were made in April 2000. Article 1 of these amendments turned Taiwan's parliament into a semi-bicameral one. The term of all National Assembly members expired on May 19, 2000. Since that day, members to the assembly can only be elected by proportional representation within three months of the expiration of a six-month period following the public announcement of a proposal by the LY to amend the Constitution or alter the national territory, or within three months of a petition initiated by the LY for the impeachment of the President or the Vice-President. Elected members have to convene of their own accord within ten days after the confirmation of the election result and have to remain in session not longer than one month, with the term of office expiring on the last day of the convention. The first and only election under this new system was held in May 2005. All of the 400 members of the National Assembly were elected by proportional representation in one nationwide constituency.

Constitutional reforms in June 2005 paved the way for a new electoral system and the abolition of the upper house. Under the new system, each voter casts two ballots. Now, there are 79 single-seat constituencies and 34 PR seats. The motives behind the electoral reform were quite similar to those found in the early 1990s in Japan. The new system is expected to curb corruption, to minimize the power of factions, to strengthen the role of political parties in the electoral process, and to

create a more stable party system with the effective number of political parties being close to two (see Chapter 2).

In the past, members of the Legislative Yuan, the lower house, were elected in multi-member constituencies under SNTV and 22 percent of the seats in a nationwide constituency under proportional representation. Voters only had one ballot. SNTV (single non-transferable vote) is said to have cultivated the personal vote, led to the formation and consolidation of factions, and caused corruption in Japan and Taiwan.

Another problem of SNTV in multi-member constituencies is the need for coordination in electoral campaigns, since party candidates probably have to contest against their party colleagues. If one candidate, for instance, is too popular and attracts too many votes the party colleague may lose the election. Political parties and candidates have, therefore, to coordinate campaign activities and assign each of the party candidates to a certain part of the constituency. There were different approaches in Taiwan and Japan to solve that problem.

In Japan, the LDP, for example, encouraged candidates to join one or two committees of the party's Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC). Each committee focuses on a special field, such as construction and rice farming. This process of differentiation helped candidates contesting in the same district to attract different segments of the electorate and by doing so maximize the number of votes and seats of the LDP (Krauss and Pekkanen, 2004: 17). After the introduction of single-seat constituencies, this specialization disappeared for two reasons. First, the candidates no longer needed to differentiate themselves since there was only one candidate of the party anyway. Second, single-seat constituencies are much bigger in size. Candidates now have to attract voters with very different backgrounds. Specialization would be counterproductive.

In Taiwan, the conservative Kuomintang (KMT) was less professional and mainly assigned its candidates to *zerenqu*, responsibility zones. Each candidate had to take care of his district within the constituency. With the 2002 Taipei municipal council election, the KMT changed its strategy to the one originally applied by the Democratic Progressive Party and the New Party. This electoral concept is known in Taiwan as *peipiao*, forced vote allocation. In newspaper ads and campaign literature, parties ask their supporters to vote for a certain candidate of their party regardless of whom they favor. For instance, if a party nominated four candidates in a multi-member constituency, it could instruct those supporters born in January, February and March to vote for candidate 1 and those born in April, May and June to vote for candidate 2, and so forth. In most cases this forced vote distribution worked out (see Pao, 1998).

In Korea, the electoral system had to be changed after the Constitutional Court ruled in June 2001 that it was unfair and restrictive of voters' rights. Under the old system, voters could only cast one vote. (227 members were elected in single-seat constituencies by plurality vote and 46 members by proportional representation based on each party's share of those votes cast for candidates contesting the single-seat constituencies.) The court, thus, was of the opinion that voters could not distinguish

between candidate and party preferences. The system now allows the casting of two ballots. The number of PR seats was increased from 46 to 56 seats and the threshold decreased from 5 percent to 3 percent. The first election under the system was held in 2004. The new two-ballot system was expected to benefit smaller parties. A poll conducted by the Korean Gallup reported that about 32.9 percent of all voters split their tickets (Cho, 2005: 529). Minor parties benefited from this effect, especially the Democratic Labor Party (DLP). Of those who voted for the DLP in the PR tier, almost 80 percent supported candidates of other parties in the single-seat constituencies. The party only captured two seats in single-seat constituencies, but obtained eight out of 56 PR seats. The new system was also expected to minimize the effect of regionalism in Korean elections. Regionalism in South Korea has been evident since historical times. It was suppressed during the Japanese colonial period, the US military government and the subsequent autocratic rule (Steinberg, 2000: 225). It re-emerged during the period of liberalization and democratization, and became a primary determinant of voting behavior in South Korean elections. When Kim Dae Jung was elected President in 1997, over 90 percent of the voters in the southwestern Honam region cast their votes for him. In southeastern Youngnam region, however, only some ten percent of the electorate supported him. More than 50 percent voted for Lee Hoi Chang, instead (Lee, 2001: 374). Korean political parties survive with the support of their regional strongholds. In the 2000 national election, regionalism in the Youngnam region intensified and the Grand National Party captured 64 out of 65 seats at stake. The Millennium Democratic Party could not win a single seat in the region. In the Honam region, however, 86 percent of the seats at stake were taken by the MDP and the remaining 14 percent by independents (Choi, 2002: 97; Kim and Kim, 2000: 53).

After the election reform, regionalism remained, however, a dominant factor in South Korean voting behavior, but some shifts suggest 'attenuating influence.' The conservative Grand National Party prevailed in the eastern peninsula and the Uri Party in the western. Uri, however, made inroads on 25 percent of the vote in traditional Grand National Party territory (Kim and Kim, 2004: 636).

Mongolia's new constitution came into force in February 1992. According to Article 21, the parliament consists of one chamber and has 76 members. Citizens aged 25 or older are eligible to run for office and citizens aged 18 or older may exercise their right to vote. The term of office is four years. In April 1992, a new election law was passed. The law stipulated that the 76 members of parliament be elected by plurality vote in 26 electoral districts with a district magnitude ranging from two to four. The applied Block Vote led to the unexpected landslide victory of the former communist Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) in the 1992 parliamentary election. The MPRP captured 92.1 percent of the 76 seats at stake with less than 60 percent of the votes cast. This was widely considered to be not only unfair but dangerous to the nation-state's political development (Brick, Gastil and Kimberling, 1992). In January 1996, the parliament finally amended the election law. All of the 76 parliament members are now elected by plurality vote in single-seat constituencies instead. The first election under the new system was held

in June 1996 and was a watershed in Mongolia's short history of democracy: the Democratic Alliance (DA) consisting of the Mongolian National Democratic Party (MNDP) and the Mongolian Social Democratic Party (MSDP) ended the 75-year parliamentary majority of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP). The alliance captured 65.8 percent of the 76 seats at stake in the Great State Hural, Mongolia's parliament. The MPRP lost 45 of the 70 seats the party had obtained in the previous election. Policy errors of the government and internal strife caused a deep split within the DA. New political parties were formed and in the 2000 national election, the democratic forces were split into twelve parties and three party coalitions that altogether nominated 560 candidates. The MPRP, on the other hand, nominated 76 candidates, that is one in each of the 76 single-seat constituencies, and ran a highly focused campaign targeting younger voters. Unsurprisingly, the MPRP won a landslide, capturing 72 out of the 76 seats at stake. The victory of the MPRP clearly showed that without unity the democratic forces cannot win elections. In 2004, the opposition was more united than four years earlier. Seven political parties took part in the election and together nominated 153 candidates. The Party of Civil Courage, the Democratic Party, and the Motherland-Mongolian Democratic New Socialist Party formed a coalition—the Motherland-Democracy (MLD). The remaining 15 candidates were independents. Apart from the MLD, only the ruling MPRP nominated one candidate in each of the 76 single-seat constituencies. Compared with the previous election, the average number of candidates contesting in each electoral district decreased from nine to three, which significantly increased the chances of the candidates nominated by the opposition camp. The MPRP indeed lost half of the parliamentary seats it had captured in 2000, whereas the opposition gained substantial support (Schafferer, 2005).

In Malaysia, all members of the lower house are elected in single-seat constituencies by plurality vote (for details see Chapter 4).¹ In the 2004 Philippine national election, 212 members were elected in single-seat constituencies by plurality vote and 24 members by proportional representation. The number of seats varies between 208 and 260 depending on the outcome of the election: marginalized smaller parties and sectoral groups securing 2 percent of the vote get one seat, those obtaining at least 4 percent two seats, and those getting 6 percent or more three seats. Not all of these groups may secure enough votes to capture the maximum number of three seats. The total number of seats, thus, varies from election to election (for details see Chapter 5).

In Thailand, the 1997 Constitution replaced the Block Vote (BV) electoral system applied in lower house elections. The BV system allowed voters to cast as many votes as there were seats in a district. They could not cast all their votes for a single

¹ The upper house, Dewan Negara, consists of 70 seats: 44 appointed by the paramount ruler, 26 appointed by the state legislatures. Wong (2005: 312) points out that the Dewan Negara 'is used by the ruling coalition to place fading or second-ranking politicians, as well as a back-door to appoint ministers from amongst unelected technocrats or defeated candidates.'

candidate, but could split their votes between candidates nominated by different parties. This system caused a proliferation of political parties, which in turn led to unstable coalitions. Moreover, the intra-party competition in the multi-member constituencies led to factionalism and incohesive parties. Candidate-oriented campaigning and personal networks practicing vote-buying mushroomed. The new electoral system was expected to improve the electoral culture and create stable majorities in parliament. Now, 400 seats are elected in single-seat constituencies and 100 PR seats in a nationwide constituency with a 5 percent threshold. Statistics suggest that the aim of reducing the number of parties has been achieved by the reforms. The effective number of parties in the legislature fell dramatically from an average of 6.2 before the reforms to 3.1 in 2001. Moreover, it was the first time since 1957 that a single party succeeded in capturing a majority in the legislature. Thai Rak Thai, the party of media tycoon Thaksin, has held a majority of seats in the legislature since shortly after the 2001 election. After the reform, political parties have put significant effort into developing coordinated party-centered electoral strategies. They also began to 'differentiate themselves in terms of their policy platforms and in some cases made those differences an important campaign issue' (Hicken, 2005: 107).

Members of the Thai upper house, the Senate, had been appointed before the 1997 reforms. Now, 22 of the 200 members are elected in single-seat constituencies by plurality vote and the remaining in multi-member districts under SNTV. The aim of the reformers was to guarantee a Senate that would remain 'above the messy partisan fray' (Hicken, 2005: 107). Candidates running in Senate elections are therefore constitutionally barred from belonging to political parties and from engaging in electoral campaigning.

Opinion polls

Poll reporting has increased dramatically and has become a major element of election campaign coverage in advanced democracies. The misuse of opinion polls has often been criticized and in most countries the law regulates its application in electoral campaigning.

In Taiwan, individuals, political parties and organizations are prohibited from releasing opinion polls ten days before election day. Mass media may neither cite newly released nor previously released outcomes of opinion polls during this period. This regulation, however, only applies to presidential elections. In other elections, opinion polls are abundantly used to influence voting behavior. Most opinion polls are either fake or unprofessionally conducted. The media is biased and often misinterprets poll results or uses unreliable data. The majority of newspaper articles and TV news analyses reveal a fundamental misunderstanding of what 'margin of error' means. Taiwanese journalists are not alone here. Research by Larson (2003) showed, for instance, that almost half of all the reports on major US news networks during the 2000 US presidential race were inaccurate and exaggerated poll reports.

Inaccurate poll reporting has become a serious problem in Taiwan and has already led to several disputes after media-declared winners lost elections. The 2004 presidential race is one excellent example here. Incumbent President Chen Shui-bian won the election with a margin of 0.3 percent of the vote. The media, nevertheless, proclaimed rival candidate Lien Chan as the winner, since he had 'led' in opinion polls. His lead was, however, well within the margin of error. In this case, the media's irresponsible behavior caused violent protests in the aftermath of the election.

In Taiwanese elections, candidates frequently use opinion polls conducted by major cable news networks, such as TVBS, to manipulate voting behavior. When opinion polls show that the candidate is right behind the highest vote getters in his or her constituency (multi-member under SNTV), he or she is likely to place a newspaper ad quoting the poll and urging the electorate not to let him down. Such advertisements are usually called 'Save Ads.' Opinion polls may also suggest that the rival candidate lags behind. In such a situation, the candidate is likely to urge the electorate to give up supporting the rival candidate since he or she obviously has no chance whatsoever of winning the election.

In Japan, the LDP has so far not succeeded in amending the election law banning the publication of opinion poll data before elections. Every time the LDP picked up the issue of forbidding opinion polls, serious protests from civic groups, such as the powerful Japan Newspaper and Editor Association (NSK), followed. It is, however, illegal to publish 'the procedures and outcomes of any popularity polls' (Public Election Law). A popularity poll, as stipulated by the law, refers to any voting in writing. In addition, the act of making people click on the names of their favorite candidates on the Internet is interpreted as legally prohibited voting.

In Korean elections, opinion polls are banned during the election campaign period. Article 108(1) of the Korean election law stipulates that during the entire election campaign period (21 days in presidential elections and 15 in parliamentary elections) the details or results of public opinion polls may neither be published nor quoted. This includes mock voting and any type of popularity poll. Moreover, for the period of 60 days before elections, no opinion poll may be conducted. Whenever an opinion poll is conducted for the purposes of disclosure or publication, the inquiring institution/person must inform the respondents of their address or phone number. In addition, those conducting the poll may not adopt practices in which:

- questions are made of biased words or phrases to a particular political party or candidate
- those to be polled are urged to give answers, or where questions are made to lead them to give answers according to the intention of the inquiring person or where the views of those polled are distorted
- inquiries are made in ways that entertainment or great good luck is anticipated
- the names of those polled or the contents implicating it are disclosed.

